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THE EXPOSITOR (ATTHASĀLINĪ)

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COMMENTARY ON THE DHAMMASANGANI
THE FIRST BOOK OF THE ABHI-
DHAMMA PIṬAKA

VOL. II.

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* Wrongly printed Part IV.

THE EXPOSITOR

(*ATTHASĀLINĪ*)

II

PART VIII—DISCOURSE ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL¹

CHAPTER I THE FIRST PATH

HAVING thus shown the moral consciousness productive of prosperity in the three forms of rebirth, now to show the transcendental moral consciousness for the transcending of all rebirth,² again a beginning is made with 'which are the states that are moral?'

Herein in what sense is it 'transcendental'? [214] Because it crosses the world, it crosses over the world, passing beyond the world it stands overpowering it.

'He cultivates⁴ the Jhāna' means he evolves, produces, develops the ecstatic Jhāna of one momentary flash of consciousness.

Because it goes forth from the world, from the round of rebirths, this Jhāna is called 'going out.' Or, a person goes forth by means of it; hence it is called 'going out.' The

¹ Lit., supramundane (*lōkuttara*). B.P.E. 82: 'engaged upon the higher ideal.'

² *Bhava*—; forms of rebirth—lit., [re-]becoming.

³ *Dhs.* § 277.

⁴ *Bhāveti*. Cf. above, p. 217.

person who is endowed with that, comprehending (the Fact of) Ill goes forth, abandoning the cause (of Ill) goes forth, realizing the (Fact of) cessation goes forth, evolving the Path goes forth.

Again, this is not like that which is known as 'leading to accumulation,'¹ which heaps up and increases decease and rebirth in the round of rebirths by the moral consciousness of the three planes of existence. But this is even as, when one man having heaped up a stockade eighteen cubits high, another man taking a large hammer were to go on knocking down and demolishing what had been heaped up. So it sets about pulling down and demolishing decease and rebirth heaped up by the three-planed moral consciousness, by bringing about a deficiency in the causes thereof; hence it is 'leading to dispersion for the putting away of [wrong] views.'

In the phrase 'for the putting away of [wrong] views,' views are called 'view-gone-things,' just as we say 'muck-gone-thing,' 'dung-gone-thing,' for muck, dung, etc.² Or, from being included among the sixty-two false views, they go to be included among 'the views'—hence 'view-gone-things.' Or, the course of these states is the *course* of the *view*—hence the term. Similar in course and procedure to the view is the meaning. Which are they? (The theory of individuality),³ doubt, practice of mere rite and ritual, and the immoral states of lust, hate, and delusion leading to perdition, together with the associated states. It is they that are said to be similar in course to [false] views from the nature of their procedure till the evolution of the First Path. Thus the sixty-two false views and also these immoral states are 'view-gone-things.'

Of these view-gone-things, 'for the putting away' means in order to remove by extirpation.

'The first' is [in order] of counting, and also the first to be called up.

¹ Cf. above, p. 57f.

² The suffix 'gatāni' has no meaning.—*Tr.*

³ *Pyā* omits.

'Stage' (*bhūmi*):—in such phrases as 'of the uncovered *bhūmi*' the great earth is called *bhūmi*; in such phrases as 'in the pleasurable *bhūmi* in the realm of sense-desire' a state of consciousness is called *bhūmi*. But here the fruition of the religious life is intended; it is called *bhūmi* because it is the ground (or soil) for associated states, which are dependent on it. Or it is so called because, although it transcends the world, it itself arises, unlike *Nibbāna*, the unmanifested. 'For the attainment' of that First Stage should be understood to mean for the winning, the getting of the first Fruition of the religious life called the Fruition of Stream-winning. [215] 'Allof from' means separated by way of extirpation, being without.

Now although the transcendental *Jhāna* is not accomplished without progress, yet out of a desire not only to [state but to] emphasize here that it goes with progress, [the Buddha,] abandoning the simple formula referred to 'painful progress, sluggish intuition,' etc.¹ Where that person who, in discarding the lower nature from the outset, does so with pain, by external aid, or instigation, and with fatigue, progress is painful. And he who, having discarded the lower nature, in living the life of insight, attains to the manifestation of the Path only after a long time, intuition is sluggish. Thus, any unspecified occasion (when the lower nature is discarded) is known as of painful progress and sluggish intuition. Of which occasion do they approve? That occasion² when the lower nature which revives after having been discarded once, and twice, on the third occasion remains discarded, and is brought to complete severance by means of the Path—of that they approve. It has been given the name of painful progress and sluggish intuition. With so much the matter is clear. Therefore the explanation here should be understood from the beginning thus:

That person, who, in comprehending the four Great Primaries [or Essentials], comprehends derived matter, comprehends the immaterial, but in comprehending the material

¹ Cf. above, p. 242 f.

² According to the Teachers.

and the immaterial, is able to do so with pain, difficulty and fatigue—to him progress is painful. And to him who has comprehended the material and the immaterial in his life of insight, if there be sluggishness in the manifestation of the Path, intuition is sluggish. He who having comprehended (without difficulty) the material and the immaterial in determining [the complex of] mind-matter, does so with pain, difficulty and fatigue, and who, having so determined that [complex], in living the life of insight, is able to produce the Path only after a long time, is of painful progress and sluggish intuition.

Another man who, having determined the [complex of] mind-matter in comprehending the causal relations, does so being fatigued with pain and difficulty, and who, having comprehended the causal relations in living the life of insight, produces the Path only after a long time, [216] is also of painful progress and sluggish intuition.

Another man who, having comprehended the causal relations, in penetrating the characteristic signs (of impermanence, etc.) does so fatigued, with pain and difficulty, and who, living the life of insight, has penetrated the characteristic signs, produces the Path only after a long time, also shows painful progress and sluggish intuition. Another man who, having penetrated the characteristic signs—his insight being sharp, valiant, clear, transporting—in laying hold of the uprisen desire for insight, does so fatigued with pain and difficulty, and who, having laid hold of that desire, lives the life of insight, but produces the Path only after a long time, also shows painful progress and sluggish intuition. They,¹ approving of this section, have given it the name of painful progress and sluggish intuition. In this way should the following three stages of progress be understood.

In the list 'contact, etc.,' four terms:—'the controlling faculty of believing "I shall come to know the unknown," right speech, right action, right livelihood'—are extra.² The terms 'path-factor,'³ etc., also are extra, occurring in the

¹ The Teachers.

² Cf. *B.P.E.*, § 277, n. 2.

³ *Dhs.* § 283. *B.P.E.*: 'Path component.'

sections of the Exposition and in the expositions of 'initial application of mind,' etc. The rest are all as said above.¹ But the state of being transcendental by way of 'stages' (or planes) is here a distinctive feature.

Of them the faculty of believing 'I shall come to know the unknown'² is the controlling faculty which has arisen, by means of former reflection, in one who practises accordingly, 'I shall know the unknown deathless path, the doctrine of the Four Truths, in the continual stream of becoming, of unknown beginning.' Its characteristic, etc., should be known by the method given above in the controlling faculty of understanding.³

'Right speech' is beautiful or praiseworthy speech, a name for abstinence from wrong speech by the complete severance of misconduct in speech. It has comprehension⁴ as its characteristic, abstaining (from wrong speech) as its function, the putting away of wrong speech as its manifestation.

'Right action' is beautiful or praiseworthy action, a name for abstinence from life-taking, and so on, by the complete severance of wrong action. Its characteristic is the production of, or striving after, or the rousing of associated states for good action, its function is abstinence (from wrong action), its manifestation is the putting away of wrong action.

'Right livelihood' is beautiful or praiseworthy livelihood, a name for abstinence from wrong livelihood. It has purification⁵ as its characteristic, suitable maintenance of life [217] as its function, the putting away of wrong livelihood as its manifestation. Or, the characteristic, etc., here are to be understood by what has been said on the three abstinences.⁶

Thus, by virtue of these three states the Path mentioned above as fivefold should here be understood as the eightfold Path. The absence [of these Path-factors], and likewise the absence of pity and sympathy among the 'Or-whatever-

¹ Cf. above, p. 142 *f.*

² *Dhs.* § 296.

³ Cf. above, p. 161.

⁴ *I.e.*, of associated states, or of the listener.

⁵ *I.e.*, of the living being, of associated states, or of life.

⁶ See above, p. 174 *f.*

states,'¹ should be noted, for those three factors occur in the text here, and pity and sympathy have a being for object, whereas these transcendental states have Nibbāna for object; hence those two are not included here. So far for the distinctive meaning in the section of the Summary. In the section of the Exposition the terms 'Path-factor' and 'Path-included' mean respectively 'a portion of the Path,' and included in, connected with, the Path as a thing included in the forest is forest-included.

In 'rapture as a factor of perfect wisdom (or of full enlightenment)'² the expression means that rapture is the factor of perfect wisdom. Herein, 'factor of wisdom' (*bodhi*) may also be taken to mean factor of one who has wisdom (*bodhi*, or who is enlightened). The Ariyan disciple is enlightened by means of the harmony of the seven constituent states of mindfulness, investigation of the Law, energy, rapture, repose, concentration and equanimity. This arises at the moment [when we experience] supramundane things, and is opposed to the various perils of mental contraction and distraction, fixity and struggle, indulgence in sensual pleasures and devotion to self-torture, and addiction to the speculations of annihilation and eternalism, etc. It is this harmony of states, at the moment when the transcendental state arises, that is called *bodhi* (enlightenment, knowledge). And the verb *bujjhati* (to be awake, enlightened, to know) implies a rising from the slumber of the continuum of the lower nature, or a penetrating the Ariyan Truths, or a realizing Nibbāna. The factor of such *bodhi*, called the harmony of states, is 'the Wisdom-factor,' like Jhāna-factor, Path-factor, etc. The Ariyan disciple who is enlightened by means of such harmony of states as has been described is said to have *bodhi*. The potential parts of this *bodhi* are 'factors of wisdom (or enlightenment),' like the factors of an army, or of a chariot. Hence the Commentarial Teachers have said: 'Wisdom-factors are the [potential] parts of a person who is being enlightened.'

Further, in what sense are they Wisdom-factors? Because they conduce to enlightenment, because they are enlightened, [218] because they are fittingly enlightened, because they are penetratively enlightened, because they are rightly enlightened. Thus by this analytic method also may the meaning of 'Wisdom-factor' be known.

Again, 'factor of perfect wisdom' is a praiseworthy or beautiful factor of wisdom. And 'rapture as a factor of perfect wisdom' means that rapture itself is a factor of perfect wisdom. In the expositions of one-pointedness of mind, etc.,¹ where the term occurs the meaning is to be understood in the same way.

'Of those states'² means, of those states of the Four Truths which at that time become intuited. 'That are unknown' means, although these states (the Four Truths) are now known by means of the First Path, yet, as a man having come to a monastery where he has never been before, and being seated in the middle of it would say with reference to his not having gone there before, 'I have come to a place I have never been to,' and being decorated with flowers that he has never before been decorated with, and being dressed in a dress that he has never before worn, and having eaten a meal that he has never before enjoyed would say, with reference to his new experiences, 'I have eaten a meal not enjoyed before,' and so on; so here also, because these states had never before come into this given person's experience, therefore the word 'unknown' is said. And the same with [the equivalents] 'undiscerned,' etc.

Of these terms, 'undiscerned' means 'not discerned before this with the eye of wisdom'; 'unattained' means 'not attained in the sense of access'; 'not understood' means 'not made clear by knowledge or insight'; 'unrealized' means 'not brought right before the eyes.'

'For the realization' means 'for the purpose of bringing right before the eyes.' And as the full construction is made with this word, so ought it to be carried out with the others—

¹ *Ib.* §§ 287-95.

² *Ib.* § 296.

namely, for the purpose of knowing the unknown, of discerning the undiscerned, of attaining the unattained, of understanding what is not understood.

In 'from the fourfold misconduct of speech,'¹ speech should be known as vocal intimation. Conduct spoiled by any of the three faults (lust, hate, delusion) is misconduct. Misconduct produced from, or accomplished by speech is misconduct of speech. 'Avoidance' (*ārati*) means one delights in being away from this fourfold misconduct of speech. 'Abstinence' (*virati*) means one delights in being without them. 'Renouncement' (*pativirati*) means, being turned away from them, one delights in being without them. Or we may see in each prefix an added emphasis. The whole three are synonyms for refraining. 'Abstention' (*veramantī*) means it kills, destroys enmity. This also is a synonym for refraining.

[219] Moreover, one speaking falsehood, etc., by any volition is said to commit misconduct of speech. When the abstinence belonging to this supramundane Path has arisen, it does not allow the commission of such an act, it cuts off the course of action (*i.e.*, volition), hence the term 'to leave uncommitted.' Similarly it does not allow the doing of such an act, it cuts off the course of action, hence 'to leave undone.' And he who commits the fourfold misconduct of speech by any volition is said to transgress. When the abstinence belonging to this supramundane Path has arisen, it does not allow such transgression, hence 'non-transgression.' 'Non-trespassing the boundary' (*anatikkamo velā*) —in such passages as 'at that time,'² *velā* means 'time.' In 'he lives at Uruvelā,'³ *velā* means 'heap,' [namely, of sand (*uru*)]. In 'being steady by nature he does not pass beyond the boundary,'⁴ *velā* means 'boundary.' Here also it means 'boundary.' The fourfold good conduct of speech is intended to be the boundary, because it is not to be trespassed. So he who commits the fourfold misconduct of speech by any volition is said to trespass over the boundary. When the

¹ *Ib.* § 299.

² *Samyutta* i. 76, § 6 *passim*.

³ *Ib.* 103 f.

⁴ Not traced.

abstinence belonging to this supramundane Path has arisen, it does not allow (this volition) to trespass over the boundary—hence 'not to trespass over the boundary.' Or, *relū* means it destroys (*relāyati*). What does it destroy? The fourfold misconduct of speech, from destroying which it is called *relū*. And *anatikkamo* means it does not get beyond a person's prosperity and happiness. Thus is the meaning to be understood by these two words. Finally, 'to destroy the causeway,' that is 'he breaks down the causeway.' The meaning is that it destroys the base, the cause of the fourfold misconduct of speech; for that condition is here intended by causeway. This is the definition of the word:—the condition, such as lust, etc., of the fourfold misconduct of speech ties, makes a person to be bound in the round of rebirths—hence 'cause-way-breaking,' i.e., abstinence which breaks up misconduct in speech.¹ Moreover, this abstinence called right speech is obtained in a variety of conscious experience previous to the Path; for by one thought one abstains from speaking falsehood, by another from calumnious speech, etc. But it is obtained in one conscious experience at the moment of the supramundane Path; for there arises only one abstinence cutting off the base of the fourfold volition of misconduct of speech and fulfilling the Path-factor. 'From misconduct of body' means from evil practices such as life-taking, etc., produced on account of, or accomplished by the body. The remainder is to be understood by the previous method.

And this abstinence called right action² is obtained in a variety of conscious experience previous to the Path; for by one thought [220] one abstains from life-taking, by another from theft and wrong behaviour. But it is obtained in one conscious experience at the moment of the supramundane Path; for there arises only one abstinence cutting off the base of the threefold volition of misconduct of body and fulfilling the Path-factor.

With respect to the 'leaving undone' in the exposition of

¹ The word-play here cannot be reproduced in English. *Setu*—dyke, or causeway, or 'bund'—is made a derivative from *Śin*, to bind.—*Ed.*

² *Dhs.* § 300.

right livelihood¹ one maintaining a wrong livelihood by any volition is said to be continuing the practice (of wrong livelihood). But when the abstinence belonging to this supramundane Path has arisen it does not allow (this volition) to keep up the practice; hence 'leaving undone.' In this way the construction should be understood. And there is no such separate thing as 'livelihood.' It is understood, together with speech and action, from being part and parcel of them. But by way of a constant dependence on the four requisites,² it has been taken out from them and so taught. This being so, right livelihood has no [separate] function of its own, and does not complete the eight path-factors [by any new increment]. Wherefore it behoves this method to make a 'function' for 'right livelihood,' and to let the eight path-factors be completed. For livelihood, in failing, fails at the doors of body and speech; it cannot fail at the mind-door. In succeeding, it succeeds at these two doors; it cannot succeed at the mind-door. And transgression at the body-door is, or is not conditioned by livelihood. Likewise at the vocal door. In this respect, kings and ministers, addicted to amusement and displaying their bravery, indulge in deer-hunting, or highway robbery, or adultery. This is an immoral act of body; abstinence therefrom is right action. Whatever fourfold misconduct of speech people commit that is not conditioned by livelihood is an immoral act of speech; abstinence therefrom is right speech. And for the sake of livelihood, whatever creatures hunters, fishermen, etc., may kill, whatever theft people may commit, however they may wrongly behave themselves (in sensual pleasures)—this is known as wrong livelihood; abstinence therefrom is known as right livelihood. After taking a bribe, whatever lies they may speak, whatever calumnious speech they may utter, harsh speech, or frivolous talk—this is known as wrong livelihood; abstinence therefrom is known as right livelihood. And Mahāśiva the Elder has said: 'Transgression in the doors of body and speech,

¹ *Dhs.* § 301.

² The four life-necessaries for the religieux—food, clothing, lodging, medicine.—*Ed.*

[221] whether conditioned or not by livelihood, is counted as an immoral act of body and of speech. Abstinence therefrom is said to be right action and right speech.' When the pupils asked, 'Where does livelihood come in?' he replied, 'The enjoyment of the four requisites, which have been produced in dependence upon the threefold hypocrisy¹ is livelihood.' But this is the height of wrong livelihood, abstinence from which is known as right livelihood. This right livelihood is obtainable in the various conscious experiences previous to the Path. For by one conscious experience one abstains from the transgression in the door of body; by another, from that in the door of speech. But it is obtained in one moment of consciousness at the moment of the transcendental path; for then there arises only one abstinence, cutting off the base of the volition of wickedness called wrong livelihood, produced by way of the seven courses of action² in the doors of body and of speech, and fulfilling the path-factor. This is the distinction in the Section of the exposition.

Among the controlling faculties the faculty of believing, 'I shall come to know the unknown,' and among the path-factors right speech, etc., are additions. Through these [additions] nine controlling faculties and the [full] Eightfold Path are declared in the section of the Summary.³

The section of 'Emptiness' retains its original form.⁴ So far the Progress formula is different. Farther on the teaching is divided into the Emptiness formula, the Empty-Progress, the 'Unhankered-after' and the Unhankered-after Progress.⁵ Of these, Empty is the name of the supramundane Path, given for the three reasons: of arrival, of its own merits and of the object. How? In the Order a bhikkhu, being

¹ The threefold hypocrisy produced by evil desires is (a) wearing of coarse raiment, boasting of one's saintly qualities, behaving as though one had attained holiness.—*Tikkā*.

² Misconduct, threefold by act, fourfold by speech.

³ *Dhs.* § 337; *B.P.E.* § 337a. *I.e.*, one more faculty in addition to those named in §§ 58, 74.

⁴ *Ib.* §§ 344, 345; cf. §§ 132-45 (title), where the P.T.S. ed. apparently omits the word *suññatam*. ⁵ *Ib.* §§ 344-57.

convinced of the non-existence of an absolute soul, views complexes as soulless. But because, by merely viewing them as soulless, the genesis of the Path is not obtained, it behoves him to view them also as impermanent and as ill, therefore he practises the contemplation of the threefold discernment of impermanence, ill and soullessness. Still his insight leading to emergence¹ views the complexes of the three planes, as Empty. This insight is known as Emptiness. Standing in the place of 'that which tends to arrive,' it gives the name of Emptiness to its own path. Thus the Path gets the name of Emptiness because [this concept tends to] arrive.

And because the path is void of lust, etc., therefore it gets the name of Emptiness by means of its own merits. Nibbāna also, from being void of lust, etc., is called Emptiness. Because it arises with Nibbāna for object the Path gets the name of Emptiness from its object. [222] Of these three reasons it gets its name from its own merits, and also from the object by means of the Suttanta or explanatory method of teaching. Abhidhamma discourse is teaching without such a method. Therefore, here 'Emptiness' gets its name, not from its own merits, nor from the object, but from the fact of its arrival; for arrival is the principal² and is twofold: of insight, of the Path. Of these, the insight-arrival is the principal where the Path has arrived; the Path-arrival is the principal where fruition has arrived. Here, owing to the arrival of the Path, the insight-arrival is the principal.

In 'the Undesired,'³ 'undesired' is a name of the Path,

¹ The insight which views conditioned things with indifference. It occurs together with the stage called adaptation (anuloma), and is called insight leading to transcendence. Because it views conditioned things as empty, it is called 'emptiness' (sūññatā). Because it views them as ill, or because in it craving is dried up, it is called undesired, unpanched after.—*Tīkā*.

The word transcend-ence, henceforward occurring frequently, is lit., standing up away from: *v-utthāti*—i.e., rising from. It is translated 'transcending,' or 'emerging from.'—*Ed.*

² Some read *dhuvamp*: 'certain,' 'assured,' for *dhuramp*: 'principal.'

³ *Dhs.* § 351. *B.P.E.*: 'unpanched after.' Cf. *Compendium ix*, § 9. *Apanihita* is from (a)*pra-ni-dhā*: 'not to lay down toward.' Not aimed at, or aspired to. Cf. *A. i.* 8; *S. iv.* 302.—*Ed.*

which gets it for three reasons. How? Here a bhikkhu, being convinced from the beginning of the Truth of ill, views complexes as ill. But because, by merely viewing them as ill, the emergence of the Path is not obtained, it behoves him to view them also as impermanent and selfless, therefore he practises the contemplation of the threefold discernment as impermanent, ill and selfless. Still his insight leading to emergence dries up, destroys and relinquishes the desire for the complexes of the three planes. This insight is known as 'the undesired.' Standing in the place of that which tends to arrive, it gives the name of Undesired to its own Path. Thus the Path gets its name of Undesired because the concept tends to arrive. And because, in the Path, the desire of lust, hate and delusion does not exist, therefore it gets the name of Undesired by means of its own merits. Nibbāna also, from the absence of those desires, is called the Undesired. From arising with Nibbāna as its object, the Path gets the name of Undesired. Of these three reasons, etc. (*continue as in preceding paragraph*).

[223] To the objection:—but are not 'Emptiness, Signless, Undesired' three names of the Path? As the Buddha has said, 'Bhikkhus, there are three Deliverances: that of Emptiness, of the Signless, of the Undesired.'¹ Why of the three are the two taken here, and not the Signless?—we reply:—From the absence of the arrival. For the insight of the 'Signless' is not able by itself to stand in the place of arrival and to give the name to its own path. Nevertheless, the Buddha Supreme declared the insight of the 'Signless' to his own son, Rāhula the Elder:

*Study the signless, and abandon pride's
Deep-hidden bias; so by conquering
Thy pride thou mayest know tranquillity.²*

For insight severs the signs of permanence, stability, bliss, self.³ Hence it is spoken of as the Signless. Yet, although

¹ *Pts.* ii. 35.

² Ascribed to Abhirūpanandā. *Pss.* of the Sisters, ver. 20, and to Ananda addressing Vangīsa, *Pss.* of the Brethren, ver. 1226. But cf. *S.* iii. 135 f.; *A.* ii. 165.—*Ed.*

³ Reading attanimittap.

it severs the sign, it itself frequents states which are signs; thus it occurs with the sign. Therefore it itself is not able to stand at the place of arrival and give the name to its own path.

A further view: The Abhidhamma is the teaching of things in the ultimate sense. And in the ultimate sense there is a deficiency in the conditions producing the Signless Path. How? The deliverance called Signless has been declared by way of the discernment of impermanence. And by means of that deliverance the controlling faculty of faith is excessive. Owing to its not being a Path-factor, it is not able, in the ultimate sense, to give the name to its own path. Of the other two, the deliverance called 'empty' has been declared by way of the discernment of soullessness, and the deliverance called 'undesired' has been declared by way of the discernment of ill. Of them, by means of the deliverance called 'empty,' the controlling faculty of understanding is excessive; by means of the deliverance called 'undesired' the controlling faculty of concentration is excessive. These controlling faculties, being factors of the Ariyan Path,¹ are able in the ultimate sense to give the name to their own paths. In other words, in the triplet of the object of the Path,¹ also, in the classification of the states as the dominant influence of the Path, because desire-to-do and consciousness, at the time of their being dominant influences, are not Path-factors, the state of their being dominant influences of the Path is not stated. Thus should this be understood. This is the decision of the opinion of a certain teacher apart from the Commentary.

[224] Thus in all respects the insight of 'the Signless' is not able by itself, standing at the place of arrival, to give a name to its own Path; hence a Path of the 'Signless' has not been included. But some have said that such a Path, although it does not get the name from its arrival, gets it, by the Suttanta expositions, from its own merits and from its object. They should be refuted thus:—If the 'Signless path' gets its

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 1031-3.

name from its own merits and from the object, then the Empty and the Undesired paths also should here, in the Abhidhamma, get their names from their own merits and from their objects. But they do not. And why? Because this [sort of] path gets its name for two reasons:—from its essential property and from opposing; in other words, from its intrinsic nature and because of something rejected. Now the paths called Empty and Undesired get their names from their own intrinsic natures and from opposing. They are void of lust, etc., and without the desires springing from lust, etc.; thus they get their names from their own intrinsic nature. And Emptiness is opposed to the (false) conviction of the soul and the Undesired to desire; thus they get the name from opposing. But the Signless Path, owing to the absence of the signs, etc., of lust, of permanence, gets its name from its intrinsic nature, but not from opposing; for it is not opposed to the discernment of impermanence, which has the signs of the complexes as its object, and which stands in conformity to it; thus in all respects, by Abhidhamma exposition, there is no Signless Path. But by the Suttanta exposition it is brought out and shown. For on any given occasion there is the emergence of the Path, the three characteristic signs¹ present themselves, as if by a single act of 'adverting.' There is no simultaneous presentation of the three, yet it is said so, to show when the station of religious exercise is manifested. Indeed, from the outset, let there be anywhere a conviction [of the mind], then insight making for emergence, as it emerges, gives the name of its own path to whatever sign it has grasped, placing it at the point of arrival by just that sign. How? Because of the disposition here or there respecting any one of the three Signs, the rule is that the other two Signs are seen also, for when one Sign alone is seen, there is no emergence of the path. Hence the bhikkhu [225] who is convinced as to impermanence, emerges not solely as to that, but also as to the other two; similarly if he start with either of these two.

¹ Impermanence, ill, soullessness.

Of the three Paths, the Path of one emerging by means of impermanence is the Signless; that of one emerging by means of ill is the Undesired; that of one emerging by means of soullessness is the Empty. Thus by the Suttanta expositions¹ it has been brought out and shown. But (to object:) what has insight leading to emergence for its object? The three characteristics. What is called a characteristic is the same as a concept, and is not a state that can be said to be limited or sublime, etc. And whoso discerns the three characteristics as impermanence, ill, soullessness, to him the five aggregates become like a corpse tied to his neck. Knowledge, having the complexes as its object, emerges from them. So a bhikkhu, desirous of buying a bowl, might see one brought by a bowl-merchant, and glad and delighted would think, 'I will take it.' On examining it he might see holes, whereupon he loses all attachment, not for the holes, but for the bowl. Similarly, noting the three characteristics [the student] has no further attachment for conditioned things. He transcends any such thing by means of knowledge, having such thing as object.

The simile of the robe may be similarly applied.

Thus the Blessed One, in classifying transcendental jhāna, brought out the two methods of the fourfold and fivefold jhāna in the 'progress' formula, as well as progress in the [idea of] emptiness and the 'undesired' in those corresponding formulas respectively. Why did he so bring them out? To meet individual inclinations and to adorn his discourse, both of which reasons are to be understood as stated above. So in the words 'he cultivates transcendental jhāna'² we find the two methods, by way of fourfold and fivefold jhāna, in the 'progress' formula, as also in the rest. Thus in all the five portions ten methods have been classified. Hereon the following is the special [comment]:—

*Subjective and objective with respect
To matter, th' immaterial, the five,
The interchange of factors eight and seven,
The sign, the progress, the chief influence.*

¹ *Pts.* ii., *Vimokkhakathā*, esp. p. 64.

² *Dhs.* §§ 277 *ff.*

Namely, in the transcendental Path, being convinced of one's own person one transcends it [226]; being so convinced one transcends that which is objective; being convinced of the objective one transcends that; being convinced of matter one transcends that; so convinced one transcends the immaterial; being convinced of the immaterial one transcends that; being so convinced, one transcends matter. At one stroke one transcends the five aggregates. As to 'the interchange of factors eight and seven,' this Path is both eightfold and sevenfold; the Factors of Wisdom also are seven or six; jhāna is fivefold, four- three-, or twofold:—thus should the mutability of factors eight, seven, etc., be understood. And as to 'the sign, the progress, the chief influence,' 'sign' is that which is transcended; the other terms refer to the steadiness or steadiness of progress, and to the dominant influence.

As regards the sentence—' being convinced of his own person he transcends it '—this refers to one who from the outset is subjectively convinced as to the five aggregates, and being so convinced considers them as impermanent, liable to suffering, void of soul. But inasmuch as by this purely subjective view there is no emergence of the Path, and it behoves him to consider also that which is objective, he considers the aggregates of another person, and so, with regard to things not affecting his own desires, he considers them also as impermanent, etc. Now he contemplates his subjective self, now that which is objective. When he thus contemplates his own person, his insight unites with the Path. And so, being convinced as to his own person, he transcends it. But if his insight unites with the Path when he is contemplating the objective, then he is convinced as to the subjective and transcends the objective. Similarly when he is convinced as to an objective personality and transcends both it and his own personality.

Another man from the outset is convinced of matter and, being so convinced, defines elemental matter and derived matter, and views them as impermanent, etc. But because by just this formulated view of matter there is no emergence of the path, and it behoves him to view the im-

material as well, therefore [227] he defines feeling, perception, mental co-efficients, consciousness, which have arisen by making matter the object, saying 'This is not material,' and views them as impermanent, etc. Now he contemplates matter, and now non-matter. When he thus contemplates matter, his insight unites with the Path. So being convinced of matter he is said to emerge therefrom. If, on the other hand, when he contemplates non-matter, his insight unites with the Path, he is said to be convinced of matter and to transcend non-matter. And the same with his being convinced of non-matter and transcending both that and matter. 'Whatever has the nature of coming to be, has the nature of passing away'¹—thus being convinced at the time of transcending, he is known to transcend at one stroke the five aggregates.

This is the insight of a bhikkhu of sharp insight and great understanding. As if folk were to offer a man aching with hunger a bowl full of food of divers excellent tastes and put a lump of ordure in the middle. And he were to scrape the curry with his hand, and seeing the lump were to ask, 'What is this?' and on being told, would not have any inclination for the food or the bowl, saying, 'Fie! Fie! take it away,' so should the application of this simile be understood. As the time of rejoicing on seeing the bowl full of food, so is the time when the bhikkhu, then a foolish average man, grasps the five aggregates as '*I am* the five aggregates; *mine* are they.' As the time of seeing the lump of ordure, so is the time of noting the three characteristics. As the time of having no inclination for the food or the bowl is the time when the bhikkhu of sharp insight and great understanding transcends at one stroke the five aggregates, saying, 'Whatever has the nature of coming to be has the nature of passing away.'

As regards

The interchange of factors eight and seven,

¹ *Vinaya Texts* i. 97, § 29.

it should be understood in accordance with the change of factors classified above. For the insight of indifference to conditioned things fixes the distinction among the wisdom-factors, the Path-factors, and the Jhāna-factors of the Ariyan Path. But some Elders say that the basic jhāna does so; others say that the aggregates which are the objects of insight do so; others say that individual inclination does so. Concerning these doctrines it should be understood that this previous insight leading to transcendence, also called indifference to conditioned things, fixes that distinction.

Here is the discourse in regular succession: The Path arisen in one of dry insight¹ [228] by the fixing as insight, and the Path arisen without making a base of the Jhāna of one who has acquired the attainment, and the Path produced by making a base of the First Jhāna and contemplating particular conditioned things (*i.e.*, other than the basic Jhāna) are of the First Jhāna. In all of them there are seven Wisdom-factors, eight Path-factors, five Jhāna-factors. Their previous insight is accompanied by joy and by indifference and, at the time of emerging after attaining to the state of indifference to conditioned things, is accompanied by joy only. In the five-fold method, in the Paths produced by making a base of the Second, Third, Fourth Jhānas, the jhāna in due course has four, three, two factors. But in all the Paths there are seven Path-factors, in the Fourth jhāna six Wisdom-factors. This distinction is due to the fixing of the basic jhāna and of insight, for their previous insight is accompanied by joy and indifference, but the insight leading to transcendence is accompanied by joy only. But in the Path produced by making the Fifth Jhāna the basis by way of indifference and one-pointedness of mind, there are two Jhāna-factors; the Wisdom-factors and Path-factors are six and seven respectively. This distinction also is due to the double fixing (of basic jhāna and of insight). In this method the previous insight is accompanied by joy and indifference; that leading to transcendence is accompanied by indifference only. And the same with the

¹ Cf. *Compendium*, pp. 55, 75.

Path produced by making the immaterial Jhānas the basis. Thus the attainment, emerging in proximity to the Path produced by contemplating any conditioned things whatever after emerging from the basic jhāna, makes the Path similar to itself, as the colour of the ground is similar to that of the iguana.

In the second doctrine of the Elders, the Path produced by emerging from any attainment, and contemplating any states of attainment, is similar to that attainment—that is, to the contemplated attainment. But if we contemplate states of the sensuous sphere, we are in the First Jhāna. Here also the fixing as insight is to be understood by the method stated.

[229] In the third doctrine of the Elders, the Path produced by contemplating any jhāna states, when any jhāna is made the basis, in accordance with one's wish: 'O if I could attain to the Path with seven factors, with eight factors!' resembles that particular jhāna. Yet without the basic jhāna, or the contemplated jhāna, the resemblance thereto is not accomplished by the mere wish. This meaning is intended to be shown by the *Nandakovāda Sutta*.¹ For there it is said:— 'Bhikkhus, as on the fifteenth, the Sabbath day, people have no doubt, no misgivings whether the moon will be deficient or full, but are quite sure that it will be full, so, bhikkhus, those bhikkhunis are delighted at Nandaka's sermon on the Law, and have their intentions fulfilled. Bhikkhus, of those five hundred bhikkhunis, even she who is the most backward is a "Stream-winner," not liable to suffer in purgatory, assured, and bound for enlightenment.' For among them she who has in her the sufficient cause of the fruition of Stream-winning, has her intentions fulfilled by just that fruition; and so for the three higher fruitions.² Thus the path produced by contemplating any jhāna states, making any jhāna the basis in accordance with one's wish, resembles that jhāna.

Yet without the basic jhāna or the contemplated jhāna the resemblance thereto is not accomplished by the mere wish. Here also the fixing of insight is to be understood by the said

¹ *Majjhima* iii. 270 f., esp. 277.

² Of once-returning, never-returning, Arahantship.

method. To the Elder Tipiṭaka-Cūlanāga,¹ holder of the doctrine [that the basic jhāna alone fixes it], his pupils said, 'Reverend sir, let the basic jhāna, where it is present, fix it [as you say]. But where it is absent—that is, in the immaterial existence—what fixes it?' 'There also the basic jhāna fixes it, my friends. For the bhikkhu who has attained the eight attainments makes a basis of the First Jhāna, produces the Path and Fruition of Stream-winning, does not fall away from the jhāna, and when his hour comes is reborn in the immaterial worlds. Emerging from the attainment of the Fruition of Stream-winning of the First Jhāna, he establishes insight and produces the upper three Paths and Fruitions. These are only of the First Jhāna; the same is true for the Paths and Fruitions of the Second Jhāna, etc. [230] In the immaterial consciousness² there arise the threefold, fourfold Jhānas, which are transcendental, not worldly. So, my friends, there also the basic jhāna fixes it.' 'Reverend sir, the question has been well explained.'

The Elder Mahādatta, resident at Moravāpi, held the doctrine that aggregates, which are the objects of insight, fix it, in that the Path, which emerges after contemplating any aggregate, resembles that aggregate. His pupils said to him: 'Reverend sir, in your doctrine a flaw appears. According to it the bhikkhu who has emerged after contemplating matter, would have a Path resembling matter and undeclared.³ He who has transcended, after comprehending rightly the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception, would have a Path resembling that, and have attained to the state of that sphere.' 'Friends, it is not so; for the transcendental Path is never known not to attain ecstasy. Hence one who has transcended, after contemplating, matter has a Path of eight factors accom-

¹ This name means 'Little-wonderman knowing by heart the Three Piṭakas.' See below, p. 354. The name may have served to distinguish him from the Cūlanāga, who accompanied Mahinda to Ceylon. *Sāmantapāsādikā*, p. 313.—*Ed.*

² *I.e.*, consciousness such as he would have in the Arūpa worlds.

—*Ed.*

³ *Avyākata*. *I.e.*, unmoral.

panied by joy; he who also has transcended, after contemplating, the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception has no Path resembling that sphere in every respect, but has a Path of seven factors accompanied by indifference.'

[Students] quoted the doctrine of the Elder Tipiṭaka-Cūlābhaya, that personal inclination fixed it, and told it to the Elder Tipiṭaka-Cūlanāga. He replied: 'Whoso has the basic jhāna can let personal inclination fix it for him; but whoso has it not, what inclination can avail to fix it for him? It would be like one who looks for interest when he has no capital.'¹ They told that utterance to the Elder Tipiṭaka-Cūlābhaya, who replied: 'Friends, that doctrine of mine that the personal inclination fixes it, was said with reference to one possessed of the basic jhāna.' As it has been understood with reference to one possessed of the basic jhāna, so should it be understood with reference to one possessed of the contemplated jhāna. For the path produced in him who, emerging from the Fifth Jhāna, is contemplating the First Jhāna, etc., becomes, in the doctrine of the first Elder, of the First Jhāna, and of the First Jhāna and the rest in the doctrine of the second Elder. Thus the two doctrines oppose each other. In the third doctrine it becomes of whatever jhāna among the Jhānas is desired; thus those two doctrines do not clash with this, and the inclination is beneficial. The three Elders, then, were clever, experienced, and full of intelligence. [231] On that account the teachers have made a text of their doctrines. In this commentary just the meaning in point has been brought out, and it has been shown that only insight fixes the three doctrines.

Now as regards

The sign, the progress, the chief influence,

at the time of the production of the Path, since there is 'a change of factors,' whence does adoption² rise, and whence the Path? Adoption emerges from the sign (*i.e.*, the object

¹ For *Nibbānassa* read *niddhanassa* . . . (P.T.S. ed.)—*Ed.*

² *Gotrabhu*, or 'becoming kin'—namely, to the spiritual consciousness of Buddhas and their elect followers, the moment preceding Jhāna-estasy. Cf. *Compendium*, p. 215.—*Tr.*

of insight), and is not able to cut off the process (of states in the round of re-births); for it emerges from one side. The Path emerges from the sign, and cuts off the process; for it emerges from both sides. This is the manner of their production:—On whatever occasion there is emergence of the Path, on that occasion the adaptation¹ is not once, nor for the fifth time. For adaptation at the first occurrence does not get the causal relation called 'repetition.' At the fifth time, owing to its nearness to the life-continuum, it trembles,² for at the fifth time the apperception is known to have fallen (in strength).³ Hence it is neither at the first nor the fifth time. But to one of great understanding there are two adaptations, thirdly, adoption, fourthly, Path-consciousness, [then] three fruitional consciousnesses, after which comes the lapse into the (subconscious) life-continuum. To one of medium understanding there are three adaptations, [then] (4) adoption, (5) path-consciousness, [then] two fruitional [movements of] consciousness, after which is the lapse into the life-continuum. To one of inferior understanding there are four adaptations, then (5) adoption, then (6) Path-consciousness, then (7) fruitional consciousness, after which is the lapse into the life-continuum. Of these three persons (the emergence of the Path) ought to be said concerning the person of medium understanding and not concerning persons of great, or of inferior understanding. For on whatever occasion there is emergence of the path, on that occasion the element of mind-consciousness, inoperative, unconditional and accompanied by indifference, becomes 'adverting' of the mind-door, and makes the aggregates of the field of insight its object, setting the life-continuum in motion. Taking the aggregates taken by that advertting, there immediately arises the first insight of adaptation with apperception. This occurs among those aggregates as impermanent, ill or soulless, [232] dispels the gross darkness covering the Four Truths and ceases, revealing the

¹ *Anuloma*, the stage preceding 'adoption.'

² And so is unable to be the cause of 'adoption.'—*Tikā*.

³ Just as a man's strength fails in old age.

more clearly the three characteristics. Immediately afterwards arises the second adaptation. Of these two, the first is devoid of the causal relation of repetition, and renders service to the second, which is sharp, valiant, clear, and which, occurring even in that object (of the field of insight) in that manner (*i.e.*, of being impermanent, ill, soulless), dispels the darkness of medium density covering the Four Truths and revealing all the more clearly the three characteristics, ceases. Immediately afterwards arises the third adaptation, to which the second renders service. From its acquirement of the causal relation of repetition, it is sharp, valiant, clear, occurs in that object in that manner, completely dispels the residuum of darkness of slight density covering the Four Truths, reveals all the more clearly the three characteristics and ceases. So when, by the three adaptations the darkness covering the Truths is dispelled, there immediately arises the insight of adoption making Nibbāna its object.¹

Here is an illustration: They say a certain man who had eyes to see, went forth at night saying, 'I will observe the conjunction of the stars,' and looked up to see the moon, which from being covered by clouds did not appear to him. Then a wind came and dispersed the densest clouds, another wind the lighter clouds and a third wind the thinnest of the clouds; so that he saw the moon in the sky clear of clouds and observed the conjunction of the stars. Herein, the darkness of our lower nature, dense, thick, medium, thin, covering the Truths, is like the three clouds; the three kinds of adaptation-consciousness are like the three winds; the insight of adoption is like the seeing man; Nibbāna is like the moon; the dispelling of the darkness covering the Truths by each adaptation-consciousness is like the dispersing of the three clouds one by one by the winds; [233] the making of pure Nibbāna the object of the insight of adoption when the darkness covering the facts disperses is like the seeing by the man of the pure moon in the sky clear of clouds. As the three winds are able only to disperse the clouds covering the moon and not to see the

¹ *Compendium, loc. cit.*

moon, so the adaptations are able only to dispel the darkness covering the Truths, and not to make Nibbāna the object. As the man is able to see the moon, but not to disperse the clouds, so the insight of adoption is able to make Nibbāna the object, but not to dispel the darkness of our lower nature. Thus adaptation has conditioned things for its object and adoption has Nibbāna for its object.

For were adoption to take the object taken by adaptation, a subsequent adaptation would follow it;¹ and so there would not be just the rise of the Path. But the insight of adoption, not taking the object of adaptation, does not allow the reproduction of adaptation. And although it itself is not adverting, it stands at the place of the advertинг consciousness and, as though giving a sign to the Path, 'Arise thus' ceases. And the Path, not letting go the sign given, follows it without a break, and arises piercing and bursting the mass of greed, hate and delusion never before pierced and burst.

Here is an illustration: They say an archer had a hundred planks placed at a height of one hundred bowlengths, and wrapping his face with a cloth fixed an arrow and stood in a car. Another man rolled the car, and when the planks came facing the archer, made a sign with a stick. The archer, not letting go the sign of the stick, shot the arrow and pierced the planks. Herein the insight of adoption is like the sign of the stick; the insight of the Path is like the archer; The making Nibbāna the object and the piercing and bursting of the mass of greed, hate and delusion, never before pierced and burst, by the insight of the Path at the sign given by the insight of adoption, is like the archer's piercing the planks by not letting go the sign of the stick.²

[234] This bursting of the mass of greed, etc., is also called the complete destruction of the causeway, the extirpation of the ground that had been got. Indeed, the Path has only one function:—to reject latent evil tendencies.³ In rejecting

¹ Namely, by our lower nature for rebirth. 'Adoption' (gotrabhu) will have become 'adaptation' (anuloma).—Tr.

² *Vis. Magga*, p. 674.

³ The seven anusaya's. *Compendium*, p. 176.—Tr.

latent tendencies one is said to emerge from the (five aggregates as) sign and to cut off their proceeding. The sign is the sign of matter, feeling, perception, mental co-efficients, consciousness; the process is the continual round of these five aggregates and is twofold: grasped at, not grasped at. Of these two, the teachers, saying that the shadow of the emergence of the path from the process not grasped at was seen, affirmed that it emerged from such an occurrence.

By the path of stream-winning five kinds of consciousness—four associated with false views and one, accompanied by doubt—are put away. These five kinds of consciousness produce matter, which is called the material aggregate not grasped at, they themselves being called the conscious aggregate; feeling, perception, and mental co-efficients associated with them are called the three immaterial aggregates. Concerning these, if the path of stream-winning were not cultivated by the stream-winner, these five kinds of consciousness would break out among the six objects of sense. But the path of stream-winning preventing this, and destroying the causeway so that it cannot arise again, is said to emerge from the 'not grasped at.'

By the path of Once-returning six kinds of consciousness, four dissociated from false views, two accompanied by grief—namely, gross sense-desire and ill-will—are put away. By the path of Never-returning the same six kinds—namely, subtler sense-desire and ill-will—are put away. By the path of Arahantship, five kinds of immoral consciousness—four dissociated from views and one accompanied by distraction—are put away. In this, if those three paths were not cultivated by Ariyans, these kinds of immoral consciousness would break out among the six objects of sense. But the three paths preventing this, and destroying the causeway so that it cannot emerge again, were said to emerge from the 'not grasped at.'

The teachers also said, that when the shadow of the emerging from the process grasped at was seen, [235] it emerged from such process. For if the stream-winner were not to cultivate the path of stream-winning, the process of the aggregates grasped at would go on in the continual stream of becoming

the beginning whereof is unknown prior to seven rebirths. *And why? Because of the existence of the conditions of the process. But in point of fact the path of stream-winning arising severs these five corruptions—three fetters, latent bias of wrong view, latent bias of doubt. Now (that the path of stream-winning has arisen), whence for the stream-winner could the process of the aggregates grasped at go on in that continual stream of becoming the beginning whereof is unknown prior to seven rebirths?* So the path of stream-winning bringing about the discontinuity of the aggregates grasped at is said to emerge from the 'grasped at.'

If the Once-returner were not to cultivate the path of Once-returning, the process of the 'grasped at' would go on in the five rebirths, after the next two. And why? Because of the existence of the conditions of the procedure. But in point of fact the path of Once-returning arising severs these four corruptions: gross fetters of sense-desires and of aversion, gross latent bias of sense-desires and gross latent bias of aversion. Now (that the path of Once-returning has risen), whence for the Once-returner could the process of the aggregates grasped at go on in five existences excepting two? So the path of Once-returning bringing about the discontinuity of the aggregates grasped at is said to emerge from the 'grasped at.'

If the Never-returner were not to cultivate the path of Never-returning, the process of the aggregates grasped at would go on in the second existence after the next. And why? Because of the existence of the conditions of the process. But in point of fact the path of Never-returning arising severs these four corruptions:—the subtle fetters of sense-desires and of aversion, the subtle latent bias of sense-desire, the subtle latent bias of aversion. Now (that the path of Never-returning has arisen), whence for the Never-returner could the process of the aggregates grasped at go on in the next rebirth save one? So the path of Never-returning bringing about the discontinuity of the aggregates grasped at is said to rise from that which is 'grasped at.'

If the Arahant were not to cultivate the path of Arahant-

— Omitted in P.T.S. ed.—Ed.

ship, the process of the aggregates grasped at would go on in material and immaterial existences. And why? Because of the existence of the conditions of the process. But in point of fact the path of Arahanthood arising severs these eight corruptions:—lust of material existence, lust of immaterial existence, conceit, distraction, ignorance, the latent bias of conceit, the latent bias of lust of existence, the latent bias of ignorance. Now (that the path of Arahanthood has arisen), whence for the Arahan could the process of the aggregates grasped at go on in a new existence? So the path of Arahanthood [236] bringing about the discontinuity of the aggregates grasped at is said to emerge from the 'grasped at.' And of these the path of Stream-winning emerges from existence in purgatory, the Path of Once-returning emerges from one portion of the happy tendency of sensuous existence, the path of never-returning emerges from sensuous existence, the path of Arahanthood emerges from material and immaterial existences, also from all existences. So say the teachers. And this is the text for the elucidation of this meaning (*i.e.*, of emergence from the process of the 'grasped at').

It is owing to the cessation of constructive consciousness¹ by the insight belonging to the Path of Stream-winning that whatever mind and matter may have arisen in the continual stream of becoming, the beginning whereof is unknown prior to seven rebirths, they cease, are suppressed, terminated, calmed in that Path. It is owing to the cessation of constructive consciousness by the insight belonging to the Path of Once-returning that whatever mind and matter may have arisen in the last five existences save two, they cease, are suppressed, terminated, calmed in that Path. It is owing to the cessation of constructive consciousness by the insight belonging to the Path of Never-returning that whatever mind and matter may have arisen in the two last existences save one, they cease, are suppressed, terminated, calmed in that Path. It is owing to the cessation of constructive consciousness by the insight

¹ Which gives result in purgatory and in happy tendencies beyond the seventh rebirth.—*Tr.*

belonging to the Path of Arahanthood that whatever mind and matter may have arisen in the material or immaterial element, they cease, are suppressed, terminated, calmed in that Path. This is the text. But, together with the cessation of the last consciousness of the Arahan who has entered on the utter passing away without leaving any residue of life, understanding, mindfulness, mind and matter cease, are suppressed, terminated, calmed. So far is the decision regarding the sign.

As regards 'the progress, the chief influence,' does the progress waver or not? It wavers. To expand: the four paths for the Tathāgata and Sāriputta the Elder were of easy progress and quick intuition. The first path of Mahāmoggallāna the Elder was of easy progress and quick intuition, the upper three paths were of painful progress but quick intuition. And why? From oppression by drowsiness. They say that the supreme Buddha looked after the Elder, as though he were a child, for seven days; and one day the Elder sat dozing. Then the teacher said, 'Moggallāna, Moggallāna, are you sleepy with heavy eyelids, brahmin?' The progress of a disciple who had attained to such superknowledge wavered. [237] Will not, then, the progress of others waver? Verily, of one bhikkhu, the four paths are of painful progress and sluggish intuition, of another are of painful progress and quick intuition, of another they are of easy progress and sluggish intuition, of another, of easy progress and quick intuition. Of some one the first path is of painful progress and sluggish intuition, the second path is of painful progress and quick intuition, the third path is of easy progress and sluggish intuition, the fourth path is of easy progress and quick intuition. And the dominant influence wavers like the progress. For, of one bhikkhu the four paths are dominated by desire-to-do, of another by energy, of another by consciousness, of another by investigation. And of one the first path is dominated by desire-to-do, the second by energy, the third by consciousness, the fourth by investigation.¹

¹ The text here has *Pakinnakakathā nijjhītā* (end of the discourse on particulars), but it is not obvious where this discourse begins.

Now¹ because, in cultivating the transcendental moral consciousness [the student] cultivates not merely the Jhāna, in the sense of closely examining the object, but also the path in the sense of escape from the round of rebirths, the application in mindfulness in the sense of having the mental object present, the supreme efforts in the sense of making effort, the bases of supernormal potency in the sense of accomplishing, the controlling faculty in the sense of dominant influence, the strength in the sense of not shaking, the factor of wisdom in the sense of being enlightened, the fact in the sense of being true, the calm in the sense of non-distraction, the idea in the sense of emptiness, the aggregate in the sense of a group, the sense-organ in the sense of exerting, the element in the sense of emptiness, intrinsic nature, and absence of a living entity, the nutriment in the sense of causal relation, the contact in the sense of touching, the feeling in the sense of experiencing, the perception in the sense of noting, the volition in the sense of co-ordinating, the consciousness in the sense of cognizing, therefore, in order to explain these nineteen terms, a beginning is once more made with, 'which are the states that are moral?'² So with the meaning: 'he cultivates this also, he cultivates that also,' twenty methods have been shown by way of personal inclination and of adorning the discourse. To expand: In the company of devas seated to listen to the Law, [238] whichever devas know in the course of the preaching the spiritual in the sense of closely examining the object, to them in a fitting manner it has been preached as Jhāna . . . those devas who know, in the course of the preaching, consciousness in the sense of cognizing, to them in a fitting manner it has been preached as consciousness. This is personal inclination.

Furthermore, the supreme Buddha, on account of his true enlightenment and because of his ten powers, four grounds of confidence, four analyses, six kinds of special knowledge, can fix and preach the discourse as he wishes. If he so desires,

¹ Some read vibhāv-ento, -eti, for bhāv-ento, -eti, thus altering the meaning into 'Now because, in explaining transcendental moral consciousness, the teacher explained,' etc.—Tr.

² Dhs. § 358.

he can preach it as the transcendental Jhāna in the sense of closely examining the object, as the transcendental Path in the sense of escape . . . as the transcendental consciousness in the sense of cognizing. Of them, as where the transcendental Jhāna is described, ten methods have been classified, so with the Path, etc. Thus in twenty places two hundred methods have been classified.

Now, in order to show the classification of the dominant influence once more a beginning is made with 'which are the states that are moral ?'¹ wherein the transcendental Jhāna produced by making desire-to-act the principal, the chief, the forerunner is known as dominated by desire-to-act. And the same with the rest. Thus in the preceding formulated method there are two hundred methods, and there are two hundred each in those dominated by desire-to-act, etc. Thus the king of the Law has shown the First Path in classifying it by a thousand methods.

End of the First Path.

CHAPTER II

THE SECOND PATH

Now, in order to show the Second Path, and so on, again a beginning is made with 'which are the states that are moral ?'² Herein 'for the diminution of sense-desire and ill-will' means in order to diminish the strength of these corruptions. Here the diminution should be understood to take place in two ways: by occasional production and by feebleness in breaking out. For to the Once-returner the lower nature does not arise frequently as in the majority who follow the round of rebirths. It arises occasionally like the sparse blades of grass in an imperfectly mown field. And when it does arise it does not arise crushing, spreading, covering, [239] making darkness, as in the case of the people who follow the round of rebirths.

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 359-64.

² *Ib.* § 362.

But being put away by the two Paths, it becomes very weak and is attenuated in form like a film of cloud and a fly's wing. Some Elders say on this point, ' to the Once-returner the lower nature arises thick and strong, although it may only arise after a long interval. For verily, he has sons and daughters.' This saying is not material. For sons and daughters are due to the mere exercise of bodily functions. But the lower nature, being put away by the two paths, lacks strength. Hence the diminution of the Once-returner's lower nature should be understood as due to the two reasons of occasional production and feebleness of power. ' Of the second ' is second by way of calculation and of the second production. ' For the attainment of the stage ' means for the purpose of getting the fruition of religious life. And so for the Third and the Fourth Paths. We shall speak only of what is specially distinctive. ' The controlling faculty of perfected knowledge ' is the knowing controlling faculty, said to be that controlling faculty which knows, without passing beyond the limit of knowledge made by the first Path, the four facts known by that Path.

In the section of the exposition also its meaning is to be understood in the same way. In the section of the groups also, together with it are nine controlling faculties. The rest is to be understood by the previous method.

CHAPTER III

THE THIRD AND FOURTH PATHS

IN the Third Path¹ ' for the complete putting away ' means for the purpose of entirely putting away those ' Fetters ' which have been diminished by the path of Once-returning.

In the Fourth Path² ' for the complete putting away of lust for the material, for the immaterial, conceit, distraction, ignorance ' means for the purpose of entirely putting away these five upper ' Fetters. ' Of these, lust for the material is

¹ *Dhs.* § 363.

² *Ib.* § 364.

lust and desire for material existence. Lust for the immaterial means lust and desire for immaterial existence. Conceit is that which is killed by the Path of Arahanthood. [240] So are distraction and ignorance. In these two Paths also the ninth controlling faculty is perfected knowledge.¹

In all the paths, by the due order of terms, there are altogether sixty terms. With the four absolute factors they make sixty-four. Undivided they are thirty-three. The sections of the groups and 'Emptiness' remain the same. And there are one thousand methods in each of these in the second Path, etc., as in the first. Thus the king of the Law has shown the four Paths classifying them by four thousand methods.

In the *Saccavibhanga*² transcendental points of sixty thousand methods have been set down by way of these four Paths (or these one thousand methods), so also there have been set down similar points of twenty thousand methods in the *Satipatthāna Vibhanga*, of twenty thousand methods in the *Sammappadhāna Vibhanga*, of thirty-two thousand methods in the *Iddhippāda Vibhanga*, of thirty-two thousand methods in the *Bojjhanga Vibhanga*, or twenty-eight thousand methods in the *Maggavibhanga*. But in the *Dhammasaṅgāti* four thousand methods in the four Paths have been set down. Out of the four paths in the first Path of the first Jhāna eight factors have been classified. Likewise in the second, etc.

In the first Path right view abandons wrong view; hence it, with right intention, etc., should be understood in the sense of abandoning the opposite. This being so, because the sixty-two heresies³ have been abandoned by the first Path, there would be no heresy to be abandoned by the three higher Paths. How, then, can right view be mentioned in them?⁴ As whether there is poison or not, an antidote is called antidote, so whether there is wrong view or not, right view is called right view. If this were so, right view would be a mere

¹ B.P.E. § 364a. Cf. *Iti-vuttaka*, p. 53.

² *Vibhanga*, ch. iv., vii.-xi. ³ Described in *Dialogues*, i. 27-55.

⁴ Reading *kathāṇi* for *kalāṇi*.

name and have no function in the three higher Paths, and the path-factors would not be fulfilled; hence it is proper that right view be made to have its function and the path-factors be fulfilled. But in the three higher Paths right view should be shown to have its function by fixing according to what is obtainable. To expand: There is a certain conceit to be killed by the three higher Paths. It has its locus in heresy. Right view abandons that conceit. Hence it is right view. For in the path of Stream-winning right view abandons wrong view. Moreover, the Stream-winner has a conceit which is to be killed by the path of Once-returning, and which has its locus in heresy. Right view abandons that conceit. Hence it is right view. Only the Stream-winner has an intention which is co-existent with seven [of the twelve] kinds of immoral consciousness,¹ by which there take place movements of the vocal organs, of the physical limbs, enjoyment of the requisites, [241] the co-existent² endeavour, the intrinsic nature of unmindfulness, the co-existent² one-pointedness of mind. These states [beginning with intention] are called wrong intention, etc. In the Path of Once-returning right intention, etc., are so called by the putting away of those states, wrong intention, etc. So, in the Path of Once-returning, the eight factors of the Path come by performing their own functions.

The Once-returner has a conceit which has to be killed by the path of Never-returning, and which has its locus in heresy. Only to the Once-returner intention, etc., as co-existent with seven kinds of immoral consciousness [are known as wrong intention, etc.]. By the putting away of these the performance of their own functions by the eight factors in the path of Never-returning should be understood.

The Never-returner has a conceit which has to be killed by the path of Arahantship and which has its locus in heresy. But intention, etc., co-existent with five kinds of immoral consciousness,³ which only the Never-returner has, are known

¹ Read: *satta akusala* . . . Namely, four kinds dissociated from false views, two rooted in hate, and one connected with distraction.—*Tr.*

² Co-existent with those seven kinds.—*P.y.*

³ Namely, four dissociated from false views and distraction.—*P.y.*

as wrong intention, etc. By the putting away of these wrong states, the performance of their own functions by the eight factors in the path of Arahanthood should be understood.

The first out of the four Paths discerns the Four Truths, which are also discerned by the three higher Paths. The latter do not discern anything not discerned by the first. This discourse is one generally accepted among the teachers. But the sectary¹ says, that in them one does see what has not been discerned by the first Path. He should be asked, 'Which controlling faculty in the first Path do you single out [as functioning herein]?' If he knows, he will reply, 'The controlling faculty of believing, "I shall come to know the unknown."'² And when he is asked, 'Which controlling faculty in the three higher Paths will you classify?' he will reply, 'The controlling faculty of perfected knowledge.'³ He should be told, 'If one sees something which has not been discerned by the first Path, you must classify the controlling faculty of believing, "I shall come to know the unknown" [which is peculiar to the First Path], under the three higher Paths also, so that it may meet the question.' He would again ask, 'Does another path put away other corruptions, or those already put away?' When he is told, 'Another path puts away other corruptions,' he says further, 'If another path puts away other corruptions not yet put away, then one also [by it] sees Truths unseen by the first Path.' He should be asked, 'How many Truths are there?' If he knows, he will answer, 'Four.' He should be told, 'In your doctrine sixteen "truths" would arise. You see truths unseen even by the Buddhas. You are a seer of many "truths." Do not take such a view. There is nothing new in seeing the Truths. But one puts away corruptions not yet put away.'

[242] In this matter of nothing being new in seeing the Truths, the simile of the basket has been taken:—They say that a certain man kept four treasure-baskets in a grand treasure-room. At night some business in connection with them arising, he opened the door, lit a lamp and, when the darkness

¹ Vitandavādins. Cf. *Dialogues* i. 14, n. 3; 167 f; and above, 5, n. 3.

² *Dhs.* § 296. *Above*, p. 295.

³ See *above*, p. 320.

was dispersed by the lamp and the baskets were visible, he did the business, shut the door and went away, and darkness was spread abroad again. A second time and a third time he did likewise. When, for the fourth time, the door was opened and he was looking to find the baskets invisible in the darkness, behold ! the sun arose. When through the brightness of the sun the darkness disappeared, he did his business with the baskets and went away. In this simile the four baskets are like the four Truths; the time of the opening of the door for some business with them is like the time of the putting forth of insight for the Path of Stream-winning; the darkness is like the obscurity covering the Truths; the light of the lamp is the light of the Path of Stream-winning; the manifestation of the baskets to the men on the disappearance of the darkness is like the manifestation of the Truths to the insight of the Path. And the Truths manifested to the insight of the Path are manifested to the person endowed with the Path. The time of his going away after doing his business with the baskets is like the time of cessation of the Path of Stream-winning after it has done its part in putting away corruptions. The spreading of darkness again is like the obscurity yet covering the Truths and to be killed by the three higher Paths. On the second occasion the time of the opening of the door is like the time of putting forth insight of the Path of Once-returning; the light of the lamp is like that of the Path of Once-returning; the time of departure after doing the business of the baskets is like the time of cessation of the Path of Once-returning after it has done its part in putting away the corruptions; the spreading of darkness again is like the obscurity still covering the Truths and to be killed by the two higher Paths. On the third occasion the time of opening the door is like the time of putting forth insight of the Path of Never-returning; the light of the lamp is like that of the Path of Never-returning; the time of departure after doing the business of the baskets is like the time of cessation of the Path of Never-returning after it has done its part in putting away the corruptions; the spreading of darkness again is like the obscurity covering the Truths and

to be killed by the higher Path of Arahanthood. On the fourth occasion the time of opening the door is like the time of putting forth the insight of the Path of Arahanthood; the rising of the sun is like the production of the Path of Arahanthood; the disappearance of darkness is like the dispelling of the obscurity covering the Truths by the Path of Arahanthood; [243] the manifestation of the baskets to the man at the disappearance of darkness is like the manifestation of the Four Truths to the insight of the Path of Arahanthood; and the Truths manifested to the insight are manifested to the person; the time of departure after the business with the baskets is like the casting off of all the corruptions by the Path of Arahanthood; the time of the occurrence of light since sunrise is like the non-obscurity of the darkness covering the Truths since the production of the Path of Arahanthood. So far the simile shows that nothing new is added after the Truths are seen. For the three higher Paths discern in them *only* what has been discerned (by the first Path).

As regards 'another Path puts away other corruptions,' the simile of the soap has been taken:—A certain man gave dirty clothes to the washerman, who applied the three kinds of soap consisting of saline soil, potash and dung powder. When he had ascertained that these alkalines were dissolved, he washed the clothes in the water and removed the grossest dirt. Then knowing them to be not yet altogether cleansed, he applied the three soaps a second time, washed them in the water and removed the finer dirt. Then knowing them to be still not altogether clean, he applied the soaps for the third time, washed them in the water and removed the finest dirt. Then knowing them to be not yet altogether cleansed, he applied the soaps for the fourth time, washed them in the water, removed all the dirt from within their texture, and returned them to the owner, who put them in a scented chest and wore them at will. Here the dirty clothes are like the mind following after the corruptions; the time of applying the three kinds of soap is like the time of producing work in the threefold discernment; the removal of the grossest dirt after the washing is the casting off of five corruptions by the Path of Stream-

winning. The re-application of the soaps for the second time is the procedure of work in the threefold discernment which knows the mind to be not yet altogether cleansed; the removal of the finer dirt than in the first case is like the casting off of the pair of gross 'Fetters' by the path of Once-returning; the re-application of the three soaps when it is known that the clothes are not yet [244] altogether cleansed, is like the procedure of work in the threefold discernment which knows the mind to be not yet altogether cleansed; the removal of the still finer dirt is like the casting off of the pair of subtle 'Fetters' by the Path of Never-returning. The re-application of the soaps when it is known that the clothes are not yet altogether cleansed is like the procedure of work in the threefold discernment which knows that the mind is not yet altogether cleansed; the removal of dirt from within the texture by a subsequent washing is like the casting off of the eight corruptions by the Path of Arahantship; the wearing at any desired moment of the clean clothes resembling silver plates and kept in a scented chest, is the living at any desired moment of the life of fruitional attainment by the cleansed mind purged of the 'intoxicants.' Thus runs the simile. 'Friends, as the garment is old and dirty, and the owners gave it to the washerman, who kneaded and soaked it in the three kinds of soap: consisting of saline earth, potash and dung powder, and washed it in clean water; although it became clean, exceedingly clean, a very subtle smell of salt earth, or potash, or dung powder remained unremoved in it; the washerman returned it to the owner, who kept it in a chest perfumed with scent; and the subtle residuum of the smell of salt earth, or potash, or dung powder was completely removed—so, friends, although the Ariyan disciple has put away the five lower "Fetters," there is in him a subtle residuum from among the five grasping aggregates of the conceit of "I am," of the desire¹ for "I am," of the latent bias of "I am."² Subsequently he lives in the discernment of the rise and fall of the

¹ According to the *Tikā* 'desire' (*chando*) here = craving (*tanhā*), and the latent bias is in the form of craving and of conceit.

² *Samyutta* iii. 131.

five grasping aggregates. And to him who so lives discerning that 'these are material qualities,' 'this is the origin of them,' 'this is the end of them,' 'this is feeling' . . . 'this is perception' . . . 'these are mental co-efficients' . . . 'this is consciousness,' 'this is the origin of consciousness,' 'this is the end of consciousness,' that subtle residuum, which is his from among the five grasping aggregates of the conceit of 'I am,' of the craving for 'I am,' of the latent bias of craving and conceit of 'I am' is completely removed. [245] Of the four Paths the Path of Stream-winning has put away, by way of factors of consciousness, five immoral kinds of consciousness, together with the evil states arising; the Path of Once-returning has diminished, by way of factors of consciousness, two classes of consciousness accompanied by grief, together with the evil states arising; the Path of Never-returning has put away the same two kinds of consciousness together with the associated states; the Path of Arahantship has put away, by way of factors of consciousness, five kinds of immoral consciousness together with the evil states arising. From the time when these two kinds of immoral consciousness are put away there is no such thing as a corruption which may arise again in the Arahant by way of a factor of consciousness.

Here is an illustration:—They say a great king placed guards at the frontier country and lived at the capital in the enjoyment of kingship. Then the frontier country rose in rebellion. At that time a dozen robber chiefs together with many thousands of men plundered the kingdom. Officials from the frontier country sent word to the king:—'Your Majesty, the frontier country has risen.' The king sent back a message, 'Catch the robbers without hesitating. I will reward your work.' At the first engagement the official forces killed five robber-chiefs together with many thousands of men. The remaining seven took each his own followers and entered the mountains. The officials informed the king of the occurrence. The king sent them treasure, saying, 'I will reward your work; catch the robbers.' At the second engagement the ministers defeated two robber-chiefs and reduced the strength of their followers, who all fled and entered the mountains. The king was

informed of that occurrence and again sent them treasure, saying, 'Catch them without delay!' At the third engagement the official forces killed the two chiefs together with their companions, and informed the king of the occurrence. Again the king sent them treasure, saying, 'Catch the remainder without delay.' At the fourth engagement the official forces killed the five chiefs with their followers. There was no one going by the name of a robber after the death of those twelve chiefs. The districts were secure from danger and the people lived dancing their children on their breast so to speak. And the king surrounded by the victorious heroes [246] enjoyed great glory in a magnificent palace. Here the great king is like the King of the Law; the officials living in the frontier country are like the religious aspirants; the twelve robber-chiefs are like the twelve kinds of immoral consciousness;¹ their many thousands of companions are like the evil states arising by way of the factors of consciousness; the time of information of the revolt of the frontier country is like the time of telling the teacher when the corruptions arise with reference to an object:—'Reverend sir, in me corruptions have arisen'; the giving of treasure with the message, 'Catch the thieves without delay!' is like the announcement of a station of religious exercise by the King of the Law: 'Bhikkhu, put down the corruptions'; the time of killing the five robber-chiefs with their followers is like putting away the five kinds of immoral consciousness with their associates by the Path of Stream-winning; the renewed reporting of procedure to the king is like telling the supreme Buddha the merits acquired; the giving again of treasure, saying, 'Catch the rest,' is like the announcement of the insight of the Path of Once-returning by the Blessed One; the reduction of the strength of the two robber-chiefs with their followers at the second engagement is like the diminution of the two kinds of consciousness of melancholy with their associates by the Path of Once-returning; the renewed reporting of procedure to the king is like telling the Teacher the merits acquired; the

¹ See below, Part IX.

giving again of treasure, saying, 'Catch the thieves without delay,' is like the announcement of the insight of the Path of Never-returning by the Blessed One; the killing of the two robber-chiefs with their followers at the third engagement is like putting away the two kinds of consciousness with their associates by the Path of Never-returning; the renewed reporting of procedure to the king is like telling the Tathāgata the merits acquired; the giving again of treasure, saying, 'Catch them without delay,' is like the announcement of the insight of the Path of Arahanthood by the Blessed One; the time of security of the district after the destruction of the five robber-chiefs with their followers at the fourth engagement is like the impossibility of an immoral state arising again by way of a factor of consciousness after the putting away of the twelve kinds of immoral consciousness, when the remaining five kinds of immoral consciousness with their associates are put away by the Path of Arahanthood; the enjoyment of great glory in a magnificent palace by the king surrounded by the victorious heroes is like [247] the enjoyment of the bliss of whichever of the three kinds of fruitional attainment he prefers —the 'Emptiness,' the 'Signless,' the 'Undesired'—by the King of the Law surrounded by the Arahants.

Here ends the Exposition of the term 'moral consciousness.'

PART IX—DISCOURSE ON IMMORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

CHAPTER I

DISCOURSE ON THE SECTION OF THE SUMMARY OF STATES

Now in order to show the classification of the term 'immoral state' a beginning has been made with, 'Which are the states that are immoral?'¹ Herein the different sections of the determination of states, etc., and the decision of the meanings of terms already mentioned above are to be understood in the way given above. And we shall explain just what is special here and there to this discourse.

Herein, in the determination of the occasion, because there is no series of planes of the immoral as there is of the moral, therefore this immoral consciousness, though it certainly is of the realm of sense, is not said to be so.² As regards the phrase 'associated with opinions,' *dīthi* (opinions) is the same as *dīthi-gatam*, like *gūhagatam*, *muttagatam*, etc. Or, from there being no species to be understood, it is simply 'opinions,' and *dīthigatasampayuttam* means simply associated with opinions (or views). The origin of this wrong view called *dīthi-gata* should be known to be due to these reasons:—the hearing of evil doctrine, evil friendship, the desire not to see Ariyans, unsystematic thought; in other words: of those doctrines which are associated with erroneous views, such hearing being preceded by much vain imagining, by a want of centrality of mind and a lack of scrutiny; evil friendship said to be the companionship with evil friends who have failed in the true doctrine; the desire not to see Ariyans such as the Buddhas and good men; unskilfulness in the Ariyan Law of different

¹ *Dhs.* § 365.

² Following the M. reading in P.T.S. ed.—*Ed.*

kinds, such as the four applications of mindfulness, etc.; the absence of discipline or the destruction of restraint with respect to the Ariyan Law (divided into the restraint taught in the Pātimokha, the controlling faculties, mindfulness, knowledge, elimination) and the doctrine of good men; and addiction to tumultuous festivities by means of unsystematic thought developed by the foregoing reasons. That this consciousness is automatic should be considered in the way mentioned above.¹

[248] In the section of the summary of states,² 'contact' is co-existent with an immoral consciousness. And the same with 'feeling,' etc. Thus their being immoral is what alone distinguishes them from the former states.

The 'one-pointedness of mind' is the steadiness of mind free from distraction when taking life, etc. Indeed, men concentrating the mind are not distracted and let fall unmerring weapons on the bodies of creatures. Being well concentrated they steal others' property. With mind [governed by] a single function they fall into wrong behaviour. So there is one-pointedness of mind in the occurrence of immorality.

'Wrong view' is untrue view; or, from being held amiss, a false view is a wrong view. A view loathed by the wise as bringing disadvantage is also a wrong view. And the same with 'wrong intention,' etc. Further, by it associated states see wrongly, or itself sees wrongly; or it is the mere act of wrong seeing—thus it is wrong view. It has unwise conviction as characteristic; perversion as function; wrong conviction as manifestation; the desire not to see the Ariyans as proximate cause. It should be regarded as the highest fault. In 'wrong intention,' etc., only the term 'wrong' is distinctive. The remainder should be understood in the same way as under the head of moral consciousness.

As regards 'the strength called unconscientiousness, strength called fearlessness of blame,' the meaning of 'strength' will be made plain in the section of the exposition. And in the others, 'unconscientious' means that it is not modest, or does not abominate; the state of immodesty or of not abominating is

¹ Fp. 207; also 102; 215.

² Dhs. § 365.

unconsciousness. No fear of blame is fearlessness of blame. Of them unconsciousness has the characteristic of not abominating misconduct of the body, etc., or of absence of shame. Fearlessness of blame has the characteristic of not being diffident on account of misconduct of the body, etc., or of absence of confusion. Unconsciousness as a strength is strength of unconsciousness. Recklessness of blame as a strength is strength of recklessness of blame. This is the meaning in abstract. The detailed account is to be understood as opposed to what has been said above.¹

By it associated states lust, or itself lusts, or the mere act of lusting—[249] such is 'greed' (or lust). By it associated states are deluded, or itself is deluded, or just the being deluded—this is 'delusion.' Of them, greed has the characteristic of grasping the object like sticky lime; the function of clinging like a piece of flesh thrown into a hot pan; the manifestation of not letting go like a taint of lampblack; the proximate cause of viewing the fetter-like states as enjoyment. Growing into a river of craving, it takes away beings to purgatory as a river of swift current carries any object fallen into it to the great ocean. Thus it should be regarded.

'Delusion' has the characteristic of blindness or opposition to knowledge; the essence of non-penetration, or the function of covering the intrinsic nature of the object; the manifestation of being opposed to right conduct or causing blindness; the proximate cause of unwise attention; and should be regarded as the root of all immoralities.

By it they covet, or itself covets, or the mere coveting—this is 'covetousness.' It has the characteristic of a desire to make others' prosperity one's own; the function of seeking with such desire; the manifestation of gazing at others' prosperity; the proximate cause of a great fancy for others' prosperity. Indeed, it appears only as gazing at the prosperity of others, and arises when there is a great fancy for the same. It should be regarded as the outstretched hand of the mind for others' prosperity.

¹ Cf. p. 198.

In 'there is calm,' etc., calm is due to the suppression of distraction in other objects. It lifts or supports the mind in the occurrence of immorality—this is 'support.' 'Non-distraction' means it is not distracted.

In this consciousness faith, mindfulness, wisdom and the six pairs have not been taken. And why? There is no faith in an unbelieving mind, therefore that has not been taken. What! Do men of false opinions not believe in their own teachers? They do. But that is not faith; it is a mere acquiescence in words; in the real sense it is either indiscrimination (that is, delusion) [250] or opinion. And there is no mindfulness in a mind unguarded by mindfulness, therefore that has not been taken. What! Do men of false opinions not remember an act done by themselves? They do. But that is not mindfulness. The procedure of immoral consciousness is due to such mere mode of remembering. Therefore mindfulness has not been taken. Then why is it said, 'wrong mindfulness' in the Sutta?¹ In the Sutta the discourse is made by the explanatory method so as to complete the 'Wrong Path' and the notion 'wrongness,' because of the immoral aggregates being exempt from and opposed to mindfulness. But in the absolute method (of Abhidhamma) in immoral consciousness there is no mindfulness; therefore it has not been taken. And in the consciousness causing blindness and folly there is no wisdom, therefore that has not been taken. Is there no deceptive knowledge in men of false opinions? There is. But it is not knowledge; it is trickery (*māyā*), which in the real sense is craving. Moreover, this consciousness is connected with torment, slow, heavy, rough, stiff, unwieldy, unhealthy, bent and crooked. Hence faith and the six pairs [repose of mind and of mental factors] have not been taken.

Having by so many terms in due order shown the thirty-two terms established in the text as factors of consciousness, now to show the 'or-whatever' states, he said 'or-whatever states on that occasion.' Herein the meaning is to be understood

¹ E.g., *Digha* iii. 254, 287, etc.; *Majjhima* i. 118, iii. 77, etc., etc.

thus:—in all immoral consciousness are ten states, to wit: desire-to-do, resolve, attention, conceit, envy, meanness, sloth and torpor, flurry and worry, which come in the Sutta, appear in Sutta passages. These states are spoken of in the Commentary as 'or-whatever' states. But in this consciousness desire-to-do, resolve, attention and excitement—these four states called 'the unfailing factors' are the 'or-whatever,' of which the first three should be understood in the way given above. There they are moral; here immoral. Moreover, the other state is the state of the excited mind—hence excitement or flurry. It has mental excitement as characteristic like wind-tossed water; wavering as function, like a flag waving in the wind; whirling as manifestation like scattered ashes struck by a stone; unsystematic thought owing to mental excitement as proximate cause; and it should be regarded as mental distraction over an object of excitement. Thus there are in all thirty-six terms of states [251] in this section of the summary of states—thirty-two beginning with contact and the four 'or-whatevers.' Leaving out the four unfailing factors only thirty-two come in the text; but here by taking what has not been taken, the fivefold contact-group, initial application, sustained application, zest, one-pointedness of mind, controlling faculty of energy, controlling faculty of vitality, wrong views, strengths: unconscientiousness and fearlessness of blame, greed, delusion—thus there are sixteen states.

Of these sixteen states seven occur under a single category, nine occur under different categories. Which are the seven?—contact, perception, volition, sustained application of mind, zest, life-controlling faculty, delusion—these seven states occur under a single category. Feeling, consciousness, initial application of mind, one-pointedness of mind, energy-controlling faculty, wrong view, strength of unconscientiousness, strength of fearlessness of blame and greed—these nine states occur under different categories. Of them, six states are referred to two categories, one to three, one to four, one to six categories. And how? Consciousness, initial application of mind, wrong view, the 'strengths': unconscientiousness and fearlessness of blame, and greed—these six are referred to two

categories. To expand:—First: consciousness by way of the fivefold contact-group is called consciousness; by way of the controlling faculties it is called controlling faculty of mind. Initial application of mind by way of jhāna-factors is called initial application of mind, by way of the Path-factors is called wrong intention. Wrong view is called so in the Path-factors and courses of action. The 'strength': unconsciousness, is called so by way of the 'strengths,' and unconsciousness by way of 'world-destroying pair.' And the same with fearlessness of blame also. Greed is called so by way of the pair of conditions, and covetousness by way of the course of action. Thus these six are referred to two categories. And feeling is called so by way of the fivefold contact-group, bliss by way of jhāna-factors, and the controlling faculty of joy by way of the controlling faculties—thus one state is referred to three categories. And energy is called the controlling faculty of energy by way of the controlling faculties, wrong endeavour by way of the Path-factors, 'strength' of energy by way of the 'strengths,' and support by way of the Final Pairs¹—thus one state is referred to four categories. And concentration is called one-pointedness of mind by way of jhāna-factors, concentration-controlling faculty by way of the controlling faculties, wrong concentration by way of the Path-factors: the 'strength': concentration by way of the 'strengths,' [252] calm by way of the Final Pairs by virtue of the unitary method in the second couplet,² and non-distraction in the third—thus one state is classified in six places. All these states form nine groups by virtue of the fivefold contact-group, jhāna-factor, controlling faculty, strength, Path-factor, root, course of action, world-destroying factor, Final Pairs. What ought to have been said in the section of the outline of states has been said in the exposition of the first moral consciousness.

End of the Discourse on the Section of the Outline of States.

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 1254 f.

² Cf. *Dhs.* § 1355 f.; §§ 54, 57. *B.P.E.*: 'composure' and 'balance.'

CHAPTER II

THE FIRST TYPE OF IMMORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

IN the section of the exposition,¹ in the exposition of one-pointedness of mind, the double expression, 'solidity and steadfastness,' is synonymous with stability. But that expression which has been said in the exposition of moral consciousness, to wit, 'It stands having dived and entered into the object,'² does not count here. True, in the immoral consciousness, it has been shown above that the one-pointedness of mind present is weak. Such meaning as non-scattering is the opposite of scattering, produced by way of distraction and perplexity is not obtained here. But that which does not disperse co-existent states is non-scattering; that which is not distracted is non-distraction; by way of the immoral one-pointedness of mind the state of mind is non-scattering. It does not tremble through the co-existent states—this is strength of concentration. Because the concentrating or fixing on the object is perverted, the concentration is false. Thus the meaning should here be understood.

In the exposition of the controlling faculty of energy³ the method given above—namely, 'striving in expelling lust'⁴—is not obtained here. Only in the sense of not trembling because of the co-existent states is the 'strength' called energy to be understood.

In the exposition of wrong views⁵ in the sense of not viewing justly, such views are called *ditthigata* (*gone to views*), from being included in the sixty-two heretical views.⁶ The meaning of this word has been discussed above. Just 'opinion' as being something difficult to get beyond is meant by 'view as jungle,' like a jungle of grass, of forest, of mountain. Just 'opinion' as being something dangerous and fearsome is meant by 'view as wilderness,' like a wilderness infested by thieves and wild beasts, of sand, waterless, without food. As something crushing or boring through the right view and being

¹ *Dhs.* § 375.

² Cf. p. 194.

³ *Ib.* § 376.

⁴ Cf. p. 193.

⁵ *Ib.* § 381.

⁶ Cf. *above*, p. 321.

contrary to it is meant by 'opinion as a disorder.' For wrong views when they arise pierce right views, and go counter to them. The changing and wavering of views from the holding at one time the Eternalistic, and at another time the Annihilationistic standpoint is meant by 'opinion as a scuffling.' A man of opinions is not able to stand by one view, follows at one time the Eternalistic and at another time the Annihilationistic view. Opinion as holding captive is meant by 'fetter' in the term 'opinion as a fetter.' It seizes the object firmly as crocodiles, etc., seize a man—thus it is called 'grip'; and 'fixity,' because it establishes itself. For a false view or opinion from the strength of its procedure establishes itself and seizes. By way of permanence, etc., it convinces—hence the term 'conviction' (or 'tendency'). Passing over the intrinsic nature of things, it considers them perversely, as permanent, etc.—this is 'perversion.' It is a vile path, because it brings disadvantage; or, it is the way to vile places of suffering—hence the term 'by-path.' From being not the right path, it is a 'wrong path.' For just as one who is gone astray, although he holds that this is the path to such a village, does not arrive at the village, so a man of false opinions, although he holds that this is the path to a happy destiny, cannot get there; hence from being not the right path it is a wrong path. From its false nature it is wrongness. (Just as people may appear to be crossing at the ferry), fools frequently cross over at an opinion or view from their merely wandering to and fro at it—thus it is a 'ford.' It is a ford, an abode of disadvantages—thus it is a 'fording-place' (*titthāyatana*), or in the sense of the birth-place, dwelling-place (*āyatana*) of heretics (*tittha*) it is *titthāyatana*. That state or intrinsic nature which is an inverted grasp is *vipariyesagāha*; or it is grasp (*gāha*) on account of the object being inverted; thus it is *vipariyesagāha*. Perverted grasp is the meaning.

In the expositions of unconscientiousness and recklessness of blame, the meaning is to be understood contrary to what has been said in conscientiousness and fear of blame. And the 'strength' called unconscientiousness-with-recklessness of

blame is to be understood in the sense of not trembling because of co-existent states.

In the expositions of greed and delusion,¹ 'greed' means 'is greedy.' 'Being greedy' is the mode of greed; 'greedy' is consciousness associated with greed, or a person with such consciousness; 'greediness' is the state of the greedy mind or person. 'Infatuation' is excessive lust. 'Being infatuated' refers to its mode. 'Infatuation' is the state of an infatuated mind or person. 'Covetousness' means coveting. It has been explained under 'greed.' [254] 'Immoral root' means immoral *plus* root, root of immoral things.

'Lack of knowledge' and 'of vision' is the opposite of knowledge and vision. 'Lack of comprehension' means the not getting at, not coming up to things when confronted with them. Co-ordination of things² is judgment; 'want of judgment' is the opposite; 'lack of enlightenment' is the not connecting them with impermanence, ill, soullessness; perceiving in an unreal, distorted way is also 'lack of enlightenment.' 'Lack of penetration' is not penetrating the doctrine of the 'Four Truths.' 'Lack of grasp' is the not comprehending even a single fact of external experience under the general law of impermanence, etc. Does not probe into a matter—this is 'lack of thorough grasp.' Does not contemplate impartially (evenly)—this is 'lack of impartial regard.'³ Does not take a view based on the nature of things—this is 'non-reflection.' There is not one single act among moral and immoral acts that this delusion visualizes, owing to its perverting and failing to comprehend the intrinsic nature—this is 'non-visualization.'⁴ Or, such delusion cannot itself perform the visualization of any such action—this is non-visualization. That delusion destructive of the pure continuity of consciousness, which by its absence would remain pure and cleansed, is 'destructive of purity.' The state of

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 389, 390.

² Lit. perceiving things as fit (*anurūpato . . . anubodho; sic lege*).

³ Lit. of even regard.

⁴ Lit. [absence of] work of bringing before the eyes.

being foolish is 'folly.' Is deluded—this is 'delusion.' Excessive delusion is 'vagueness.' That which is deluded all round is 'obfuscation.' What is not knowledge by being opposed to it is 'ignorance.' The meanings of the next words, 'flood,' 'bond,' have been given. Continually lies latent in the sense of being firmly fixed—this is 'bias.' Besets and subjugates the mind—this is 'bursting forth.'¹ Cannot go in the direction of benefit owing to not acquiring benefit; it lags—this is a 'barrier'; it limps is the meaning. Or in the sense of being difficult to open or lift it is a bar. For as an iron bar called *mahāpaligha* is difficult to lift, so is this delusion like the bar; hence a 'bar.' The rest is clear in meaning.

[255] The sections of the Summary and Emptiness are to be understood in sense by the method given above.

End of the First Kind of Immoral Consciousness.

CHAPTER III

THE SECOND AND FOLLOWING TYPES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

IN the second class of consciousness,² the expression 'with external aid'³ is the only variant. The meaning of that also has been discussed above. But further, although [as in the first class] this consciousness arises in one who with joy lets his sense-experience evoke greed, and who [erroneously] regards such notions as 'a being,' 'a person' [as something ultimately true], yet inasmuch as it may also arise 'through external aid'—i.e., be deliberately, methodically [brought about]—at such a time this class of consciousness is to be understood as coming to pass. Thus, when the son of a noble family asks in marriage a maiden of heretical views, and they will not give her, saying, 'You have different views,' other relatives cause them to give her to him, opposing them by saying, 'This [young man] will do whatever work you do.' And in company with these

¹ Cf. *Points of Controversy*, p. 288 (*pariyuttihāna*).

² *Dhs.* § 399.

³ *B.P.E.*: 'prompted by a conscious motive.'

heretical people, he goes to the heretics, and at first there is only a difference of opinion, but as time goes on, the doings of these heretics become acceptable, and he accepts the heretical views, saying, 'They are pleasing to me.'

Moreover, in this class, among the 'or-whatever' states, sloth and torpor are additional features. Of these the one is the state of being slothful, the other is the state of being torpid. Absence of striving, difficulty through inability, is the meaning. The compound 'sloth-torpor' is sloth *plus* torpor; of which sloth has the absence of, or opposition to striving as characteristic, destruction of energy as function, sinking of associated states as manifestation; torpor has unwieldiness as characteristic, closing the doors of consciousness as function,¹ shrinking in taking the object, or drowsiness as manifestation; and both have unsystematic thought, in not arousing oneself from discontent² and laziness [or indulgence], as proximate cause.

End of the Second Type of Consciousness.

The Third class of consciousness arises in one who with joy lets his sense-experience evoke greed, who does not [erroneously] regard such notions as 'a being,' 'a person' [as something ultimately true], who goes to look at cock-fights, wrestling, boxing, dancing, theatres, etc., or is devoted to [256] listening to pleasant sounds, and so on [for the other senses]. Here there are five factors unfailing³ together with conceit. Herein conceit is fancying (deeming, vain imagining). It has haughtiness as characteristic, self-praise as function, desire to [advertise self like] a banner as manifestation, greed dissociated from opinionativeness as proximate cause, and should be regarded as [a form of] lunacy.

End of the Third Type of Consciousness,

¹ Reading *odahanarasam*. *Onahanarasam* would mean 'binding of associated states.'—*Tr.*

² Namely, in quiet settlements, calm, insight, etc.—*Pyī.*

³ See above, p. 334.

When at the above-mentioned places (cock-fights and so on) people spit on one's head, scatter the dust off their feet, then in those who, to avoid the spittle and dust, strenuously look to themselves at intervals, as well as in those who look through this and that aperture when a royal procession goes forth or a festive party moves along, this fourth consciousness arises. In it are seven [of the ten]¹ or-whatevers,¹ together with sloth and torpor. In both this class and the next wrong view is wanting. Excepting this the enumeration of states is to be understood by the other classes.

End of the Fourth Type of Consciousness.

The fifth class arises in one who being neutral as to feeling lets his sense experience evoke greed, and who [erroneously] regards such notions as 'a being,' 'a person,' etc., as ultimately true. In it indifferent feeling is in place of joy; zest is wanting. All the rest is like the first class of consciousness.

End of the Fifth Type of Consciousness.

The sixth, seventh, eighth classes of consciousness are to be understood in the same way as the second, third and fourth by changing the feeling and leaving out zest.

In these eight classes of consciousness, accompanied by greed, two dominant influences of co-existence and of object are to be understood.

The ninth class arises in one who with gloom lets his sense-experience evoke aversion. In the determination of the occasion of this consciousness, 'gloomy' refers to a mind depraved by hate, or a mind contemptible through having base feeling. The state of such a mind is gloom (or moroseness). 'Accompanied by gloom' means morose.² It impinges on the object without affection—this is aversion.

¹ See above, p. 334.

² *Dhs.* § 413.

'Associated with aversion' means accompanied thereby. [257] In the summary of states, in three places, morose [or gloomy] feeling of grief occurs where the meaning of the term feeling has been explained; likewise the terms painful and gloomy.

With reference to characteristics, etc., gloom has the experiencing of an undesirable object as characteristic, making use of the undesirable in this or that manner as function, mental ailing as manifestation, and assuredly the heart-basis as proximate cause.

Hate and ill-will have been discussed in connection with roots and courses of action, just as greed and covetousness have been mentioned in the first class of consciousness. 'Hate' may be defined as 'by it [associated states] offend [the object],' or 'itself is offensive,' or as mere offending. It has flying into anger or churlishness as characteristic, like a smitten snake; spreading of itself, or writhing as when poison takes effect, as function; or, burning that on which it depends¹ as function, like a jungle-fire; offending or injuring as manifestation, like a foe who has got his chance; having the grounds of vexation as proximate cause, like urine mixed with poison.

By it the mind reaches the putrid state:—this is 'malignity,'² or, it ruins the practice of the Vinaya, the attainment of beauty, of benefit, of bliss, etc.—this is ill-will. In meaning it is just *doso* (the preceding term).

And in this ninth kind of consciousness are twenty-nine terms in order due, making fourteen by taking what has not been taken. By virtue of them the difference between the groups, classifiable and unclassifiable, is to be understood.

Of the 'or-whatevers,' desire-to-do, resolve, attention and distraction are constant. But these arise as groups of five with the presence of one or other of the three:—envy, meanness and worry. These three are thus known as inconstant 'or-whatever' states. Of these 'envy' is that which envies.³ It has the characteristic of envying, of not enduring the

¹ The heart or physical base (*hadaya-vatthu*).—*Pjñ.*

² *Dhs.* § 419.

³ *Ib.* § 1121

prosperity of others, the function of taking no delight in such prosperity, the manifestation of turning one's face from such prosperity, the proximate cause being such prosperity; and it should be regarded as a fetter.

'Meanness'¹ is the state of being mean. It has, as characteristic, the concealing of one's property, either attained or about to be attained; the not enduring the sharing of one's property in common with others, as function; the shrinking from such sharing, or niggardliness or sour feeling* [258] as manifestation; one's own property as proximate cause; and it should be regarded as mental ugliness.

A contemptible act is *kukata*; the state of [a displeased mind, produced by making] such an act [its object] is 'worry' (*kukkucca*).² It has repentance as characteristic, sorrow at deeds of commission and omission as function, regret as manifestation, deeds of commission and omission as proximate cause, and it should be regarded as a state of bondage.

So much of what is distinctive is there in the section of the outline.

In the exposition of feeling,³ in the section of the exposition, 'unhappy' should be known as the opposite of happy.

In the exposition of hate,⁴ that which offends or hates is 'hate.' 'Hating' is the act or mode of offending. 'Hatred' is the state of the offending mind or person. Offence in the sense of forsaking nature⁵ is 'disordered temper.' 'Upsetting' is the act or mode of such offending. That which opposes is 'opposition.' That which opposes repeatedly is 'hostility.' This is said of the mode of the opposing or hostile [person or mind]. The rough, hard-hearted person is 'churlish.' The state of such an one is 'churlishness.' On account of this fault not a word is well-chosen, but is ill-spoken, not completed—this is 'abruptness.' In anger there is no finished speech, or even if speech during anger is so, it is without measure. For *asuropa* others read *assuropa* 'dropping tears,' because of tears being shed. This view is not reasonable, because a

¹ *Dhs.* § 1122.

* *Kaṭukañcukatā*.

² Cf. *B.P.E.*, p. 312, n. 4.

³ *Dhs.* § 415.

⁴ *Ib.* § 418.

⁵ *Pakatibhāvo*.

happy person may also shed tears. As to the term *an-attamanatā*, there is no mentality of self because of opposition to mentality of self, as explained above. But because this is of the mind only, and not of a being,¹ therefore it has been said to be 'of the mind.' Here, as well as in the sections of the Compendium and Emptiness, the remainder should be understood by the method given above.

THE TENTH TYPE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

The tenth, because it is induced 'by external aid,' arises in one urged by others, one who remembers the offence of another, one who by himself keeps remembering others' offences and gets angry. In this class of consciousness also are twenty-nine terms in order due; but they make fourteen terms by taking what has not been taken. And in the 'or-whatevers' sloth and torpor also are obtained. Therefore in this consciousness are these six:—to wit, four unfailing factors and sloth and torpor, without envy, meanness and worry. At the time when envy, etc., arise, seven 'or-whatevers' at any one moment arise together with one or other among them. All that remains in all the sections is just like the ninth kind of consciousness. But in these two kinds of consciousness where dejection is a factor, [259] only the co-existent dominance is obtained; object-dominance is not obtained,² for anger does not care or have respect for anything.

THE ELEVENTH TYPE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

The eleventh kind of consciousness arises when misgiving is aroused in one who as to feeling is indifferent with regard to the six objects of sense. In determining the occasion of this sort of consciousness, we find a new phrase:—'associated with doubt.'³ In the outline of states only the expression, 'there is doubt,' is distinctive. Here doubt means exclusion from the cure⁴ [of knowledge]. Or, one investigating the intrinsic nature by means of it suffers pain and fatigue (*kicchati*)—thus it is doubt. It has shifting about as characteristic, mental

¹ Satio, ultimate persistent entity, soul. ² See above, p. 284.

³ Dhs. §§ 422-25.

⁴ Cikicchā, omitted in P.T.S. ed.

wavering as function, indecision or uncertainty in grasp as manifestation, unsystematic thought as proximate cause, and it should be regarded as a danger to attainment.

There are twenty-three terms in order due in this consciousness; by taking what has not been taken they make fourteen. By way of them the determination of the groups classifiable and unclassifiable is to be understood. These two, attention and distraction, are the only 'or-whatevers.'

In the exposition of one-pointedness of mind,¹ because this 'distraction' is weak, and because, in the eleventh class, there is just a mere static instant² of the mind, therefore without saying 'solidity,' etc., just one term—'stability of mind'—is stated. On this account, in the section of the outline also, 'the controlling faculty of concentration,' etc., are not given.

In the exposition of perplexity or doubt, 'doubt' (*kañkha*) is the act of doubting. A previous doubt is said to induce a subsequent doubt; or the term is one of manner or mode. Consciousness imbued with doubt is 'dubious' from the arising of doubt, and of such the state is 'dubiety.' Puzzlement is 'not intelligence.'³ 'Perplexity' has been explained. In the sense of wavering already given it sways to and fro—'swaying between two.' Because of hindering attainment it is like a path branching in two—a 'double path.' 'Fluctuation' is the inability to establish anything in one mode, thus, 'Is this state permanent, or is it impermanent?' [260] Because of the inability to 'comprehend,' there is 'uncertainty of grasp.' 'Evasion' is the being unable to decide, receding from the object. 'Hesitation' is the being unable to plunge in. 'Not plunging in' is the inability to plunge right in. 'Mental rigidity' is the inability to proceed as deciding respecting the object. Stiffness is the meaning. For perplexity having arisen makes the mind stiff. But because on arising it takes the object and, so to speak, scratches the mind, therefore it is called 'mental scarifying.' The rest in all the sections is evident.

¹ *Dhs.* § 424.

² Some read *idain cittaiñ dubbalai*, *ettha pavatti thitimattam eva*, 'this consciousness is weak and there is just the mere static procedure.'

³ Read *Vimati ti na mati*.

THE TWELFTH TYPE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

In the determination of the occasion of the twelfth kind the phrase 'associated with distraction'¹ occurs. This sort of consciousness—namely, being hedonically neutral as to sense—becomes distracted. In the 'summary of states' distraction here comes in place of perplexity (or doubt). In the order of terms there are twenty-eight terms, which make fourteen by adding what has not been taken. It is through these that the arrangement of the groups, classifiable and unclassifiable, is to be understood. Two 'or-whatevers' are present:—resolve and attention.

In the exposition of 'distraction,'² in the Exposition section, 'of mind' means excluding a being or a man (as ultimate entity). 'Distraction' is the mode of mind when excited, flurried. 'Disquietude' is unquiet. 'Agitation' is a throwing about of mind. 'Turmoil of mind' is a reeling condition like the swaying of a moving vehicle, or an ox, etc. By this expression fluctuating about one object only is intended; for distraction wavers as to one object, doubt as to various objects. The rest in all the sections should be understood by the method above given.

Now in these two classes of consciousness, this is the specific distinction. On being asked, 'How many kinds of consciousness roll off from an object?' these two, 'associated with distraction' and 'accompanied by doubt,' should be stated. Of these the latter [261] invariably rolls off; the former, when it has obtained a footing in the acquirement of resolve, rolls off at stages. Just as if two stones, one round and the other rectangular, were to roll down an inclination, the round stone would roll down right away, the rectangular stone would roll with intervals of stopping, so should the application of this simile be understood.

In all these twelve classes of consciousness the classification of 'low,' etc.,³ has not been brought out, because all of them

¹ *Dhs.* § 427.

² *Ib.* § 429.

³ Cf. above, p. 284.

are low. The dominant influence¹ of co-existence, although obtainable, has not been brought out, because the method has already been shown above. But in these twelve, owing to the absence of knowledge, there is no such thing as the dominance of investigation. In the last two classes a different dominant influence (from that of investigation) might have been brought out, but it (*i.e.*, that of co-existence) is also absent, because it does not arise with any co-existent state as the principal in desire-to-act, etc., and because of the inhibition in the *Paṭṭhāna*. But when action is put forth by these twelve classes of immoral consciousness, excepting the one accompanied by distraction, the remaining eleven involve rebirth. When the kind that is accompanied by doubt, being weak and without obtaining resolve, involves rebirth, why does not the one accompanied by distraction, which is strong and has obtained resolve, do so? Because of its not being a state 'removable by the path of insight.'² Did it carry rebirth, it would come in the division named 'removable by the path of insight.' (But it does not so come), hence, excepting it, the remaining eleven involve rebirth. Moreover when action is put forth by any of the eleven, there is rebirth in the four places of suffering by that volition, and rebirth is got by the unconditioned element of mind-cognition accompanied by indifference as an immoral result. And there would also be a getting of rebirth in the four places of suffering by the kind of consciousness accompanied by distraction. If so, there should then be removal by the path of insight. But because there is to this kind of consciousness no getting of rebirth in purgatory, therefore it does not come in that Division.

End of the explanation of the expression, Immoral States.

¹ Cf. above, p. 284.

² Cf. p. 57.

PART X—DISCOURSE ON UNMORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

CHAPTER I

DUALITY IN AWARENESS OF MIND

Now the analysis and exposition of the term ' unmoral ' begins at the question, ' Which are the states that are unmoral ? '¹ Unmoral [consciousness] is then shown as fourfold—namely, with respect to result, inoperative action, matter and Nibbāna'. That question is stated to show resultant unmoral consciousness, the moral result in that, the limited result in that, the unconditioned element in that,² as well as the fivefold sense-awareness therein,² and visual awareness by ' door '-process therein. [262] And the statement: ' . . . because moral kamma has been wrought on the sensuous plane . . .' is to show genesis in that (visual awareness) by kammas specifically caused, thus excluding reference to such general conditions as ' door,' ' object,' etc.

Here ' . . . has been wrought ' refers to the act as a cause; ' has been stored up ' refers to the heaping up, the development, * as cause. ' Visual awareness ' is cognition by sight as a cause, or cognition proceeding from, or seated in the eye. This holds for the other senses. In visual awareness, the ' characteristic ' is being aware of a visible object by dependence upon the sense of sight, the ' function ' is the taking as object merely the visible form, the ' manifestation ' is the state of confronting the visible object, the ' proximate cause ' is the disappearance of the inoperative element of ' mind ' with regard to the visible object. The other modes of sense-awareness may be similarly defined. Here taken in order are ten terms, or, by omitting what has already been taken, seven. Of the seven, two only are classifiable. Of these, consciousness is classified with respect to two

¹ *Dhs.* § 431. ² Clauses omitted in P.T.S. ed. * *Upacitattā*.

occasions—namely, by way of the fivefold contact-group and of controlling faculty; feeling with respect to three occasions—by way of the fivefold contact-group, of Jhāna-factor and of controlling faculty. Of groups also there are these three; there is only one 'or-whatever'—to wit, attention.

In the section of the Exposition, visual awareness as 'clear'¹ is said with reference to basis. For consciousness, when moral, is known to be clear by its own purity, when immoral, by the results in the life-continuum, and when resultant, by the clearness of the basis.

In the exposition of one-pointedness of mind,² 'stability of thought'—thus much of the term is stated. For this consciousness also is weak; in it just the static instant is obtained; it is not able to reach solidity, steadfastness.

In the section of the Summary, the Jhāna-factors and Path-factors have not been brought out, because the Jhāna is consummated by³ initial application of mind and the Path is consummated by a moral condition. Originally without conscious initial application the Jhāna-factor is not obtained, neither, in consciousness morally unconditioned, are the Path-factors obtained. [263] Therefore in this kind of consciousness neither of these factors has been brought out. In it has been classified the fourfold aggregate of mental co-efficients (contact, volition, one-pointedness of mind, life-controlling faculty). The section of Emptiness is clear as to its meaning.⁴ The expositions of auditory awareness, etc., should be understood in the same way.

Indifference has been assigned to any cognition by way of sense; but pleasure, only to the sense of touch. Herein is this distinction, which should be understood with reference to impact. In the four doors—eye, ear, nose, tongue—only derived matter strikes or impinges on derived matter. When this takes place, the resisting friction is not strong; there is just the mere touch, as when four lumps of cotton placed on four anvils are struck by cotton lumps. Feeling takes up the

¹ Dhs. § 436.

² Ib. § 438.

³ °Pacchimakarī. Some read °pamānam, 'measured by.'

⁴ Or remains the same.

middle (neutral) position. But in the door of the bodily surface the external great essential itself as the object strikes the internal sentient organism and impinges on the [internal] great essentials which are the cause of [internal] sensory stimulation. As when the cotton lump, placed on top of the anvils, is struck with a hammer, the hammer breaks through the cotton and 'takes' the anvil, and the friction is strong, so the friction of the impact is strong.¹ With reference to a desirable object, intimation by act arises, accompanied by pleasure; with reference to an undesirable object, it is accompanied by pain. And the basis, door, object of these five classes of consciousness are constant. In the fivefold cognition of sense there is no such thing as the shifting of the basis, etc. For the moral resultant, visual cognition, making the sensitive eye the basis, and accomplishing the function of seeing visible objects sprung from four causes and desirable or fairly desirable, stands at the eye-door and becomes a 'result.' The auditory and other cognitions, making the sensitive ear, etc., the basis, and accomplishing the function of hearing, smelling, tasting or touching, in sounds, etc., desirable or fairly desirable, stand at the ear-door, etc., and become results. But of these objects sound springs from two causes (thought and the caloric order).

In the exposition of the mind-element,² mind, in the sense of intrinsic nature, emptiness, absence of a living entity, and element make up this compound. It has the characteristic of knowing visible or other objects immediately after visual or other cognition respectively, the function of receiving visible and other objects, the manifestation of the state of such reception, the proximate cause of the absence of visual and other cognition. [264] Here, in the section of the outline of states, are twelve terms; by taking what has not been taken there are nine, of which seven are unclassifiable, two classifiable. Resolve and attention are the two 'or-whatevers.' The exposition of initial application of mind defines it as a setting on to the object. But because the consciousness in

¹ Cf. *Comp. of Phil.* 231 f.

² *Dhs.* §§ 455 ff.

question is neither moral nor immoral, therefore it is not said to be 'right intention, or wrong intention.' In the section of the Summary, the Jhāna-factor, although obtainable, has fallen into the stream of the fivefold sense-cognition; hence it has not been brought out. And the Path-factor is not even obtained.¹ The section of Emptiness is evident. The basis of this consciousness is constant and is the heart-basis. The door and object are not constants. Of these, though the door and the object may be shifted, yet the locus is one; for this consciousness has receptiveness for function²—namely, in the five objects at the five doors—where, after being receptive, it becomes a result. When visual and other cognitions of moral results cease, it receives those visible and other objects which have reached their loci, and been produced immediately after the cognitions.

In the expositions of the element of mind-cognition³ the term, rapture, in the first element of mind-cognition is an additional feature. Feeling also is joyful feeling. Because this first element arises only with respect to a desirable object therefore it is joyful feeling. The second element arises with respect to a desirable neutral object, therefore in it is indifferent feeling. The terms are the same as those in the exposition of the mind-element. In both, because the elements of mind-cognition have fallen into the stream of the fivefold sense-cognition, the Jhāna-factors have not been brought out, nor have the Path-factors, because they are unobtainable. The remainder in all the sections should be understood by the method given above. But as to characteristics, etc., this twofold element of mind-cognition with unconditional resultant has the characteristic of knowing the six sense-objects, the function of receptiveness, etc., the manifestation of such a state of receiving, etc., the proximate cause of the heart-basis.

Of the two elements, the first becomes a result on two occasions:—when this resultant mind-element, coming imme-

¹ Reading, for *pana*, *pi na*.

² Reading *ekamp*, *sampati*°.

³ *Dhs.* §§ 469 f.

⁴ *Ib.* § 455.

diately after such sense-cognition as is a moral resultant in the five doors, and receiving the object of such cognition, ceases, it stands in the five doors and becomes a result, accomplishing the act of receiving with respect to that very object. And it becomes a result as the registration (or retention) with respect to a vivid object at the six doors. [265] How ? When a boat goes across a fierce current, the water is cleft and follows the boat a little distance, and then goes along with the current. So when at the six doors the vivid object, being deceitful, presents itself, apperception takes place; after this happens, there comes the turn for the subconscious life-continuum. But this consciousness, not allowing this turn, seizes the object which was seized by apperception, arises in the first or second conscious interval, and descends even into the life-continuum. Or similarly, when a herd of cattle cross a stream—so the simile might be expanded. Thus this element of mind-cognition, from seizing that object seized by apperception, results in an act of registration.

And the second becomes a result on five occasions. How ? At the time when the blind, the deaf, the foolish, the mad, a hermaphrodite, or a neuter takes conception in the world of men, such consciousness takes effect as conception; after that as long as such a person lives, it takes effect as life-continuum; in the fivefold-object-process with respect to the moderately desirable, it takes effect as receiving, in a vivid object at the six doors, at the moment of death, registration and decease respectively. Thus it results on five occasions.

End of the Twofold element of mind-cognition.

CHAPTER II

DISCOURSE ON THE MORAL RESULT OF THE SENSUOUS REALM

Now to show the eight main kinds of resultant consciousness, once more a beginning is made with, ' Which are the states that are unmoral ?¹ Herein, since the method has already

¹ *Dhs.* § 498.

been given in the text, all the sections have been abridged. Their meaning should be understood by the method given above. But herein, to show such distinctions as there are, it is stated that 'the absence of greed is an unmoral root.' As to such terms as are not stated, they should be understood thus: the divisions into door of kamma, course of kamma, basis of meritorious act¹, described under the moralities of the sensuous realm, do not obtain here. And why? Because here we deal with consciousness where there is no production of intimation, no giving of result, no arising as a meritorious act, such as charity, etc. [266] Among the 'or-whatevers,' the pity and sympathy given above are not among the results, owing to their having a being as object. For the results of consciousness in the sensuous realm are really concerned with limited objects. And it is not only pity and sympathy that are here absent, the 'abstinences' are also absent. For, of course, the five precepts are [not unmoral, but] moral.

Here also the arrangement of classes of consciousness as automatic and non-automatic by means of moral thought and different causes should be understood as obtaining. The result of automatic moral consciousness is automatic, but of non-automatic moral consciousness, it is non-automatic. Moreover, that result which arises from such causes as potent objects is automatic; the other arisen from such other causes as weak objects is non-automatic. In the division also into low, etc., these units of resultant consciousness are not known as 'low,' 'medium,' 'exalted,' because they are not accomplished as such by desire-to-do or other dominant influence.² But the result of low moral consciousness is low, that of medium moral consciousness is medium, and that of exalted moral consciousness is exalted. Here there are no dominant influences. And why? Because they are unfit to be produced with desire-to-do, etc., as the principal. All the remainder is as has been said in the eight classes of moral consciousness.

Now we have to understand the occasion when the results

¹ See above, pp. 209 *ff.*

² P. 284.

of these eight main classes of resultant consciousness take effect. This is on four occasions:—conception, life-continuum, decease, registration. How? They take effect as conception in the case of meritorious, twice-conditioned, or thrice-conditioned persons among men and devas of the sensuous realm. Next, subsequent to conception, they become the life-continuum for sixty, eighty, or even an incalculable number of years, for the whole life-cycle; thirdly, registration at the six doors in the case of a vivid object; and lastly, decease at the moment of death. Thus on four occasions they take effect.

All those who are about to be Buddhas, at the time of taking their last conception, do so by means of the great units of resultant consciousness, accompanied by joy, thrice-conditioned and automatic. And that conception-consciousness is the result of a prior consciousness of love. But [in their case] the incalculably long lifetime [conferred] in that conception is reversed as to time. Mahāsiva the Elder said: 'Consciousness accompanied by indifference is stronger than that which is accompanied by joy; it is by the former that Bodhisats take conception; conceived by that, they have noble aspirations, they do not hanker even after celestial objects, they are like Tipiṭaka-Cūlanāga the Elder and others.' [267] But the Great Commentary, rejecting this view, thus, 'This idea is merely the Elder's fancy,' goes on to say: 'The beneficent work of omniscient Bodhisats is powerful; therefore Bodhisats take conception by a consciousness, which in its early phase was love, was a moral resultant of experience in the world of sense, is accompanied by joy, is thrice-conditioned and automatic.'

Now a table of contents should be drawn up for the discourse of elucidating results. So far the Elder Tipiṭaka-Cūlanāga has said: 'By one moral volition sixteen kinds of resultant consciousness arise. In this (by virtue of twice-conditioned conception) there are the twelve kinds² of results, and (by virtue of unconditioned conception) the eightfold unconditioned

¹ Cf. *Jātaka* i. 172.—*Ed.*

² Maggo.

result.' But Mahādatta the Elder, [known as] Moravāpi-vāsin,¹ has said: 'By one moral volition arise twelve kinds of resultant consciousness. In this (by virtue of the twice-conditioned conception) are the ten kinds² of results, and, by virtue of unconditioned conception, the eightfold unconditioned result.' Elder Tipiṭaka-Mahādhammarakkhita said, 'By one moral volition arise *ten* kinds of resultant consciousness. In this, by virtue of unconditioned conception, there is the eightfold unconditioned result.' On this occasion they took up the 'Sāketa query.' In Sāketa the devotees, assembled in hall, raised the query:—'When by one volition kamma is put forth, is there one conception only, or different conceptions?³' Being unable to decide it, they went and asked the Abhidhamma Elders, who convinced them by saying, 'Just as from one mango seed only one sprout issues forth, so there is only one conception.' Then one day they raised the query thus:—'When kamma is put forth by different volitions, are there different conceptions³ or is there one only?' And being unable to decide it they asked the Elders, who convinced them by saying, 'Just as when many mango seeds are sown, many sprouts issue forth, so are there many conceptions.'

Furthermore, on this occasion there was drawn up what is known as the declaration of [karmic] preponderance. Namely:—these [reborn] beings abound in greed, hate and delusion, as well as in the severally opposite tendencies. [Let us call the former *G, H, D*; the latter *g, h, d*.—*Ed.*] Now what determines the abundance? Previous conditions. Variation is determined just at the moment when kamma is exerted. How so? When, at such a moment, *G* only in the kamma is strong, *g* is weak, *h* and *d* are strong, *H, D* are weak, then the weak *g* is unable to cancel⁴ the strong *G*, but *h, d*, being strong, [268] are able to cancel *H, D*. Hence the being, born through conception given by such kamma, is of strong appetites, of sanguine⁵ habit, good tempered, intelligent and keen as adamant in wit.

¹ Dweller at the Peacock's Pond.

² Maggo.

³ I.e., of living beings in rebirth.—*Ed.*

⁴ Lit. possess (*pariyādātum*).

⁵ Lit. happy going (*sukha-silo*).

If, on the other hand, when kamma is put forth, both *G*, *H* are strong, and *g*, *h* are weak, *d* is strong, *D* is weak, then by the foregoing method the resultant being has strong appetites and dislikes, but is intelligent and keen as adamant in wit, as was Elder Dattābhaya. When *G*, *D* are strong, and the rest weak, the resultant, by the preceding method, is lustful, dull, but is amiable and gentle of disposition. Furthermore, when *G*, *H*, *D*, at that moment, are strong, the rest *g*, *h*, *d* weak, by the foregoing method, the resultant is strong in appetites and dislikes, and is dull in intelligence. Again, when, at that moment, *g*, *H*, *D* are strong, *G*, *h*, *d* weak, he will be fairly free from lust, and not carried away even by the sight of divine objects, but he will be full of enmity and dull of intelligence. Again, when *G*, *h*, *D* at that moment are strong, and the rest weak, he, by the foregoing method, will be greedy and amiable, but dull. Again, when *g*, *H*, *d* are strong, and the rest weak, he, by the foregoing method, will be not greedy or intelligent, and full of dislikes. Finally, when *g*, *h*, *d*, at that moment, are strong, and *G*, *H*, *D* are weak, the resultant being will be disinterested, amiable and wise as was Elder Mahā-Sangharakkhita.

Furthermore on that occasion the declaration as to root-conditions was drawn up¹—Thrice-conditioned kamma gives a result which may be thrice-conditioned, twice-conditioned, or unconditioned. Twice-conditioned kamma does not give thrice-conditioned result, but gives the others. By thrice-conditioned kamma conception may be thrice-conditioned, or twice-conditioned, but not unconditioned; by twice-conditioned kamma, it may be twice-conditioned or unconditioned, but not thrice-conditioned. Automatic moral consciousness gives a result which may be automatic² or non-automatic. [269] Non-automatic moral consciousness gives a result which may be non-automatic or automatic. Feeling must vary according to the object. Registration must be determined by apperception.³

¹ The reader is reminded that 'root-conditions' refer to the foregoing six: *G*, *H*, *D*, *g*, *h*, *d*.—*Ed.*

² See above, p. 353; cf. 373.

³ See *Compendium*, p. 126 f.

Now in the doctrine of this and that Elder, sixteen kinds (of results), etc., should be understood.

To expand: In the case of a being who has taken conception by the first main class of resultant consciousness, similar to the first class of sensuous moral consciousness, and, after issuing from the womb, has become able to acquire a certain status of restraint and non-restraint, when a desired object has presented itself at the door of his eye, and before the advertинг door-consciousness has affected the subconscious life-continuum, there is no measure of the object and its passing. Why is it thus? Because of the weakness of the object. This is one of the occasions without effect.

Again, when adverting by the five doors does agitate the life-continuum, but has not yet reached determination, it persists in the interval, visually cognizing, or receiving, or examining, and it is impossible that it should turn back. Reaching determination, one or two moments of consciousness arise; then, getting the causal relation of repetition, and persisting as apperception, it again lapses into subconsciousness. This act of perception is also of the kind where the object is weak, and is obtained when we say, 'It was as if I saw,' or 'I heard.' This is another occasion without effect.

Again, when another person attending on occasion of sense agitates my subconscious life-continuum, processes of cognition arise,¹ apperception takes place. But whereas registration should occur at the conclusion of apperception, before registration arises, apperception lapses into the subconscious life-continuum. To illustrate this:—Just as in constructing an embankment in the river, and in directing the water to a great channel, the water first flows over and fills the fields on both sides of the bank and flooding, runs along crab-passages, etc., then flows into the full river, so herein. The time when the water flows [only] in the river [270] is like that of the proceeding of the subconscious life-continuum. The time of constructing the embankment is like that of the advertинг by a sense-door agitating the life-continuum. The time of

¹ Lit. processed cognitions (*vithicittāni*).

water flowing into the great channel is the occurrence of the process of perception. The filling of the fields on both sides of the bank is like apperception. The flowing back of the water into the river after running along crab-passages, etc., is the relapse into the life-continuum after apperception has taken place, before registration arises. Thus there is no means of computing the act of consciousness descending into the life-continuum. This consciousness is also of the kind described owing to the weakness of the object. It is the third occasion without effect.

But now, if a vivid object is presented, visual or other cognitions arise when advertiring by the five doors agitates the life-continuum, and a unit of the first kind of moral consciousness of the sensuous realm becomes apperception at the stage of apperception, and coming into play six or seven times, gives the turn to registration, then this registration being at the same time established, the main type of *resultant* consciousness, similar to that unit of moral consciousness, is established. This resultant consciousness gets two names:—‘root of life-continuum,’ from its resemblance to conception-consciousness, and ‘registration,’ because [like the act of registration] it seizes the object which was seized by the apperception.

On this occasion four kinds of resultant consciousness:—visual cognition, reception, examination, registration—are counted as results. And when the second class of moral consciousness becomes apperception, then the second kind of resultant consciousness resembling it is established as registration. This second kind of resultant consciousness, in that it does not resemble conception-consciousness, gets two names:—‘adventitious life-continuum’ and ‘registration’—by the former method. Together with it the four preceding kinds of [resultant] consciousness make five. And when the third class of moral consciousness becomes apperception, then the third kind of resultant consciousness resembling it stands as registration. By the said method this consciousness gets two names:—‘adventitious life-continuum’ and ‘registration.’ Together with it the preceding five kinds of consciousness make six. And when the fourth class of moral conscious-

ness becomes apperception, then the fourth kind of resultant consciousness resembling it stands as registration. This consciousness by the said method gets the same two names. [271] Together with it the preceding six kinds of consciousness make seven.

Next, when at the eye-door a moderately desirable object is presented, in that object also by the said method three ineffective occasions may happen. But because [in this case] feeling is interchangeable with the object, therefore over that object there is examination accompanied by indifference. At the conclusion of any of the four main classes of moral apperceptions, accompanied by indifference, each of the corresponding four main kinds of resultant consciousness accompanied by indifference stands as registration. And these four kinds of consciousness by the said method get two names:—‘adventitious life-continuum’ and ‘registration,’—and are called the posterior life-continuum. Thus these five kinds of consciousness together with the preceding seven make twelve. So there are twelve at the eye-door and in each of the other doors of ear, etc., making fully sixty kinds of resultant consciousness [having respect to each sense]. So by one volition, when kamma is put forth, full sixty kinds of consciousness can arise. However, by taking only what has not been taken, twelve in the eye-door and the four cognitions—auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile—make sixteen.

In this connection the [consulting Elders] adopted the parable of the mango:—A certain man with his head covered went to sleep at the foot of a fruiting mango-tree. Then a ripe mango loosened from the stalk fell to the ground, grazing his ear. Awakened by that sound, he opened his eyes and looked; then stretching out his hand he took the fruit, squeezed it, smelt it, and ate it. Herein, the time of his sleeping at the foot of the mango-tree is as when we are subconsciously alive; the instant of the ripe mango falling from its stalk grazing his ear is like the instant of the object striking the sentient organism; the time of awaking through the sound is like that of adverting by the five doors agitating the subconscious life-continuum; the time of the man’s opening his eyes and looking

is like that of accomplishing the function of seeing through visual cognition; the time of stretching out his hand and taking the mango is as that of the resultant mind-element receiving the object; the time of taking it and squeezing it is as that of the resultant element of mind-cognition examining the object; the time of smelling it is as that of the inoperative element of mind-cognition determining the object; [272] the time of eating it is as that of apperception enjoying the taste of the object. What does this simile signify? The function of the object striking the sentient organism. When this happens there is the function of advertiring by the five doors just agitating the life-continuum, the function of just the seeing by visual cognition, of just the receiving of the object by the resultant mind-element, of just the examining of the object by the resultant element of mind-cognition, of just the determining of the object by the inoperative element of mind-cognition. But verily only the apperception enjoys the taste of the object. This is what it signifies. And in the production of this consciousness there is no doer or instigator saying, 'Be thou life-continuum, be thou advertiring, be thou the vision, be thou the reception, be thou the examination, be thou the determination, be thou apperception.'

Once more: on that occasion they adopted the fivefold order [of the cosmos]:—Germinal, Caloric, Moral, Natural-phenomenal, Psychical.¹ Of these, the Germinal order [reveals] a giving of this and that similar modes of fruition to this or that seed, as in the gram's top shoots sprouting to the north, the southern creeper growing round a tree from the right, the sunflower's facing the sun, the Māluva creeper growing towards a tree, the holes occurring in the top of the cocoanut.

The Caloric order is the simultaneous blossoming, fructifying and sprouting of such and such trees at such and such seasons.

Thrice-conditioned kamma gives thrice-conditioned, twice-conditioned, unconditioned result; twice-conditioned kamma

¹ Cf. the editor's *Buddhism* (1912), p. 118 f. (I regret I overlooked this interesting historical reference.) Cf. also Ledi Sayadaw's discussion in 'Expositions,' *Buddhist Review*, London, 1916.—*Ed.*

gives twice-conditioned, unconditioned result, not thrice-conditioned result—this giving of suitable results by various kammas is the Moral Order. And there is another moral order according as the result resembles the kamma. To show this meaning they tell the story:—In the time of the supreme Buddha a village near the gate of Sāvatthi was burnt down, a blazing wisp of hay therefrom rose up and caught the neck of a crow flying in the sky. The crow, screeching, fell to the ground and died. In the ocean, too, a certain ship got aground. They, not seeing any obstruction from below, cast lots; the unlucky number fell into the hand of the captain's wife. They then said: 'Owing to one woman let not all perish; we must throw her into the water.' The captain, saying 'I cannot bear to see her floating in the water,' tied a pot of sand to her neck and had her thrown. At that moment the ship moved off like an arrow shot from a bow. A certain bhikkhu lived in a cave. A huge mountain peak fell and closed up the entrance. On the seventh day of itself it moved away.

They told these three stories together to the perfect Buddha, as he sat in the Jetavana preaching the Doctrine. The Teacher said, 'This kamma was not the work of others; it was done by the crow itself,' etc., and he showed the related past:—The crow in a previous existence was a man, who, being unable to tame a vicious ox, tied a bundle of straw to its neck and set it on fire, and the ox died. Now that action did not allow the crow to escape [even though] he flew into the sky. That woman in a previous existence was also a woman. A dog was devoted to her, and when she went to the forest went and came back with her. Men scoffed at her with: 'There goes our dog-mistress.'¹ She felt ashamed and, being unable to restrain the dog, tied a pot of sand to its neck and threw it into the water. That action did not allow the woman to escape in mid-ocean. That bhikkhu in a previous existence was a cowherd. When an iguana entered a hole he closed the entrance by a handful of broken twigs, and on the seventh day himself came and opened it. The iguana came out

¹ Luddhikā. *Pyi* reads luddako, 'hunter-dog.'

trembling. Through pity he spared its life. That action did not allow that bhikkhu to escape even when he had entered a mountain cave and sat there. Thus connecting these three stories he spoke this verse:—

*Not to the sky nor to mid-ocean, nor
[274] By hiding him to any cavern of the hills,
Nor is there any spot in all the earth
Where he could stand so that he might escape
From deed of wickedness that he had wrought.¹*

This also is known as the Moral Order.

Other such stories might also be told.

Bodhisats taking conception, being born of a mother, their final enlightenment, as Tathāgata turning the wheel of Dhamma, the surrender of life and utter passing away:—the world-earthquake at each is of the Dhamma-Order.

And when an object strikes the sentient organism there is no doer or instigator to say, 'Be thou adverting,' etc. From the time the object strikes the sentient organism; each according to its own nature adverting by the five doors agitates the life-continuum, visual cognition accomplishes the function of seeing, the resultant mind-element accomplishes the function of receiving, the resultant mind-cognition-element that of examining, the inoperative mind-cognition-element that of determining, apperception enjoys the taste of the object:—all this is understood as the Psychical Order.

When, by thrice-conditioned and non-automatic moral consciousness, and also by automatic or non-automatic moral consciousness accompanied by indifference kamma is wrought, and similar resultant consciousness comes in the re-conception obtained, the same method holds good. But in the two classes of consciousness accompanied by indifference, procedure, having first been shown by way of a fairly desirable object, should afterwards be shown by way of a desirable object. Thus in each door are twelve, making sixty in all. By taking what has not been taken sixteen kinds of resultant consciousness arise.

¹ *Dhp.* 127.

In this connection they took the simile of the five machines for squeezing sugar-cane. Suppose, they said, that when sugar-cane is squeezed, eleven mechanics come out from one village, and seeing a plantation, know that it is ripe. Going up to the owner they announced that [275] they were mechanics for squeezing sugar-cane. He said, 'I am just looking for you,' and took them to the sugar-cane shed. There the eleven set up the machine and said, 'We are eleven; we ought to get another man; hire one.' The owner replied, 'I will be your mate,' entered the hut and became their mate. When each had done his work, when he who boiled the molasses had boiled the cane-juice, and it had been rolled into balls, and the owner after weighing it had given to each, and each had taken his due, and they had made over the shed to the owner, and in this way had done their work in four other sheds, they departed.

Now the five machines in the five huts are like the five sentient organs; the five plantations are the five kinds of objects. The eleven itinerant mechanics are the eleven kinds of resultant consciousness; the five owners of plantations are the five classes of sense-cognition; the time of the collaboration of the twelve men, inclusive of the owner in the first hut and the taking by each of his due, corresponds to the eleven kinds of resultant consciousness working in union with visual cognition, and accomplishing each its own function with regard to the visible object at the eye-door; the time of the owner's taking over the shed corresponds to the door of visual cognition not being transferred. The collaboration of the twelve men in the second, third, fourth, fifth sheds, and each taking his due, corresponds to the eleven kinds of resultant consciousness working in union with other sense-cognitions, and each accomplishing its function with regard to the other kinds of sense-object at the respective doors. To this extent is re-conception thrice conditioned by kamma which has three conditions. The foregoing covers also all twice-conditioned re-conception due to similar kamma.

We will now take kamma which was conditioned by two 'roots' only. This results in re-conception conditioned by

two 'roots.' When kamma is wrought by double-rooted consciousness which is accompanied by joy and is automatic, in the case of one who has taken re-conception by means of the similar doubly-conditioned resultant consciousness, [276] those three ineffectual occasions may arise at the eye-door, by the said method, when a desirable object is presented. At the conclusion of a unit of twice-conditioned, automatic apperception accompanied by joy, arises registration resembling it and termed 'sub-consciousness of conditions.' But if apperception is not automatic, the registering is termed 'adventitious sub-consciousness.' After either of the apperceptions which are accompanied by indifference concerning a fairly desirable object arise two moments of registration resembling them. Here, making eight at each door, are full forty kinds of consciousness. But by taking what has not been taken, eight at the eye-door with the four cognitions by way of ear, etc., make twelve. Thus by one volition, when kamma is wrought, there arise twelve kinds of resultant consciousness. The mango simile and the discourse on the fivefold order are as before.

The same method should be applied in the case of one who has taken re-conception by the resultant consciousness resembling the remaining three kinds of consciousness which have two roots. But on this occasion, in the parable of the sugar-cane-press, seven mechanics are desired. When by the seven the press is set up, it is to be understood that the owner makes the eighth, in accordance with what has been said. To this extent is re-conception twice-conditioned by kamma, which has two conditions (or roots).

Next the discourse on re-conception which is without 'roots.' When kamma is wrought by one or other of the four twice-conditioned kinds of moral consciousness, it is not right to say that in the case of one who has obtained re-conception by consciousness, which is a moral resultant, is accompanied by indifference and sense-mind cognition without root-conditions, his re-conception will be like that kamma. As a matter of fact, the kamma is twice-conditioned, the re-conception is unconditioned by roots.

When a moderately desirable object is presented at the eye-door of a grown-up being, the [possibility of the] three ineffectual occasions should be understood by the foregoing method. But at the conclusion of any apperception among the four kinds of twice-conditioned moral consciousness, the unconditioned consciousness persists as registration and gets two names:—root-subconsciousness and registration. Thus here in the eye-door, visual cognition as well as reception is accompanied by indifference. Examination also and registration are accompanied by indifference. Hence, not taking one out of these two, there are reckoned three kinds of consciousness. And in the desirable object examination and registration are accompanied by joy. Taking one of these two, the three foregoing kinds of consciousness make four. Thus, making fours in the five doors when kamma is exerted by one volition, there arise twenty kinds of resultant consciousness. [277] Nevertheless, by taking what has not been taken, the four kinds of consciousness at the eye-door with the four cognitions of the other senses make eight. This is called the unconditioned set of eight. It is experienced among mankind, and is a process obtainable among the four planes of suffering. Indeed, when Mahāmoggallāna the Elder created a lotus in purgatory, and, seated in the pericarp, gave a religious discourse to the denizens of purgatory, in them as they looked at the Elder arose such visual cognition as was a moral resultant; as they listened to his voice, they had such auditory cognition as was a moral resultant; when they smelt the odour of his robe, as the Elder was going away after sitting for the midday rest in the sandalwood forest, there arose in them olfactory cognition which was a moral resultant; at the time of giving water, after he had caused rain to fall to quench the purgatorial fire, there arose gustatory cognition which was a moral resultant; at the production of a softly wafting breeze there arose tactile cognition, which was a moral resultant. Thus the unconditioned set of eight:—five kinds of sense-consciousness, one [phase of] reception, two examinations—is obtained. Reception in the case of serpents, Supanna birds, Petas who have pavilions, is by immoral result, but in the process moral

result is given. So it is with the state-elephants, horses, etc., of a universal monarch.

Thus far the path of discourse on moral apperception regarding desirable and moderately desirable objects.

When, in respect of a desirable object, the four kinds of immoral consciousness which are accompanied by joy have reached apperception, then there is registration, which is consciousness without roots, accompanied by joy, and is a moral resultant. When, in respect of a moderately desirable object, these four, associated with greed and accompanied by indifference, have apperceived, then there is registration which is consciousness without roots, accompanied by indifference, and is a moral resultant.

And what has been said as to registration being necessarily determined by apperception should be understood to have been said with reference to moral consciousness. Which registration arises (when it does arise) immediately after an apperception which is accompanied by melancholy? Consciousness of the element of sense-mind-cognition, which is an immoral resultant and unconditioned. Which state fixes this apperception as moral or immoral? [The phase of] adverting, and also that of determining. Indeed, when the adverting and the determining are wisely and methodically done, the apperception is unlikely to be immoral, and [278] *vice versa*.

In the case of a desirable object contemplated by the subject with misgiving and excitement, what sort of registration is there? Whether he feels misgiving and excitement, or not, registration, in the case of a desirable object, is just moral resultant consciousness, without roots and joyful; in the case of a moderately desirable object it is the same, but accompanied by indifference instead of joy.

The exposition here given in outline is called the Theory of Mahā-Dhammarakkhita the Elder. When, namely, apperception accompanied by joy takes place, five moments of registration, and when it is accompanied by indifference, six moments of registration should be sought.

Now suppose that one who was reborn with a joyous

nature produces Jhāna, but in the process is careless and loses it. Reflection brings the thought:—'Lost for me are the excellent conditions!' And through remorse melancholy arises. What registration does he get? For in the Patthāna, it is forbidden [to posit] melancholy immediately after joy, and the converse. Should we not also find, in that book, that when there has been apperception concerning a sublime state of consciousness, it is also forbidden [to posit] registration?

There arises an element of sense-mind-cognition which is unconditioned, accompanied by indifference, and a resultant either moral or immoral. What adverting has such a state? It has no adverting function any more than there is one in the subconscious continuum. Granted that such advertings arise from tendency, habit or practice,¹ how does such sense-mind-cognition arise? Just as in the following psychic attainments:—the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception when it is in the causal relation of contiguity to trance, the consciousness in one who has emerged from trance, of fruition attained, the consciousness of the Ariyan Path, consciousness of fruition after a path—these states arise albeit there is no tendency, habit, or practice, even so such sense-mind-cognition may arise without them either. For consciousness may arise without adverting, but not without object. If so, which then is the object of that element of sense-mind-cognition? One or other of the limited states, such as visible objects, etc. For of these states, whatever object is presented, at whatever time, this consciousness arises referring to that object.

Now [279] to illustrate all these kinds of consciousness, there is this special illustrative method:—Cob-web, door-keeper, village child, mango, sugar-cane squeezing, born-blind and cripple, object-seizing, sufficing condition, purpose.

Among these 'cob-web' should be understood thus:—A certain highway spider (which waits in the path of insects)² spreads his web in five places, makes his net, and sleeps in the middle of it. When an insect, grasshopper or fly comes in contact with the web spread in the first place, he bestirs

¹ See the exposition of natural psychic law in *Milinda* i. 89, with the same terms.—*Ed.*

² Thus the *Yojanā*.

himself from his bed, comes out, goes along the web, kills the insect, drinks its marrow, again returns to the web and sleeps. He does likewise when the webs in the second place, etc., are touched. Herein like the webs spread in five places are the five sentient organs: like the spider sleeping in the middle is consciousness; like the moment when the web is touched by the insect, etc., is the moment when the sentient organism is struck by the object; like the stirring of the spider sleeping in the middle is the advertинг by the five doors setting life-continuum in motion after the object which has struck the sentient organ has been seized; like the passage along the web is the occurrence of the cognitive process; like the drinking of the marrow after piercing the head is the time when apperception takes place in the object; like the sleep in the middle after his return is the procedure of consciousness depending on the heart-basis. What does this parable signify? That when an object strikes the sentient organism, the unit of consciousness depending on the physical basis of the heart arises before the unit depending on the sentient basis. This is what it signifies; and this also:—Each object reaches the avenue of thought by two doors.¹

‘Door-keeper’ should be understood thus:—A certain king went to bed and fell asleep. His attendant sat shampooing his feet; a deaf door-keeper stood at the door. Three guards stood in a row. Then a certain man resident at a border village, bringing a present, came and knocked at the door. The deaf door-keeper did not hear the sound. He who shampooed the king’s feet gave a sign, by which the door-keeper opened the door and looked. The first guard took the present and handed it to the second guard, who gave it to the third, who in turn offered it to the king. The king partook of it. [280] Herein apperception should be regarded as the king; advertинг as he who shampooed the feet; visual cognition as the blind door-keeper; the three phases of thought-process beginning with reception as the three guards; the striking of the sentient organism by the object as the knocking at the door by the

¹ External sense and sense-mind.

resident of the border village who brought the present; the adverting by the five doors, setting life-continuum in motion, as the giving of the sign by him who shampooed the feet; the time of visual cognition accomplishing the function of sight with respect to object as the time of opening the door by the deaf door-keeper at the given sign; the resultant mind-element receiving the object as the taking of the present by the first guard; the resultant element of mind-cognition examining the object as the first guard giving it to the second; the element of inoperative mind-cognition determining the object as the second giving it to the third; the making over to apperception by determination as the third offering it to the king; apperception enjoying the essential property of the object as the king enjoying it. What does this parable signify? Just the functions of object striking the sentient organism; of the five-door-adverting setting the life-continuum in motion; of visual cognition, etc., seeing, receiving, examining, determining. But verily only apperception enjoys the essential property of the object.

'Village child' should be understood thus:—Many village lads were playing with dust in the middle of the road. A coin hit the hand of one of them. 'What is this that has hit my hand?' he said. Then one boy said, 'It is a white thing.' Another grasped it firmly together with the dust; another said, 'It's broad and square.' Another said, 'This is a kahāpana¹.' Then he took it and gave it to his mother, who used it in some [jewellery] work. Herein, like the many boys playing and sitting in the middle of the road, is the procedure of the subconscious life-continuum; like the coin striking the hand is the object striking the sentient organism; like the asking, 'What is this?' is the five-door-adverting setting the life-continuum in motion after seizing the object; like the saying, 'It is white,' is the visual cognition accomplishing the function of seeing; like the grasping it firmly together with the dust is the [281] resultant mind-element receiving the object; like the saying, 'It's a broad square thing,' is the

¹ On the kahāpana, a square coin, see *J.R.A.S.*, 1901, 877 *f.*; Rhys-Davids, *Buddhist India*, 100.—*Ed.*

resultant mind-cognition-element examining the object; like the saying, 'This is a kahāpana,' is the inoperative mind-cognition-element determining the object; like the mother making it into some jewellery is apperception enjoying the essential property of the object. 'What does this simile signify?' The five-door-adverting sets the life-continuum in motion without seeing it; the resultant mind-element receives it without seeing it; the resultant mind-cognition-element examines it without seeing it; the inoperative mind-cognition-element determines it without seeing it; apperception enjoys the essential property of the object without seeing it. But verily only visual cognition accomplishes the function of seeing. This is what it signifies.

'Mango, sugar-cane-squeezing'—this refers to the mango-parable and that of the owner of the sugar-cane shed parable told above (pp. 359, 363).

'Born-blind and cripple' should be understood thus:—Both of them sat in a hall at the city-gate. The cripple said, 'Oh, blind one, why do you get shrivelled up by frequenting this place? In such and such another place there's plenty of food, plenty of drink. Does it not behove you to go there and live in ease?' 'You have been the first to tell me so. Is it not up to *you* to go there and live in ease?' 'I have no legs to go with.' 'Nor have I eyes to see.' 'If so, there are your legs and my eyes.' And both agreed, saying, 'All right.' The blind made the cripple mount his shoulder where the latter sat, putting his left arm round the other's head, and with his right hand marking the road: 'In this place a root stands blocking the way. In this place is a rock. Give up the left and take the right-hand path. Give up the right and take the left.' Thus, by the association both of the blind man's legs and the cripple's eyes, they went to the place they wanted and lived in ease. Herein, like the blind man is the material body; like the cripple is the immaterial body; like the want of preparedness on the part of the blind to go without the cripple to another place [282] is the inability of matter to take, seize, vibrate without the immaterial. Like the want of preparedness to go to another place on the part of the cripple

without the blind man is the non-inability of the immaterial, where life is conditioned by the five aggregates, to proceed without matter. Like the going to the desired place by the association of both and their living in ease is the manifestation of procedure in all functions by the mutual association of material and immaterial phenomena. Thus this problem is stated with reference to the fivefold aggregate.¹

‘Object-seizing’ should be understood thus:—The eye seizes the visible object; the ear seizes audible objects, and so on.

‘Sufficing condition, result’ should be understood thus:—Because of a sufficing condition and because of result or motive. Of these, given four conditions—to wit, the visual organ unimpaired, access of visible objects to the line of vision, dependence on light, and attention—then visual cognition arises with its concomitant phenomena. For instance, the eye of a dead man is ‘impaired.’ The sight of a living man, which is extinguished or impeded by bile, phlegm or blood, being unable to cause visual cognition, is said to be impaired; that which can be such a cause is unimpaired. So for the ear, etc. And although the eye may not be impaired, yet when externally the object does not come into the line of vision, visual cognition does not arise. And although that object may come into the line of vision, when there is no basis² of light visual cognition does not arise. And although there may be light, yet when the five-door-adverting does not agitate the life-continuum, visual cognition does not arise; it arises only when the life-continuum is agitated. Visual cognition thus arising arises together with the associated states. Thus given these four conditions visual cognition arises.

Given the same four conditions, and substituting space for light and sounds for visible objects, auditory cognition arises, together with its associated states. Herein, ‘dependence on space’ means that auditory cognition arises only when this dependence is obtained; it cannot arise without it. Indeed, it cannot arise in one who has the aural orifice closed. The

¹ *Visuddhi-Magga*, p. 596.

² Or medium (sannissaya).—*Ed.* Cf. *M.* i, 190.

rest is to be understood by the foregoing method. And so also in the following cognitions. We shall speak of just what is special to each sense.

The same four conditions are necessary for the arising of olfactory cognition, substituting the element of mobility for that of space. [283] Here 'dependence on the element of mobility' means that olfactory cognition arises only when this element enters the nostril, and cannot arise without it.

The same four conditions are necessary for the arising of gustatory cognition, substituting the element of cohesion (or moisture) for that of mobility. Here, 'dependence on the element of cohesion' means that gustatory cognition arises only when this element wetting the tongue is obtained; it does not arise without it. Indeed, it does not arise in those whose tongue is dry, even though dried food be placed on the tongue.

The same four conditions are necessary for the arising of tactile cognition, but 'element of extension' must be substituted for that of cohesion. Here 'dependence on the element of extension' means that tactile cognition arises only when dependence on this element as a condition of tactile sensitivity is obtained; it does not arise without it. Indeed, in the door of touch, externally the 'great Essential'¹ as object stimulates the internal sensitive surface, and impinges on the great essentials [composing it] which are the causes of its sensitivity.

The same four conditions are necessary for the arising of sense-mind² cognition, but 'dependence on the heart-basis' must be substituted for 'element of extension.' Here 'sense-mind' is the consciousness of the [subconscious] life-continuum. When it ceases, or when it is weakened, it cannot cause 'adverting' and is said to be impaired. When unimpaired, it can cause advertинг. 'Access of cognizable things to the line [of sense-mind]' means access of such as objects of thought. 'Dependence on the heart-basis' means that thought arises only when such dependence is obtained and cannot arise without it. This problem also is stated as refer-

¹ See below, Book II, Ch. II.

² Mano.

ring to [life as conditioned by] the fivefold aggregate. 'Attention' as one of the conditions means that it arises only when the element of inoperative mind-cognition sets the life-continuum in motion. So far this is the exposition of the term 'sufficing condition.'

'Purpose' is to be understood thus: Eye is for the purpose or function of seeing, ear of hearing, nose of smelling, tongue of tasting, bodily surface of touching, [284] mind of cognizing. The eye's seeing is its purpose [or aim]. *This* is accomplished by *that*. So with the other senses [and the sensorium or sense-mind]. Thus far, in the doctrine of Tipiṭaka-Cūlanāga the Elder,¹ the sixteenfold scheme is finished, together with the twelvefold scheme and the unconditioned set of eight.

Now the doctrine of Moravāpiṇī-Mahādatta the Elder is a discourse on the twelvefold scheme, wherein the Sāketa query, the declarations of abundance and of conditions are evident. But this Elder, seeing a flaw in the theory of automatic moral kamma giving non-automatic result, says that automatic moral kamma gives only automatic result, not non-automatic, and that non-automatic kamma gives only non-automatic result, not automatic. And this Elder does not speak of fixing consciousness by apperception, but of fixing feeling by object. On that account in his doctrine, in bringing out result, there is obtained what is called the twelvefold scheme, wherein are included the tenfold scheme and the unconditioned set of eight.

In the twelvefold scheme this is the method:—Let kamma be exerted by a consciousness that is accompanied by joy, thrice-conditioned² and automatic, in an adult who has taken re-conception by means of the resultant similar to that consciousness. Then, when a desirable object reaches the line of vision in the eye-door, there arises one of the three ineffectual occasions described above. In his case, supposing his consciousness be one of thirteen kinds:—four that are moral accompanied by joy, four that are immoral, five that are inoperative—then, when registration supervenes after apperception, a [phase of]

¹ See above, p. 354 f.

² *i.e.*, having three 'roots.'

consciousness becomes established which is accompanied by joy, is automatic, and has three root-conditions, or two. Thus, when he is seeing, his [units of] consciousness may be reckoned as five:—three of visual cognition, two of registration.

Assuming that feeling changes with the object, there arises in him one or other of the twelve kinds of consciousness which are accompanied by indifference—namely, four that are moral, four immoral, and four inoperative. This consciousness arises after apperception as registration—a registration which is resultant, accompanied by indifference, is automatic, and has three, or only two root-conditions. Thus, when he is seeing, his units of consciousness may now be reckoned as three:—an examining accompanied by indifference and these two [forms of] registration. These with the foregoing five make [285] eight. As many are reckoned in each of the other four senses. Hence when kamma is exerted by one volition full forty kinds of consciousness may arise. But by taking what has not been taken there are twelve:—eight in the eye-door and the other four cognitions, auditory, etc.

Here in the discourse on the twelvefold resultant, the remarks on 'subconsciousness of conditions' and 'adventitious subconsciousness,'¹ the mango-parable,² and the discourse on the 'fivefold cosmic order,'³ are to be understood in the same way. When kamma is exerted by consciousness which is accompanied by joy, thrice-conditioned, non-automatic and moral, and also by consciousness which is accompanied by indifference, thrice-conditioned, automatic and non-automatic, the same method is to be understood. And the press-parable⁴ on this occasion is evident.

So far the occasion:—'thrice-conditioned conception takes place by thrice-conditioned kamma' has been discussed. And the occasion:—'twice-conditioned conception takes place by thrice-conditioned kamma' remains inexplicit.

Now comes the discourse that by twice-conditioned kamma arises twice-conditioned re-conception. To expand: Suppose kamma is exerted by consciousness, accompanied by joy, twice.

¹ See p. 358.

² See p. 359.

³ See p. 360.

⁴ See p. 363.

conditioned, automatic, in an adult who has taken re-conception by a resultant similar to that consciousness. When at the eye-door a desirable object is presented there may be those three ineffectual occasions after the said fashion. But in twice-conditioned consciousness there is no work of apperception. Therefore one or other of these eight kinds of consciousness:—four that are moral accompanied by joy, four that are immoral, at the conclusion of apperception, arises as registration, which is twice-conditioned, accompanied by joy, and automatic. Thus in him four kinds of consciousness:—the three phases of cognition (visual, etc.) and this phase of registration—are reckoned.

And one or other of the eight—four, namely, which are accompanied by indifference and are moral, concerning a moderately desirable object, and four which are immoral, at the conclusion of apperception—becomes registration which is twice-conditioned, accompanied by indifference and automatic. Thus in him two kinds of consciousness:—examining, accompanied by indifference, and this registration are reckoned. These, together with the foregoing four, make six. In each of the other doors are also six. Thus when kamma is exerted by one volition, there arise full thirty kinds of consciousness. But by taking what has not been taken there are ten:—six eye-door and the other four sense-cognitions. The mango-parable and the discourse on the fivefold cosmic order are evident. And the cane-press parable on this occasion does not obtain, and therefore is not given. [286] When kamma is exerted by consciousness which is accompanied by joy, is twice-conditioned, non-automatic and is moral, or is accompanied by indifference, is twice-conditioned, and either automatic or non-automatic, the same method is to be understood.

We have now discussed the case when 'twice-conditioned conception takes place by twice-conditioned kamma.' And the occasion:—'unconditioned conception takes place'—is to be understood thus:—When kamma is exerted by the four kinds of consciousness which are dissociated from knowledge as moral, and when re-conception has been got in which the element of mind-cognition is moral, resultant, unconditioned

and accompanied by indifference, it should not be said that re-conception is similar to the kamma. Speaking by the said method, and beginning with this phrase:—‘by the four kinds of consciousness dissociated from knowledge as moral,’ —the consciousness which arises concerning a desirable, and concerning a moderately desirable object should be understood. In this Elder’s doctrine, namely, mass-apperception¹ takes place. The remaining discourse:—‘which state fixes this apperception for purposes of morality and immorality?’²—should all be understood by the method given above.

With this, in the doctrine of Moravāpivāsi-Mahādatta the Elder, the discourse of the twelvefold resultant scheme finishes, together with the tenfold scheme and the unconditioned set of eight.

Now, in the doctrine of Mahādhammarakkhita the Elder, the discourse is on the tenfold scheme, wherein the Sāketa query and the declaration of preponderance³ are evident. But in the statement of conditions this is special:—Thrice-conditioned kamma gives thrice-conditioned result, and twice-conditioned result and unconditioned result. Twice-conditioned kamma does not give the thrice-conditioned result, but gives the others. By thrice-conditioned kamma conception is thrice-conditioned and also twice-conditioned, not unconditioned. By twice-conditioned kamma conception is twice-conditioned and unconditioned, not thrice-conditioned. Automatic kamma gives automatic result, not non-automatic; and non-automatic kamma gives non-automatic result, not automatic. Feeling should be [considered as] changed with object; apperception takes place in masses. From the beginning units of consciousness are to be spoken of.

Wherein this is the method:—An individual exerts kamma by the first class of moral consciousness, takes re-conception only by the first kind of resultant consciousness. This re-conception is similar to the previous kamma. To the adult,

¹ Piñdajavanam. ? Unanalyzed, unclassified thought.—*Tr.*

² See above, p. 366.

³ See above, p. 355.

when a desirable object is presented at the eye-door, three ineffectual occasions by the said method may arise. Then to him one or other of the thirteen [287] apperceptions, accompanied by joy mentioned above, becomes at the conclusion of apperception the first kind of resultant consciousness, being registration which goes under the two names of 'subconsciousness of conditions' and 'registration.' Thus to him four kinds of consciousness:—the three cognitions (visual, etc.) and this registration—are thus reckoned. In a moderately desirable object, one or other of the twelve apperceptions accompanied by indifference by the above-said method becomes established, at the conclusion of apperception, as a registration-consciousness, accompanied by indifference, thrice-conditioned, and automatic. This also goes under the names of 'adventitious life-continuum' and 'registration.' Thus to him two units of consciousness:—examining accompanied by indifference and this registration—are reckoned. These two, together with the foregoing four, make six. Thus, when kamma is exerted by one volition in the five doors, full thirty kinds of consciousness arise. But by taking what has not been taken there are ten:—six in the eye-door and the four cognitions, auditory, etc. The mango-parable and the discourse on the cosmic orders are evident. Likewise, though kamma is exerted by the second, third, fourth classes of moral consciousness, there are only so many kinds of resultant consciousness. Also when kamma is exerted by the four classes of consciousness which are accompanied by indifference, the same method should be understood. But in the latter case, first the moderately desirable object should be shown, afterwards feeling should be changed with the [changes in the] desirable object. The mango-parable and the discourse on the cosmic orders are evident. The cane-press-parable is not obtained. In moral consciousness, beginning with, 'when kamma is exerted by any of the four classes which are dissociated from knowledge,' all should be expanded and the unconditioned set of eight be stated. Thus far, in the doctrine of Mahādhammarakkhita the Elder, the tenfold scheme finishes together with the unconditioned set of eight.

But of these three Elders whose doctrine should be accepted?

Not anyone's unreservedly. But in the doctrine of all of them what is fitting should be accepted. In the first doctrine the automatic and non-automatic arrangement is intended to serve a division in causal relations. Therefore by taking in it the non-automatic result which has arisen through weak conditions of automatic moral consciousness, and the automatic result which has arisen through strong conditions of non-automatic moral consciousness, leaving out the obtainable inoperative apperceptions, and fixing (a) the registration by means of moral apperception and registration, and (b) feeling by means of the object, [288] the sixteenfold scheme has been drawn up for the use of probationers and average persons. And at the conclusion of immoral apperception, that registration which is an unconditioned result has been shown in that doctrine, but not in the two others. Therefore that unconditioned registration included in it and the conditioned resultant included in the other two—all this is obtained here also, wherein this is the method:—When in the intervals of moral apperceptions immoral apperception takes place, then the conditioned registration at its conclusion, being similar to the apperception practised at the conclusion of the moral consciousness, is fitting. When immoral apperception takes place uninterruptedly, then the registration which is without root-conditions is fitting. Thus much of what is fitting in the first doctrine should be taken.

But in the second doctrine, the automatic and non-automatic arrangement is intended on moral grounds. For this reason, taking the automatic resultant of automatic moral consciousness, and the non-automatic resultant of non-automatic moral consciousness, without fixing registration by apperception, [we should consider] the entire twelvefold scheme as stated with reference to the total apperception worthy of arising in probationers, adepts, and average persons. And in it, at the conclusion of thrice-conditioned apperception, thrice-conditioned registration is fitting; at the conclusion of twice-conditioned apperception, twice-conditioned registration is fitting; at the conclusion of unconditioned apperception, unconditioned registration is fitting. Nevertheless, it has not

been drawn up as classifying them. Thus in the second doctrine what is fitting should be accepted.

In the third doctrine also the automatic and non-automatic arrangement on moral grounds only is intended. But because of the expression, 'thrice-conditioned kamma yields results thrice-conditioned, twice-conditioned, and unconditioned;¹ twice-conditioned kamma yields results twice-conditioned and unconditioned,' in one who has taken automatic, thrice-conditioned re-conception, registration should be also automatic and twice-conditioned. Without showing this, the registration has been shown as similar to the condition (of productive kamma). The mention of this registration does not fit in with the foregoing view of the statement of the producing condition. [That expression was said by the Elder] only for the purpose of setting forth the tenfold scheme. However, the other (automatic, twice-conditioned registration) should also be obtained. Thus in the third doctrine also what is fitting should be accepted.

And all this and all the discourse on registration is said with reference to the results of kamma as productive of re-conception. However, because of the expression [in the *Paṭṭhāna*], 'conditioned life-continuum is in the causal relation of contiguity to unconditioned life-continuum,' registration which is conditioned resultant arises also in one who has taken unconditioned re-conception by means of manifold kamma. The order of its arising will be evident in the *Paṭṭhāna*.

End of the Discourse on Moral Resultants in the Realm of Sense-Experience.

[289] CHAPTER III

DISCOURSE ON RESULTANTS IN THE REALM OF ATTENUATED MATTER AND IN THE IMMATERIAL REALM

Now to show the resultant of the material and immaterial realms, once more a beginning is made with 'which are the states that are unmoral ?'²

¹ I.e., without 'roots' (hetu).

² *Dhs.* §§ 499-504.

Herein, because the resultant of the sensuous realm is both like and unlike its own moral consciousness, therefore it has not been classified as simply a sequel similar to that moral consciousness. But in the case of these two realms—of Rūpa and Arūpa—the results of kamma are like the moral consciousness in each, just as the shadows of elephants, horses, mountains, etc., resemble these. Therefore it has been classified on this principle. Again, kamma of the sensuous realm gives result at one time or another; but the kamma of the Rūpa and Arūpa realms, being unobstructed, gives result in the second individuality. Therefore it has been classified as having a similar sequel to the moral consciousness [which caused it]. The rest should be understood by the methods given under 'moral consciousness.' But this is special:—In the divisions into progress, etc., and the state of being low, exalted, or medium, resultants should be understood as coming by jhāna. Moreover, under 'predominant influences'¹ these conscious resultants being unproducible are not taken in that connection.

End of the Discourse on Resultants in the Realm of Attenuated Matter and the Immaterial Realm.

CHAPTER IV

DISCOURSE ON TRANSCENDENTAL² RESULT

TRANSCENDENTAL results, because they resemble the causal transcendental moral consciousness, have also been classified as having a similar course to morality. And because the moral consciousness on all three planes stores up and increases the round of births by means of decease and conception, therefore concerning it 'having been wrought and stored up'³ is said. But the transcendental disperses what has been stored up; of itself it pulls down what through decease and rebirth has been piled up. Hence here 'having been worked and cultivated' has been said, instead of 'having been wrought and stored up.'

¹ See p. 284.

² Dhs. § 505. Cf. above, p. 289 f.

³ Dhs. § 431.

In the 'Void,' etc., the Path gets this name for three reasons.—by way of attainment, of one's merits, of the object. This expression has been expanded above under the subject-head of 'moral consciousness'.¹ Of the three reasons, the name is obtained 'by way of one's merits' and also 'of the object' in the Suttanta explanations. For this kind of teaching is explanatory. But Abhidhamma discourse is teaching without explanation. Therefore in the Abhidhamma the name is not obtained because of one's merits and of the object, but only by way of attainment.

Now attainment is certain, and is twofold: insight-arrival and Path-arrival. Of these two, where the path has been reached, insight-arrival is certain; [290] where its Fruition has been reached, Path-arrival is certain, as has been said above. We are now dealing with the occasion of the attainment of fruition, hence that the attainment of the Path is certain must here be taken as understood.

It is said also that this Path as attainment gets the name of the Void or Empty, and is called the Signless and the Undesired because of its own merits and of the object. Therefore itself occupying the goal of Path-arrival, it gives the three names to its own fruition. How? This Path called Emptiness, which has got its name by means of just the fact of arrival, itself occupies the place of arrival, and gives the name to its own fruition—namely, 'Emptiness.' The empty, signless Path itself occupies the goal of arrival, and in giving the name to its own fruition, gives the name 'Signless.' The empty, undesired path itself occupies the goal of arrival and in giving the name to its own fruition gives 'the Signless.' And these three names are obtained, in this way, with respect to fruitional consciousness only, immediately after the Path, and not when attainment of fruition is subsequently resorted to. And subsequently it is possible to discern by the threefold insight of impermanence, suffering and no soul. Then in that person, by virtue of much insight arisen, come to pass the three fruitions called the Signless, the Undesired and Emptiness.

¹ See p. 206.

And of them those kinds of knowledge, such as insight into impermanence, with conditioned things for object, are called the knowledges of adoption.¹ And that which was said on the 'empty' Path should be understood as obtaining on the 'undesired' Path also. This Path which has also got its name only by means of just the fact of arrival, itself occupies the goal of arrival, and in giving the name to its own fruition gives 'the Undesired.' The undesired, signless Path itself occupies the goal of arrival and . . . gives 'the Signless.' The undesired empty Path similarly gives 'Emptiness.' And these three names are obtained in this way only at fruitional consciousness immediately after the Path, and not when attainment of fruition is subsequently resorted to. Thus in this exposition of resultants, the kinds of resultant consciousness are to be taken as treble those of the [causal] moral consciousness.

But whereas moral activities of the three planes are not able to make their own results get a dominant influence, transcendental moral activities can do this. And why? In the former the time of putting forth activities is different from the time for yielding result. On this account they are not able to make their own results get a dominant influence. But transcendental activities, before the faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom which occur in the transcendental Path have ceased, get the result immediately after the Path without fail and without opposition. For this reason they are able to make their results get a dominant influence. Just as where a small fire has sprung up, the creation of heat comes to an end as soon as the fire has been extinguished, and nothing else is wanted; and just as when a big blazing mass of fire set round with dried cow-dung is extinguished, the creation of heat does not come at once to an end; so in the three-plane moral activities the kamma-moment is as different from the resultant moment as is the extinction of the fire and the heat in the case of the small fire. Therefore it is not able to make its own result get a dominant influence. But in transcen-

¹ See above, p. 310, n. 2. *Pyi* reads 'adaptation.'

dental activities, before faith, etc., have ceased, fruition arises immediately after the path. Therefore it causes its own result to get a dominant influence. For this reason the Ancients have said, ' Except in the transcendental, there is no dominant influence in the resultant.'

In the exposition of the Fourth Fruition, 'the controlling faculty of one of perfected knowledge'¹ refers to that of [the saint] whose knowledge has been perfected, and has performed its function in respect of the Four Truths. Or it is a controlling faculty through the accomplishing of control within the states of consciousness that arise, possessed by those who have perfected knowledge, those, namely, who have completed what was to be done in the matter of the Four Truths, who have come to know, who have penetrated the Four Truths. [292] In the section of the exposition of the expression, 'of those of perfected knowledge,' means, of those who having come to know [so] endure. 'States'² mean inner [subjective] associated states. 'Perfected knowledge' means having come to know.³ 'Insight, understanding' and so on have already been explained. 'Path-factor, Path-included' =the factor of the Path arising in fruition and included in that Path.

There is something else to be said. In this transcendental result this is distinctive:—One of these three controlling faculties goes to one objective, one goes to six objectives, one goes to one objective. To expand: The faculty of believing 'I shall come to know the unknown' goes to one objective, viz., the Path of Stream-winning. The faculty of perfected knowledge goes to six objectives: the three lower Fruitions and the three higher Paths. The faculty of a person of perfected knowledge goes to one objective—viz., the fruition of Arahanthood. In all, the paths and fruitions amount to eight [multiplying] eight controlling faculties. Thus sixty-four transcendental

¹ *Dhs.* § 555. The 'section' referred to just below is the answer to the question.

² In *B.P.E.*, § 555, for 'doctrines' read states.

³ *Ā-jānanā*. *Jānanā* means 'coming to know.' Cf. *connaitre* and *savoir*; we have no such equivalents.—*Ed.*

controlling faculties have been accounted for. But textually¹ Paths and Fruits are multiplied by nine, making seventy-two controlling faculties. 'Path-factor' is said with reference to the Path and also to Fruition. So also is the term 'factor of Enlightenment.' 'Avoidance, abstinence' refer to the moment when the Path is realized, and the moment when Fruition is realized. 'Path' means just 'being in the Path,' but fruition is so named with reference to the Path.² It is proper to say that a factor of fruition is included in fruition. In the Path the condition of one about to be enlightened as to the four Facts is the factor of Enlightenment. In the Fruition it is the condition of one who has known the four Facts. In the Path avoidance and abstinence are so called by virtue of [the exercise of] avoiding and abstaining. In the Fruition they are so called by virtue of having avoided, having abstained.

End of the Discourse on Transcendental Result.

CHAPTER V

DISCOURSE ON IMMORAL RESULT

THESE seven kinds of consciousness when they constitute immoral results—namely, visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile cognitions, one sense-mind-element and one sense-mind-cognition-element, by text and in sense—resemble the corresponding kinds of moral resultant consciousness described above. The latter, of course, have moral kamma for cause; the immoral resultants have immoral kamma for cause. And the former arise concerning desirable and moderately desirable objects, the latter concerning undesirable and moderately undesirable objects. In the former tactile cognition is accompanied by pleasure, in the latter it is accompanied by pain. [293] In the former the element of mind-cognition, accompanied

¹ Pālito.

² I.e., because of resembling the path (*Tīkā*).

by indifference causing rebirth among men of one born blind, yields result on five occasions. But here in the latter consciousness, when kamma is exerted by the elevenfold immoral consciousness, it causes re-conception in the four spheres of evil doom,¹ making either kamma, kamma-symbol, or tendency-symbol the object, and gives result. Starting from the occasion of the second consciousness, it becomes (1) life-continuum while life lasts, (2, 3) examination in the five thought-processes with undesirable and moderately undesirable objects, (4) registration in the six doors when the object is vivid, and (5) decease at the time of death. Thus it gives result on five occasions.

End of the Discourse on Immoral Result.

CHAPTER VI

THE ELEMENT OF INOPERATIVE SENSE-MIND CONSCIOUSNESS

Now to show by classifying unmoral consciousness [called] 'inoperative,' a beginning is once more made with 'which are the states that are unmoral?'^2 Here 'inoperative' means the mere acting or doing of a function. In all inoperative consciousness that which has not attained the apperceptional state is fruitless like a plant with a wind-snapped flower; that which has reached the apperceptional state is fruitless like the flower of an uprooted tree. Nevertheless, because of procedure in accomplishing this and that function, there is the mere doing, hence [the activity] is called 'inoperative.'^3 The phrase 'neither moral nor immoral,' etc., means that, owing to the absence of the moral condition called the moral root, it is not moral; owing to the absence of the immoral condition called the immoral root, it is not immoral. Owing to the absence of moral and immoral causes of wise and unwise attention, it is said to be neither moral nor immoral. Owing

¹ Purgatory, Asuras, Petas, and animals.

² Dhs. § 566. Cf. *Compendium*, p. 149 f.

³ Or ineffectual.—*Ed.*

to the absence of the productive condition called moral and immoral, it is not result of kamma.

In the exposition of one-pointedness of mind,¹ here the mere static procedure is obtained. In these seventeen modes of consciousness, the five cognitions as moral and as unmoral, the three mind-elements, the three mind-cognition elements, consciousness accompanied by perplexity, [the terms] solidity, steadfastness, etc., are not obtained because of weakness. Excepting the occasion of its genesis, elsewhere all the rest should be understood by the method given in the exposition of the resultant mind-element.² [294] Namely, that resultant consciousness arises immediately after the five cognitions. But this inoperative consciousness arises before all thought-processes, when the thought-process arises on occasion of an object in the five doors. How? In the eye-door among desirable, moderately desirable, undesirable, moderately undesirable objects, when any one visible object strikes the sentient organism, it seizes this and that object and arises as the precursor by virtue of adverting and setting the life-continuum in motion. In the ear-door, etc., the same method should be understood.

End of the Element of Inoperative Sense-Mind Consciousness.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

THE element of mind-cognition arising . . . 'accompanied by joy'³ means that this consciousness is the special property of one purged of the 'Intoxicants,' is not shared in common with others, and is obtainable in the six doors. To expand: In the eye-door seeing a suitable place for religious application, the Arahant is joyful at this thought. In the ear-door he becomes joyful at this kind of thought:—'when they, being

¹ *Ib.* § 570.

² See above, p. 358.

³ *Dhs.* § 576.

seized by excessive greed, are making a great noise in the market-place, such frivolous craving of lust have I put away.' In the door of smell, joy arises when he is offering odours and flowers at a shrine. In the door of taste, joy arises when, after acquiring savoury alms and distributing them, he partakes of them and thinks: 'Surely I have fulfilled the duties of courtesy!' In the door of tactile activities joy arises at the consciousness, 'Surely I have completed the minor duties!' So far it is thus obtained in the five doors.

Moreover, in the mind-door joy arises with reference to past and future objects. For instance:—reflecting on the reason of some act done in the time of the lad Jotipāla,¹ of the King Makhādeva,² of the ascetic Kanha³ and others, the Tathāgata manifested a smile. And that reflection is a function of the knowledge of former existence and of omniscience, at the conclusion of the practice of which this laughter-producing consciousness arises. The Tathāgata smiled at the thought:—'in future Tantissara the silent Buddha, Mudīnga [295] the silent Buddha will arise.' That reflection is the function of the knowledge of the future and of omniscience, at the conclusion of the practice of which the laughter-producing consciousness arises. And in the section of the exposition of such consciousness, 'one-pointedness of mind' should be brought and placed as the 'strength' of concentration, because it is stronger than the other kinds of consciousness without root conditions. Energy also should be placed as the 'strength' of energy. But in the section of the outline, because the 'strengths' of concentration and energy do not occur, the pair are not called 'strengths' in the sense of completion or fulness of strength.⁴ And because this consciousness is neither moral nor immoral, therefore it has not been placed as 'strength.' And because it certainly is not strength, therefore in the section of the Summary also it has not been said 'there are two strengths.' In the exposition of the unconditioned⁵

¹ *M.* ii. 45.

² *Ib.* 74.

³ *Jāt.* iv. 6 f.

⁴ Because of the absence of root to the unconditioned consciousness, there is no firmness or stability; hence the strength is not complete.—*Tikā.*

⁵ *I.e.*, without 'roots.' Some read 'conditioned.'

mind-cognition-element accompanied by joy, all the rest should be understood by the said method.

In the phrase 'accompanied by indifference,'¹ this consciousness (of adverting at the mind-door) is common to all beings in the three planes who are endowed with mind. In such it cannot fail to arise. It must arise. And in arising there is determination in the five doors, adverting in mind-door. And the six kinds of knowledge not so held in common seize the very object seized by this consciousness. It is called the 'great elephant.' There is no object it does not seize. Which is that consciousness which, not being omniscience, is seized by omniscience? This consciousness. Of it the rest should be understood by the method given in the foregoing consciousness. There, however, from there being rapture the aggregate of the mental co-efficients has been classified as ninefold. Here from being without rapture the aggregate of the mental co-efficients has been classified as eightfold.

Now because the eight main types of consciousness arise as moral in [a saint] purged of the 'Intoxicants,' whatever kinds of inoperative consciousness are produced should therefore be understood by the method given in the exposition of moral consciousness. Here laughter-producing consciousness should be placed and included. How many are these? Thirteen. For average persons laugh at eight kinds of consciousness accompanied by joy: four moral, and four immoral. Probationers laugh at six kinds of consciousness: four moral accompanied by joy, and two immoral dissociated from error and accompanied by joy. Arahants laugh at five accompanied by joy, and inoperative.

[296] In the expositions of inoperative consciousness in the Rūpa and Arūpa realms,² the phrase 'easeful living under present conditions' means the mere happy living in this very individuality, in the present. For the Arahant, any attainment won while he is yet at the stage of the average man is of moral [value] while he is winning it and inoperative when it is won. When he becomes Arahant, that attainment be-

¹ *Dhs.* § 576.

² *Dhs.* §§ 577-82.

comes inoperative only. All the rest should be understood by the method given in the exposition of moral consciousness, because of the resemblance to such consciousness.

End of the Discourse of the Book on Risings of Consciousness, in the 'Expositor,' the Commentary on the Compendium of States of Consciousness.

BOOK II MATERIAL QUALITIES (RŪPA)

CHAPTER I MATTER AS UNMORAL

WITH the foregoing completion of the comments on conscious states the subject of the Unmoral is still unfinished. Once more comes the question: 'Which are the states that are unmoral?'¹—the object being now a classification of a section on the 'material' [in consciousness]. Under genesis of consciousness above, the unmoral as resultant consciousness and as inoperative consciousness has been exhaustively classified. The 'unminals' which are material, and the 'unminals' which are Nibbāna have not been classified. It was to show these that he grouped the unmoral under four heads, and began by speaking of (1) 'the resultants of moral and immoral states.'

The foregoing 'moral and immoral states' all belong to the four planes; so far then the unmoral as resultant has been delimitated by the two terms 'moral resultant' and 'immoral resultant.' But because the whole of that 'unmoral as resultant' is either of the sensuous sphere, or of one of the other spheres, therefore it has been set forth as included in [the consciousness of] the given sphere by the method adopted in each case. But again, because as consciousness it is [definable as] one or other of the four mental aggregates, therefore it is shown as comprised under these. Yet again, besides these three methods:—moral-immoral consciousness, plane [or sphere] of consciousness and associated aggregates—

¹ 1 *Dhs.* § 583.
390

he showed the unmoral as inoperative [297] in the terms 'those states which are inoperative.' Here the three planes and the four aggregates might have been alluded to. But these were dealt with in what had preceded. In this way the treatment has been arranged.

Now in showing forth the unmoral that is yet to be classified, he said, 'all matter and unconditioned element,' etc. Herein, by the term 'all matter' twenty-five material qualities and ninety-six material species have been taken without remainder. By the expression 'and unconditioned element' nothing but Nibbāna has been designated. By thus much the term 'unmoral state' is completely accounted for.

CHAPTER II

THE FOUR GREAT ESSENTIALS

WHY has the expression, 'In this connection what is "all matter"?' been chosen? In the preceding chapters the unmoral as matter has been mentioned only in the abstract. Now to classify and show it in detail by way of sets of one and more up to eleven this expression has been chosen. The meaning is:—in the two terms given: 'all matter' and 'unconditioned element,' what is the former? In showing this he named the four great essentials, etc. Here four is the numerical limit precluding more or less than four.

The word 'and' has the sense of inclusion by which the four great essentials are not the only material things; there are others. Thus it includes derived matter. The 'great essentials' or 'phenomena' are so-called for such reasons as the manifestation of their greatness. For they are called 'great essentials' [or primaries] because of the manifestation of their greatness, because of the illusory resemblances they show in phenomena, the immensity of their maintenance (*parihāro*), the immensity of their metamorphoses, their vast elementality. Of these terms the first means that they are manifested as vast in a continuity that is 'grasped at' and in a continuity that is 'not grasped at.' The continuity 'not grasped at' should thus be understood:—

One world-system in length and breadth is 1203,450 yojanas.¹

[298] *Thirty-six hundred thousand yojanas,
Ten thousand, fifty, and three hundred make
The world's whole round, wherein lies this our earth,
In thickness four and twenty nahutas.²
In thickness eight and forty nahutas²*

¹ The yojana itself is a disputed quantity. In the oldest books it seems to have been between seven and eight miles.—*Ed.*

² Nahuta=10,000, here, presumably, 'of yojanas.'

*The wind-girt water flows, and the wind climbs
For six and ninety myriad yojanas
Unto the lower aether. Even thus
Is told the measure of the Universe.
Sineru, highest of the mountain peaks,
Sinks four and eighty thousand yojanas
In the great deep, and to that height ascends.
To half this measure sink and rise these seven
In due succession named:—Yugandhara,
And Isadhara, Karavīka Range,
Sudassana, and Mount Nemindhara,
Vinataka, and Assakanīya's mass.
These seven celestial ranges, beautified
With many gems, compass Sineru round.
There dwell Great Regents, Yakkhas, deities.
Himāvā stands five hundred yojanas
In height (three thousand are its length and breadth),
Crowned with its four and eighty thousand peaks.
This island Jambudīpa has been named
After the Jambu tree, which others name
Nāga, whose trunk is fifteen yojanas
In girth. The trunk and the outspreading arms
Are fifty yojanas in length. It shades
A hundred; and a hundred is its height.*

And the dimensions of the Jambu are the dimensions of the variegated trumpet-flower of the Asūras, the silk-cotton tree of the Garulas, the kadamba tree of Aparayoga, the wish-yielding tree of the Uttarakurus, the acacia of Pabbavideha, and the coral tree in Tāvatimsa.

[299] Hence the Ancients said:—

*Kadamba, and devas' Pāricchattaka,
Pātali, Kappa, Jambu, Simbali,
Sirīsa seventh.
The great world's rocky rim sinks in the deep
Eighty-two thousand yojanas, its height
Identical, encircling the whole world.*

In continuity 'grasped-at,'¹ such material forms as the bodies of fish, turtle, deva, demon, etc., are big in appearance. As it was said by the Blessed One:—'Bhikkhus, in the great ocean are creatures one hundred yojanas in size.'²

'From illusory resemblance in phenomena' means, just as the juggler shows water which is not a gem as a gem, a stone which is not gold as gold, and himself not being an ogre,³ nor a bird, as ogre or as bird, so these forms, not being indigo, may appear as indigo-coloured derived matter, not being yellow, nor red, nor white, as derived matter of these colours. Thus because of their illusory resemblances to the juggler's counterfeiting are they called 'great phenomena.' As such great essentials of Yakkhas and the like who seize any being are not found inside that being, nor outside, but just exist in dependence upon him, so these material forms are not found standing mutually inside or outside; they just exist depending one on the other. Thus because they have unimaginable footing, and resemble the counterfeiting of phenomena by Yakkhas, etc., they are called 'great phenomena.'

Again, the great essentials are like ogresses. As these by seductive transformations of their external appearance, and hiding their own fearfulness, deceive people, so they, by means of lovely skin and complexion in the bodies of women, men, etc., and of lovely contour of limbs, big and small, and of lovely gestures of hands, feet, fingers, eyebrows, hiding their own various intrinsic characteristics of harshness, and so on, deceive fools and do not allow them to see their real nature. Thus owing also to their similarity to the illusory phenomena of ogresses in counterfeiting, they are 'great phenomena.'

[300] 'From maintenance' means, because they are maintained by great or many causes. These material forms, namely, from being daily maintained occur as essentials through abundance of food, covering, etc.; hence the name.

'From the immensity of their metamorphoses' means, because of the great changes [undergone by] the elements in material forms 'grasped-at' as well as not 'grasped-at.'

¹ Below, p. 437, n. 1.

² *Vin. Texts*, iii, 302.

³ *I.e.*, Yakkha.

Of these the vastness of the change in the underived is manifested at the destruction of a world-cycle; that of the derived is manifested when the elements are disturbed.

*When heat consumes this world, the flame of fire
Leaps upward even to the Brahman world.
When angry waters whelm the universe,
The whole world of ten myriad kotis falls.
When perturbation of the element
Of motion overwhelms the universe,
The whole world of ten myriad kotis falls.
As bodies that the katthamukha bites
Stiffen, so bodies from the tottering
Of the extension-element, grow stiff
As though they entered katthamukha's mouth.
As bodies that the pūtimukha bites.
Grow putrid, bodies from the tottering
Of the cohesion element will rot
As though they entered pūtimukha's mouth,
As bodies that the aggimukha bites
Grow hot, so bodies from the tottering
Of the heat-element wax also hot
As though they entered Aggimukha's mouth.
As bodies that the satthamukha bites
Are cut up, bodies from the tottering
Of the element of motion are cut up
As though they entered satthamukha's mouth.*

Such mighty changes are implied in the name 'great essentials' or phenomena.

'Because of the vastness of their "becoming":—that is, these [elemental forms], as existing, require mighty effort to cope with them, and on this account are called Great Essentials. For such reasons are they called 'great essentials.'

'The derivative matter of the four great essentials'—here the possessive case is in the sense of the ablative. The meaning is, matter which has proceeded in dependence on, is derived from, has not let go the four great essentials. This is what is called 'all matter,' and comprises four great essentials, and

twenty-three derived material things shown in due order. Thus this scheme of twenty-seven kinds constitutes 'all matter.'

[301] Now to show that matter in detail, he said, 'all matter is not a condition,' etc., laying down the table of contents by means of unitary, and so on, up to elevenfold compendia. Herein to the term 'all matter' should be applied all the terms, thus: 'All matter is not-a-condition, all matter is unconditioned.'¹ And all these forty-three terms, beginning with 'not-a-condition,' are shown briefly. Of them forty terms have been placed in due order by taking them from the Table of Contents; at the conclusion there are three terms not from the Table of Contents. Thus so far in the first compendium a specification of the Text should alone be understood. And so also in the second compendium, etc.

Now in the second there are one hundred and four couplets, of which fourteen, stated at the outset as 'there is matter derived, there is matter underived,'² are known as special cases, from the absence of mutual connection. The following twenty-five couplets, beginning with 'There is matter which is the basis of eye-contact,' are called basis-couplets, because they proceed by investigating what is basis and what is not. Following them, twenty-five couplets, beginning with 'There is matter which is the object of eye-contact,' are called object-couplets, because they proceed by investigating what is object and what is not. Following them, ten couplets, beginning with 'There is matter which is the organ of eye,' are called sense-organ couplets because they arise by investigating what is organ and what not. Following them, ten couplets, beginning with 'There is matter which is the element of eye,' are called element-couplets, because they proceed by investigating what is element and what is not. Following them, eight couplets, beginning with 'There is matter which is the controlling faculty of eye,' are called controlling faculty-couplets, because they proceed by investigating what is controlling-faculty and what is not. Following them, twelve couplets, beginning

¹ I.e., without the 6 hetu's (p. 61 f.).

² Dhs. § 585.

with 'There is matter which is body-intimation,' are called refined matter-couplets, because they proceed by investigating what is refined and what is unrefined matter. This is the specification of the Text in the second compendium.

In the third compendium¹ are one hundred and three triplets. Here connecting one personal couplet, from among fourteen particular couplets given in the second compendium, with the remaining thirteen, we find thirteen special triplets laid down by the method beginning with, 'That which is personal matter is derived, that which is external matter [302] is derived and not derived.' Subsequently, connecting that personal couplet with the remaining couplets, the remaining triplets have been laid down by the method beginning with, 'That which is external matter is not the basis of eye-contact, that which is personal matter is the basis and not the basis of eye-contact.' Their names and number should be understood by virtue of basis-couplets, etc. This is the specification of the Text in the third compendium.

In the fourth compendium² are twenty-two quadruplets. With the exception of the last all these have been stated by taking into account the tabulated qualities of matter in connection with:—'There is matter that is derived . . . is underived.' How? By taking, in the twofold compendium, each of whatever three couplets there are from the beginning among particular couplets and connecting it with five and five couplets by the method beginning with, 'That matter which is derived is "grasped at" and not "grasped at,"' fifteen quadruplets have been laid down at first, having their root in those three couplets. Now because the fourth couplet about matter as 'visible' is not connected, in the absence of *sense*, of *serial order*, of *emphasis*, with the following couplets by the method beginning 'That matter which is visible is reacting, non-reacting,' or with the preceding couplets by the method beginning with 'It is derived, underived';—owing to the absence of *sense* thus 'It is not that the visible is unimpinging or underived'; owing to the absence of *serial*

¹ *Dhs.* § 586.

² *Ib.* § 587.

order thus, 'the visible is grasped at and not grasped at'; owing to the absence of *emphasis* (all the couplets are connected only with the following couplets), this is the serial order here. With the preceding couplets it is absent. When there is the absence of what is 'grasped at' and not 'grasped at,' the absence of serial order does not matter; hence one should say that the construction should be with the 'grasped at,' etc.; it should not be made owing to the absence of distinction. Indeed the terms 'grasped at,' etc., have been connected with this visible couplet. In that construction, when it is said, 'Either the "grasped at" is visible, or the visible is "grasped at,"' there is no distinction. Therefore without contemplating that fourth couplet and connecting each two couplets, which are connected by the method beginning with 'That matter which is impinging is a controlling faculty, not a controlling faculty; that matter which is non-impinging is a controlling faculty, not a controlling faculty,' together with the three following couplets beginning with [303] 'There is matter impinging,' six quadruplets have been laid down.

And as this fourth couplet does not undergo connection, so also the initial couplet is not connected with it. Why? Because underived matter is invisible. To expand: This initial couplet being connected with the fourth:—'That matter which is not derived is visible, invisible'—does not undergo connection. Therefore passing over that fourth couplet, it has been connected with the fifth. So whichever couplet is connected with any other couplet, it should be understood that it does not undergo connection. Such is the specification of the Text in the fourth compendium.

The seven following compendia, beginning with the five-fold, are not mutually mixed. Such should be considered as the specification of the Text in the entire table of contents.

Now to classify and show the meaning of that Table of Contents, the beginning is 'no matter is a condition.'¹ But why herein has the question not been put:—'what is that "all matter" not any of which is a condition?' Because

¹ *Hetu. Dhs.* § 595. *I.e.*, the 6 hetus are immaterial.—*Ed.*

the subject is not divided. In such couplets, etc., as, 'there is derived matter; there is not derived matter,' there is partial inclusion, but here there is not such distinction as 'condition, not condition' and 'conditioned, unconditioned.' Therefore the classification has been made without a query. And the meaning is: 'all'—that is, without remainder; 'matter':—that is, the word which shows, expresses, names, characterizes the state of being affected by external objects; 'not any condition':—that is, an expression indicating the emphatic rejection¹ of the condition.²

Herein condition is fourfold:—root-condition, causal condition, chief condition, common condition. Of these, that which includes the 'three moral conditions, three immoral conditions, three unmoral conditions' is root-condition. 'Now, bhikkhu, the four great essentials are the condition, the cause in the designation of the material aggregate'³—here we have *hetu* (condition) in the general sense of causal relation (*paccaya*). In the following phrases *hetu* means chief condition:—a desirable object is the chief (thing) in a good result, an undesirable object in a bad result. As he said:—[304] 'He understands as it really has come to be, [namely,] as to occasion and condition, the result of the acquiring of kamma, past, future, and present.'⁴

'This is the condition, this is the cause of kamma-activities,⁵ to wit, ignorance':⁶—here ignorance, being the common condition of those activities, distributes the causal state, and this is *hetu* as 'condition held in common.' As the cause of both what is sweet and what is bitter is an essential property of the extended and the cohesive, so the condition of both good and bad kammic activities is ignorance. In this place the interpretation of *hetu* is root-condition. Having thus fixed the import of the conditioned state of matter laid down in the Table of Contents as, 'states which are conditions,

¹ Read *sāvadhāraṇa* for *sādhāraṇa*.

² *I.e.*, a *hetu*, or 'spring of conduct,' moral or immoral.—*Ed.*

³ *S. iii. 101.*

⁴ *S. v. 304; A. iii. 417.*

⁵ *Sankhārā.*

⁶ *S. ii., 1 ff.*

states which are not conditions,¹ he now says 'not any condition,' rejecting such a state. In this way, in all the terms, the statements as to rejection and non-rejection should be understood.² And the definition of all the terms has been given in the commentary on the Table of Contents.³

'Related to a cause' means: matter sprung from kamma is caused by kamma, that sprung from nutriments, etc., is caused by nutriments, etc. Thus by virtue of the said four causes of matter should the meaning be understood.

'Just matter'⁴ rejects the immaterial state referred to in the table of contents⁵ as 'material states, immaterial states.' 'Arisen by means of the six modes of [sense-] cognition' means that only matter as now present should be understood by means of all the six modes of cognition. That is fixed by the cognition of the five senses, but these cognitions do not cognize the past and the future; only sense-mind-cognition does that; it falls into the stream of the fivefold cognition and goes along with it. It is impermanent in that it becomes and perishes; it is overpowered by old age because of its having such nature; or, because in the material body old age is evident, therefore it is said to be 'overpowered by old age.'⁶

'Compendium of matter under a single aspect'⁷—the word aspect (*vidhā*) is found affixed to the terms conceit, appearance, portion. 'Conceit at the thought, "I am the better man"'; 'conceit at the thought, "I am equal,"' etc.⁸—thus *vidhā* is a mode of conceit. 'What sort of a person do they call virtuous, wise?' etc.—here *vidhā* means the apparent. [305] For of the term, 'what sort,' the meaning is 'what is he like?' 'The basis of knowledge as one portion,' etc.⁹—here *vidhā* means portion. Here also aspect means portion.

The word 'compendium' (*sangaha*) also is fourfold by way of co-birth, similar birthplace, similar work and calculation. In the passages:—'May all princes come, all priests come, all merchants come, all workmen come!'¹⁰ and 'Visākha, these

¹ *Dhs.*, p. 2.

² *Ib.* § 595.

³ Above, p. 61 f.

⁴ *B.P.E.*, p. 168, n. 4.

⁵ *Dhs.*, p. 3, l. 3.

⁶ *Ib.* § 584 (end).

⁷ *B.P.E.*: 'category of Form considered by way of single attributes.'

⁸ *Dhs.* § 1116.

⁹ *Vibh.* 306 f.

¹⁰ Not traced.

three states: right speech, right work, right livelihood are comprised in the aggregate of virtue¹:—such compendium is comprising under similarity in kind. In the following all are comprised as one in origin as though it were said, 'Let all of one kind come! Let all people of Kosala, of Magadha, of Bhārukaccha come!' and 'Visākha, these three states: right endeavour, right mindfulness, right concentration are comprised in the merit of concentration.'² Thus this compendium means similarity in source, as though it were said, 'Let all men bred in one place come.' In the following:—'Let all elephant-riders, horsemen, charioteers, come!' and 'Visākha, these two states: right view, right intention are comprised under the aggregate of wisdom,'³—this is compendium as work. And all these are classed together on account of their own work. In the following:—'Under what reckoned aggregate does the organ of sight go? That of the material aggregate. Verily it is so. Wherefore, indeed, dear sir, the organ of sight is comprised under the material aggregate'⁴—here compendium is a summary. The meaning is, reckoning matter by one specimen. And the same everywhere.

¹ *Majjhima N.* i. 301.

² *Ib.*

³ *Ib.*

⁴ Not traced. The diction is that of the *Kathāvatthu* (*Points of Controversy*). The matter is the subject of *Dhātukathā*, cf. i., § 17.—*Ed.*

CHAPTER III DERIVED MATERIAL QUALITIES

Now in the twofold and following compendia¹ he said, 'What is the material quality that is derived?' and so forth, thus showing the term-analysis preceded by the query, because distinctions were revealed, viz.: 'There is matter derived . . . not derived.' Here 'derived' is 'it grasps.'² The meaning is: grasping the great essentials, not letting go,³ such (derived formis) proceed in dependence upon them.

[306] Now in showing that [derived matter] according to its variety, he said, 'Organ of sight, etc.' Having thus briefly pointed out derived matter under twenty-three aspects, and then in showing it at length, he said, 'What is that matter which is organ of sight?⁴ wherein 'eye' is twofold:—eye of flesh and eye of insight. Of these eye of insight is fivefold according to this division:—Buddha eye, all-seeing eye, eye of knowledge, clairvoyant eye, and eye of the Dhamma. Of these, the passage:—'Bhikkhus, in surveying the world with the eye of a Buddha, I saw beings with but little dust of corruption in their eyes . . . beings docile and indocile,⁵ refers to the 'Buddha eye.' 'Omniscience is called the *all-seeing eye*'⁶—this is the all-seeing eye. 'Vision arose, knowledge arose'⁷—this is the eye of knowledge. 'Bhikkhus, with clarified spiritual eye indeed I saw'⁸—this is the psychic eye. 'In that very seat, the pure, unstained eye of the Dhamma arose'⁹—this is the Dhamma eye, comprising the first three Paths.

Again, the eye of the flesh is twofold: viz., as compound

¹ *Dhs.* § 596.

² Burm. text: *upādāyati*.

³ Read in P.T.S. ed. *amuficityā*. Cf. above, p. 395.

⁴ *Dhs.* §§ 597-600.

⁵ *M.* i. 169; cf. *Dialogues* ii. 32; *Kindred Sayings* i. 174; *Vinaya Texts* i. 88.

⁶ Not traced.

⁷ *Dialogues* ii. 26.

⁸ *S.* ii. 213.

⁹ Cf. *Dialogues* i. 95.

organ and as sentient organ. Of these, a lump of flesh is situated in the cavity of the eye, bound by the bone of the cavity of the eye below, by the bone of the brow above, by the eye-peaks on both sides, by the brain inside, by the eyelashes outside. It has fourteen constituents: briefly, the four elements, colour, odour, taste, nutritive essence, collocation, appearance, life, nature, sensitive skin, sentient eye. In detail, there are the four elements and the following six which depend on them:—colour, odour, taste, nutritive essence, appearance, and collocation. These ten, in that they spring from four causes, make forty. Four, to wit, life, nature, sensitive skin, sentient eye, spring solely from kamma. Thus [307] these forty-four material qualities make forty-four constituents. Although the world perceives the eye as white, as [of a certain] bigness, extension, width, they do not know the real sentient eye, but only the physical basis thereof. That lump of flesh situated in the cavity of the eye is bound to the brain by sinewy threads. Therein are white, black, red, extension, cohesion, heat, and mobility. The eye is white from the abundance of phlegm, black from that of bile, red from that of blood, rigid from that of the element of extension, fluid from that of cohesion, hot from that of heat, and oscillating from that of mobility. Such is the compound organ of the eye. And that sentient organ situated in and bound to it is called the sentient eye as derived from the four great essentials. In¹ the circle of vision where arise images of the bodies of men standing, right in front, in the middle of the black disc surrounded by white circles of the constituent organism, it [the sentient organ] permeates the ocular membranes as sprinkled oil permeates seven cotton wicks. And it is served by the four elements doing the functions of sustaining, binding, maturing, and vibrating, just as a princely boy is tended by four nurses doing the functions of holding, bathing, dressing and fanning him. And being upheld by the caloric order, by thought and nutriment, and guarded by life and attended by colour, odour, taste, etc., the organ, no

¹ *Visuddhi Magga*, p. 445.

bigger in size than the head of a louse, stands duly fulfilling the nature of the basis and the door of visual cognition, etc. As it has been said by the 'General of the Dhamma':—

*That organ of the visual sense, by which
Objects are apprehended, is a small
And subtle thing, and like a louse's head.¹*

The term *cakkhāyatana* means 'sense of sight.'² In the phrase 'that eye which is the sentient organ derived from the four great essentials,' the possessive case is used in the sense of purpose. The sentient organ arises grasping the four great essentials is the meaning. By this expression he takes only the sentient organ and rejects the remaining visual organism. But in the *Indriyagocara Sutta*³ the sentient organ arising as derived from one great essential, [308] which is the element of extension, is well upheld by the other three great essentials: cohesion, heat, and mobility. In the *Catupariyavata Sutta*⁴ the sentient organ arising as derived from the two great essentials of the elements of extension and of cohesion, is well upheld by the two great essentials of heat and mobility. These two sayings have been made by way of explanation, and this Suttanta-like discourse is an explanatory teaching. The sentient organ arising as derived from the four great essentials is true of any one and also of any two of them. In this way is the teaching in the two Suttas. But the Abhidhamma is teaching without explanation. Therefore it is here said, 'the sentient organ derived from the four great essentials.'

Because it is grasped by foolish folk, as 'this body or this collection of the five aggregates is my *self*,' therefore both the bodily frame and the fivefold aggregate is called 'self-state' (*attabhāva*, i.e., personality).

'Included in personality' is comprised in and depending on just that.

'Invisible':—what cannot be seen by visual cognition.

'Reacting':—reaction, friction is here produced.

¹ Not traced.

² *Dhs.* § 597.

³ No such named Sutta as this is known.

⁴ ? *S.* iii. 59; cf. *S.* ii. 103.

'By which,' etc. :—that is to say, in brief, this eye by which as cause a given person 'has' in the past 'seen' the visible object specified, or, now proceeding, 'sees' it, or in future 'will see' it. If the eye be intact, he 'may see' such visible object as comes into focus, or he 'may have seen' a past object with a sight that is past. He sees a present thing by a present [eye]; he will see a future thing by a future [eye]. If the given object come into the focus of the eye, he 'may see' it by the eye:—here the phrase is conditional.

'Moreover this is sight,' refers to direction of vision.

'And this is visual sense,' refers to source and collocation.

'And this is visual element,' refers to emptiness of essence, of entity.

'And this is controlling faculty of sight,' refers to the setting up of control as an essential characteristic in vision.

'And this is a world,' refers to its transience, perishableness.

'And this is a door,' refers to its being an entry.

'And this is ocean'—because it cannot be filled.

'And this is lucent'—because it is very pure.

'And this is a field,' refers to origin of contact, etc.

'And this is a basis,' refers to its fixed seat. It guides the subject showing what is level and not level—this is meant by the term 'guide,' and in that sense also it is 'guidance.'

[309] 'And this is the hither shore,' refers to its being included in individuality.¹

'And this is an empty village,' refers to its being common to many and to the absence of a possessor.²

So far by joining these fourteen epithets beginning with 'moreover this is sight,' with the four terms beginning with 'he has seen,' the four methods of specification have been expounded. How? 'By that eye invisible and reacting he has seen a thing visible and reacting. And this is sight—and this is empty village'—such visible thing is the visual sense. This is one method. So should the rest be understood.

Now because a visible object strikes the sentient visual organ even when there is no desire to see, as when lightning flashes,

¹ I.e., existence in the three planes.

² S. iv. 174.

etc., therefore to show that mode the second section of the exposition was begun. Here 'on which eye'¹ means, on the eye which is in the locative case, 'visible object' being in the nominative case. 'Has impinged' shows the meaning of the past, 'impinges' that of the present, 'will impinge' that of the future, 'may impinge' that of possibility. To expand:—Past object impinges on past eye, present object on present eye, future object on future eye; should that object reach the avenue of eye, it would impinge on the eye:—this is the meaning of possibility. But in reality only in striking the sentient organ is the visible object said to impinge. Here also, according to the foregoing method, four methods of specifying should be understood.

Now to show the case of one who by his own wish has brought the eye close to a visible object with a desire to see, so that eye impinges on object, the third section of the exposition was begun. Its meaning is clear. Now here the eye in receiving the object is said to 'impinge on it'.² Here also by the foregoing method the four methods of specifying should be understood.

[310] In what follows, ten sections in all are shown, five by way of showing the arising of the five modes of sense-contact, and five by way of showing the arising as in connection with their objects.

In these sections 'depending on eye'³ means, making eye the cause. 'Concerning a visible object' means, on account of,⁴ relating to, because of, a visible object. By this is shown the correlation of visible object, namely, contact, etc., having the basis in the sentient organ, and being related to it by 'priority'; also what is included under 'process of apperception through the door of the eye' is related to it by 'object as dominant' and 'object as sufficient cause'.⁵

¹ Dhs. § 598.

² Dhs. § 599.

³ Dhs. § 600.

⁴ Lit. 'having arrived at'; *āgama*, the other synonyms being *ārabha*, *sandhāya*, *paticca*.—*Ed.*

⁵ 'Priority,' modes of 'object,' 'dominance,' 'sufficient cause' constitute the tenth, second, third and ninth of the twenty-four relations between things taught in the *Paṭṭhāna*. Cf. *Compendium*, p. 192 f.—*Ed.*

In the other five sections the term *rūpārammāno*¹ means that [mind] has a visible thing as its object, correlation being shown merely by the relation of 'object.' The fourfold method of specifying should be understood in these ten sections, as in the foregoing three sections.

Thus thirteen sections of exposition have been shown, to wit, the preceding three to show in various ways that the eye, which has been brought out in the question 'What is that matter which is the organ of sight?'² is this sort of state, and these ten. And in each of them, because four methods of specifying are obtained, they have been shown as elaborated into fifty-two methods (13×4). And the same with the following expositions also. Here only their specific differences are to be considered.

Sotāp means hearing³ (or ear). In the interior of the compound organ of the interior of the ear, at a spot shaped like a finger-ring and fringed by tender, tawny hairs, tended by the elements of which the different kinds have been mentioned, sustained by the caloric order, by mind, by nutriment, guarded by life,⁴ attended by colour, etc., it stands duly fulfilling the nature of the basis and door of auditory cognition, etc.

Ghanāp is smelling.⁵ In the interior of the compound organ of the nose, at a spot shaped like a goat's hoof, tended, supported, guarded, attended [as aforesaid], [311] it stands duly fulfilling the nature of the basis and door of olfactory cognition, etc.

'Tongue'⁶ is so called in the sense of tasting flavours.⁷ Above the middle of the compound organ of the tongue, at a spot shaped like the upper part of a torn lotus leaf, it stands duly fulfilling the nature of the basis and door of gustatory cognition, etc.

¹ This is in a section of the text of the *Dhammasaṅgāni* omitted in the P.T.S. ed. § 600, just before *cakkhuṇī p'etāp*. The ten sections in the one § 600 are brought out in *B.P.E.*, p. 177 f.—*Ed.*

² *Dhs.* § 597.

³ *Dhs.* § 601.

⁴ Āyūnā. *I.e.*, jīvitindriyam.—*Pyi.*

⁵ *Dhs.* § 605.

⁶ *Dhs.* § 609.

⁷ Sāyana may also mean 'being pleasant.'—*Tr.*

But in this body, wherever there is a matter grasped at the 'body as field of touch'¹ everywhere becomes [the object of] service, sustenance, protection, attendance, as said above. Like oil diffusing over cotton-rag, it stands duly fulfilling the nature of basis and of door of bodily cognition, etc.

What has been said is special [to the sense in question]. The rest of the text and the meaning should be understood by the method given in the exposition of sight. For here the terms 'ear,' etc., are simply substituted for the term 'eye'; the terms 'sound,' etc., for the term 'visible object'; the terms 'has heard,' etc., for the terms 'has seen,' etc. Owing to the absence of this pair of terms, 'guide, guidance,' there are [only] twelve sets of similes. The rest everywhere is as has been said.

It may be objected that if in this body, wherever there is matter grasped at, the tactile sense stands everywhere like oil in cotton-rag, then there will be a mixing of characteristics.

Nay, there would be no such thing. Why? Because of the absence of any other species of object. But, it may be said, even if this is so, the tactile sense would not 'stand everywhere.' True, in the ultimate (or metaphysical) sense it is not everywhere. But the expression (stands everywhere) is used because it is impossible to set forth the variety in the tactile sense by breaking it up. It is impossible to separate tastes, etc., of material things like particles of sand, and so they are said to be mutually diffused; ultimately, too, there is no taste 'in' material things (if there were, there would be a 'taste-seizing' whenever there was a sight-seizing). Even so the tactile sense is not everywhere in an ultimate sense; and it is not absent because of the impossibility of breaking it up. Hence it is that no mixing of characteristics comes to pass.

[312] Moreover, the determining of characteristics, etc., prevents such mixing. For the eye has the characteristic

¹ *Dhs.* § 613. *Kāyo* (body) does duty also for 'sense-organ of touch,' or 'skin-sensibility.'

of sentience for phenomena¹ worthy of directly impinging on the object, or of sentience sprung from action caused by a desire to see the object. It has the function of drawing consciousness towards the objects; it has the localizing of visual cognition as its manifestation; it has the being produced by action caused by a desire to see as proximate cause. The ear has the characteristic of sentience for phenomena worthy of directly impinging on sounds, or of sentience sprung from action caused by a desire to hear sounds; it has the function of drawing consciousness towards sounds; it has the localizing of auditory cognition as its manifestation; and it has a proximate cause as above. The nose and the tongue (or smell and taste), and lastly the body or tactile sense may be analogously defined.

But some say that eye is a sentient surface for phenomena having excess of heat; that ear, nose, tongue are sentient surfaces for phenomena having excess of mobility, extension, cohesion; that body is a sentient surface for all phenomena. Others, again, in the case of the last four senses, assign sentience as follows:—space-element, mobility, cohesion, extension.

Such persons should be asked: Adduce your Sutta! Surely they will never find such a Sutta.

But some of these give as their reason that object-seizing is aided by visible objects which are qualities of heat,² so for the other senses. They should be answered:—

‘Who has said [313] that visible objects are qualities of heat, and so on?’ Nay, it is not permissible to say, of indivisible phenomena, this is a quality of that. Should they say: ‘Just as you assigned the functions of sustaining, etc., on the part of extension, etc., owing to the excess of this and that phenomenon among the various supports,³ so should you agree to this expression, “visible objects, etc., are qualities

¹ *Bhūtappasādo*. The *Tīkā* understands by *bhūta-*, *mahābhūta*. See also below, p. 410.—*Tr.*

² For instance, light as a quality of lamp-fire aids the seizing of the visible object by the eye; sound as a quality of mobility aids the seizing of the audible object by the ear, etc.—*Tr.*

³ *I.e.*, the material objects sprung from the four elements.—*Tr.*

of elements" from seeing the excess in visible and other sense-objects when in those supports there is preponderance of heat,¹ etc.

They should be answered thus:—If the smell in cotton with a preponderance of extension is greater than that of liquor fermented with a preponderance of cohesion, and if the colour of cold water be inferior to that of hot water with an excess of heat—if these were so, we should agree to your expression. But since these two instances cannot happen, therefore you should give up the special reasoning regarding those phenomena which are bases. As in one group, although there is no distinction of phenomena, the tastes of visible and other objects are unlike each other, so even though there is no other special reason, the visual and other sentient organs are unlike each other. What is that reason which is not mutually common? The reason of the distinction among the senses is just kamma. Therefore from the difference of kamma, and not from that of phenomena, the difference in these is to be understood. For if phenomena were different [in kind], there would be no sentient organ. Hence the ancient [thinkers] said: 'The sentient organ is [sentient] of phenomena similar [to itself], not of dissimilar.'²

And so among these sentient organs, because they are distinct and because of the differences of kamma, eye and ear seize the object before they have come into physical contact with it. This is because consciousness arises in an object which does not adhere to its own basis.³ Nose, tongue, and tactile sense seize their object while in physical contact with themselves. This is because consciousness arises in objects which adhere to their own basis. But in the Commentary the object is said to have attained [contact] because it has reached the 'sense-avenue.' The colour of the discs of the moon and sun situated above forty-two thousand yojanas away strikes the sentient visual organ. That colour,

¹ Such as the blazing and dazzling colour of fire, audible sound of wind, good taste in earth, sweet taste in water.

² Cf. the Greek theorem: Knowledge is of like by like, e.g., in Aristotle's *De Anima* i. 2. 5.

³ Namely, one of the great essentials.—*Pyi*.

although it appears to be far, is known to be in physical contact. Because it has such a range, the eye is said to have attained range-contact. The changes in the body of men cutting down trees at a distance and of washermen washing clothes appears as far off. But sound striking the sentient ear by an elemental series is [relatively] slow of ascertainment.

[314] Although [in the Commentary] it is said that 'the object is said to be in physical contact because it has reached the sense-avenue,' yet the colour of the disc of the moon, etc., appears as not in physical contact¹ and at a distance. And if sound also should come slowly, having arisen from far, it should be heard after some time. Coming by serial impact and striking the sentient organ of the ear, its direction might not be evident. Hence eye and ear have an object not in physical contact, and are like the snake, etc. As a snake takes no delight outside [its range] in places which have been scoured and swept, but is delighted when, at resting time, it has entered a place of refuse, a lair of grass and leaves, an ant-hill, and secures mental quietude, so also the eye prefers broken-up effects. It does not delight in burnished, gilded walls and the like, it does not even wish to look at them, but it delights in [surfaces] variegated with pictures and beautified with flowers and creepers, etc. Indeed, in such places, when the eye does not suffice, folk wanting to look open mouths as well. Again, the crocodile² going out, does not see what there is to seize, but goes after food with eyes shut. But when it has dived into the water a hundred fathoms deep and entered its den and laid itself down, then its mind becomes quieted and it sleeps at ease. So, too, [the sense of] hearing desires a 'den'; it entertains a wish for the cavity of the ear which is dependent on space. The space in the ear-cavity is the cause of hearing a sound. And open space also is operative when [a bhikkhu] is reciting within [a cave]. The sound does not break through the roof of the cave and come out, but going out by the doors and windows strikes the sensitive ear in an

¹ Read *asampatto* in P.T.S. ed.

² *Supsumāro*, usually rendered crocodile.—*Ed.*

elemental series. Immediately, then, those seated at the back of the cave know that so-and-so is reciting. If such be the case,—it may be said—then there is physical contact [with object]. But has this ear such an object? Yes, it has. If so (the objection is) when drums, etc., are struck from far there should be no knowledge that the sound is distant. But there is such knowledge. For when the sensitive ear is struck by sound, there is such and such a variety of knowledge as—distant sound, near sound, sound from the further bank, sound from the hither bank. Such knowledge is natural law. What is this natural law? Wherever there is a cavity, [315] from that comes hearing, like the seeing of the (distant) moon and sun, etc. Such is the absence of physical contact in hearing.

The bird does not delight in a tree or the ground, but when it rises into the sky and goes beyond a stone's throw or two, it gets a feeling of security. So also the nose desires space, and has for object odour dependent on wind.¹ Indeed, cattle at the first showers of rain keep smelling at the earth, and turning up their muzzles to the sky breathe in the wind. And when a fragrant lump is taken in the fingers and smelt no smell is got when breath is not inhaled. Again, a dog in wandering about does not see a safe place, but is harassed by the throwing of stones, etc. But when it enters the village and scratches up ash at an oven-door and lies down, it finds ease—so is it with the tongue. This, too, desires 'a village' and has for object the taste dependent on the watery element. Thus even when a bhikkhu's duties have been done during the three² watches of the night, and he early in the morning, taking bowl and robe, has to enter the village, he is not able to discern the taste of dry food unwetted by the saliva.

Again, the jackal does not find delight in roaming about till it eats human flesh at the cemetery for non-cremation, and lying down it gets ease. So the tactile sense also desires

¹ Wind which takes the odour is the sufficing condition, yet by common usage the odour is called the sufficing condition of [the sensed] wind.—*Tikā*.

² P.T.S. ed.: read *ti-yāma*° for *niyāma*°.

matter grasped at, and takes a tangible object dependent on the extension element. Thus, persons getting no other matter 'grasped at,' will when lying down put the head on the palm of the hands. Internal and external extension is the cause of the tactile sense seizing the object. Thus it is not possible to know the hardness or softness of a bed well spread out or of fruits placed in the hand without sitting down on the one or pressing the other. Hence internal and external extension is the cause in the tactile cognition of the tactile organ.

Of these senses, too, [as in sight and hearing] specifying of characteristics, etc.¹, reveals an absence of intermixture. For the characteristic, function, manifestation, proximate cause, desired object, and bases of the sentient visual organ are different [316] from those of the other sentient organs, hence the senses are not mixed. And, further, these similes illustrate the absence of intermixture:—just as although the shadow of uplifted banners of five colours seems to be blended in one, yet the shadow of each does not mix with that of the others; as although, when a lamp that is lit, has a cotton wick of five colours, the flame seems to be blended in one, yet the individual flame of the fibre of each cotton does not mix with that of the other, so these five organs, although they meet in one individuality, yet do not mix with each other. Not only they but also the remaining material objects, etc., are unmixed. For in this body are three portions: lower body, middle body, upper body. Of these, from the navel downwards is the lower body, in which are forty-four material qualities: body-decad, sex-decad,² eight material things sprung from nutriment, eight from the caloric order and eight from mind. From the navel upward till the wind-pipe is the middle body in which are fifty-four material qualities: body-decad, sex-decad, basis-decad, three sets of eight sprung from nutriment, etc. From the wind-pipe upward is the upper body wherein are eighty-four

¹ See above, p. 405.

² On 'decads,' see *Compendium*, pp. 164, 250 f.

material qualities: eye-decad, ear-decad, nose-decad, tongue-decad, touch-decad, sex-decad, the three sets of eight sprung from nutriment, etc. Among these, this decad, to wit, the four great essentials as causes of the sentient organ, together with colour, odour, taste, nutritive essence, life-controlling faculty, the sentient organ is called the eye-decad by virtue of its absolutely indivisible pre-determined material qualities. The remaining decads are to be understood in the same way. Among them the material qualities in the lower body do not mix with those in the middle and upper bodies; and the material qualities in the remaining two bodies do not mix with those in the lower. As although at eventide the shadows of the mountain and of trees seem to be one yet they are mutually unmixed, so although in these three parts of the [same] body, the forty-four, fifty-four, and eighty-four material qualities appear as one, they are mutually unmixed.

In the exposition of 'visible object'¹ colour is just 'coloured appearance'; or it shines—hence appearance. 'Evident to visual cognition' is the meaning [317] of the compound term. 'Visible' is [literally] co-vision; the meaning is, it is to be seen by visual cognition. 'Reacting' is [literally] co-reaction; the meaning is, producing the friction of impact. Among blue-or-green things,² etc., the colour of 'blue-or-green' (*nīla*) is like the clitoria, 'yellow' is like the bauhinia, 'red' is like the bandhujīvaka, 'white' is like the morning star, 'black' is like burnt coal, 'crimson' is like the sindhu-vāra, kanavīra flowers. In the Cūlahamsa Jātaka³ *hari* is used for golden:—'O Sumukha, thou golden-coloured one, depart

¹ Dhs. § 617.

² On this curious colour-blindness in Indian vision, see *B.P.E.*, p. 62, n. 1. Dr. Edridge Green, author of *Colour-blindness and Colour-perception*, would call such vision tetrachromic (seeing but four colours in the spectrum). It regards 'blue as a greenish-violet, and calls it violet or green, according to its proximity to one of these colours.' See *Strand Magazine*, Dec., 1909: 'Colour-blindness and its Dangers.'—*Ed.*

³ Called (in the Fausböll edition) Mahāvamsa Jātaka (v. 359, 89), which follows the Cūlahamsa.—*Ed.*

if thou wilt.' But in what follows *jātarūpa* is rendered by golden, hence here *hari* is dark green. These seven terms of colour have been pointed out merely with respect to their nature, without taking into account the substance itself. *Harivanna* is the colour of a dark-green leaf. *Ambikuravanna* is like the colour of a mango-shoot. These two terms have been pointed out by taking into account the substance.

The twelve terms beginning with 'long' have been pointed out by common usage. This is accomplished by reference and by juxtaposition. For the terms 'long,' etc., are accomplished by mutual reference. The terms 'circular,' etc., are accomplished by juxtaposition. Among them with reference to what is short, 'long' is so-called as being higher than that; 'short' is so-called as being lower than 'long.' With reference to what is big, a thing smaller than that is 'little,' with reference to which a greater thing is 'big.' 'Circular' is shaped like a wheel; 'oval' like an egg. 'Square' is bounded by four sides. And the same should be understood with six sides, etc. 'Sloping' (low-lying) is bent down, 'high-lying' (upland) is raised up. Among these expressions, because it is possible to know 'long,' etc., also by touch, but not 'blue-green,' etc., therefore in reality 'long' is not directly¹ a visible object, neither is 'short,' and similar terms. What we call 'long,' 'short' is relative to (dependent on) this or that, has such and such a position, and it is to be understood here as mentioned in accordance with this or that conventional usage.

The pair of terms 'shady' and 'glowing' have been mutually divided. 'Light' and 'dim' likewise. 'Cloudy,' 'frosty,' 'smoky,' 'dusty' are shown as [referring to] four substances. Of these *abbhā* is cloudy, *mahikā* is snow or frost. By these four terms the colours of clouds, etc., have been shown. By 'like the disc of the moon in colour,' etc., the radiant [318] colours of the moon, etc., have been shown; their difference as objects should be understood thus: Made of gold, roofed with silver, forty-nine yojanas in length and breadth, the moon is the mansion of the moon god. Made

¹ *Na nippariyāyena.* Or, 'is only figuratively....'—Ed.

of gold, roofed with crystal fifty yojanas in length and breadth, the sun is the mansion of the sun god. The mansions of various gods are made of the seven gems, and are seven, eight, ten, twelve yojanas in length and breadth. These are the constellations. Of these the moon is below, the sun is above. Between the two is one yojana. From the lower edge of the moon to the upper end of the sun is one hundred yojanas. The constellations of the stars march on both sides. The moon is sluggish in his course, the sun is quick, the constellations are the fastest of all. At times they are in front, at times behind the moon and the sun.

‘Mirror’ is a disc made of copper. ‘Gem’ means, all the various gems except the cat’s eye, as *jolirasa*, etc. ‘Shell’ is of the ocean. ‘Pearl’ is ocean and other pearls. ‘Cat’s eye’ is a jewel of the bamboo colour. *Jātarūpa* is ‘gold’ of the colour of the Master’s complexion. For the Master has a golden complexion, for which *suvarṇa* (literally, ‘fine colour’) is also used. ‘Silver’ stands for the coin (or *kahāpana*).¹ *Māsakas* of copper, wood, lac are in common use and are all included here. By the expression ‘or whatever other,’ excepting the visible object enumerated in the Text, all remaining objects of different colours, such as cups or shutters, rough cloth, mildew, etc., are included.

Thus all visible objects, though of different sorts, such as blue-green, etc., are not specifically divided as regards their characteristics, etc. For all this matter has the characteristic of striking the eye, the function or property of being in the relation of object to visual cognition, the manifestation of being the field of visual cognition, the proximate cause of the four great essentials. Likewise all derived matter has the four great essentials as proximate cause. But where (in other sense-cognition, etc.) there are different features, of that we shall speak. Where there are none the method used in the exposition of sight should be understood. [319] The difference is simply that there the exposition begins with sight, here it begins with visible object. And there there are four-

¹ See above, p. 369, n. A *kahāpana* might be of any metal.

teen similes beginning with 'it is eye'; here there are three beginning with 'it is matter.' The rest is the same. For as thirteen sections have been said to specify the eye by elaborating them in four methods, here they are also given.

In the exposition of sound,¹ 'sound of drum' is the sound of big drums. The other three terms denote sounds of tabors, conches, and tom-toms. 'Song-sound' is sound of singing. 'Musical sound' includes all other sounds of stringed instruments, such as the lute, etc. 'Sound of cymbals' is the sound of copper and wooden clappers. 'Manual sound' is the sound of clapping hands. 'Noise of people' is the sound of the incoherent articulations of an assembled multitude. 'Sound of concussion of things' is the sound of trees rubbing against each other; of bells and gongs. Wind-sound is that of blowing wind; water-sound is that of water flowing or driven by wind; 'human sound' is that of men talking, etc.; and all such sound except this is 'non-human sound.'²

By this last pair of terms all sounds are exhausted. Nevertheless sound not mentioned in the Text and produced by splitting bamboos, tearing cloth, etc., is included under the category of 'or whatever. . . .'

Although sounds have been distinguished [in the Text] as, e.g., of a big drum, they have not been differentiated as regards salient characteristics, etc. As to these, all sounds have the characteristic of striking the ear, the function-and-property of being the object of auditory cognition, the manifestation of being the field or object of auditory cognition. The rest should be understood by the method used in the exposition of sight. Here also the thirteen sections elaborated in the four methods are given. Their meaning may be known by the first exposition. Hence it is not expanded.

In the exposition of the field of odours,³ 'odour of roots' is odour produced by any root. And the same with 'odour

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 621-24.

² Amanussā may mean infra-human beings, as in *Mil.*, p. 207, where they are opposed to devatā (spirits, gods). Here, however, they are used in a more general sense as logical contradictories.—*Ed.*

³ *Dhs.* §§ 625-3.

of sap,' etc. Odour of vegetables, etc., uncooked or badly cooked, is 'raw odour'; that of fish, shell-fish, rotten flesh, stale butter, etc., is 'putrid odour.' [320] 'Pleasant odour' is desirable smell. 'Unpleasant odour' is undesirable smell.

By these two last terms all odours are exhausted. Nevertheless all odours not mentioned in the Text, such as that of mildew, cloth, etc., are included under the category of the 'or whatever. . . .'

Though odours have been distinguished by such classes as odour of roots, etc., they have not been differentiated as regards salient characteristics, etc. As to these, all odours have the characteristic of striking the sense of smell, the property of being the object of olfactory cognition, the manifestation of being the field of the same. The rest should be understood by the method used in the exposition of sight. Here also are given the thirteen sections elaborated in fifty-two methods. Their meaning is evident.

In the exposition of objects of taste,¹ 'taste of roots' is taste produced by any root. And the same with 'taste of stems,' etc. 'Sour' tastes are buttermilk, etc. 'Sweet' is really ghee from cow's milk, etc., but honey is connected with astringency and after standing long becomes astringent. Raw sugar is connected with alkaline and after standing long becomes alkaline. But butter after standing long, although it loses colour and smell, does not lose its taste, hence it only is genuinely sweet. 'Bitter' is as nimb leaves, etc., 'pungent' is as ginger, pepper; 'saline' is as sea-salt; 'alkaline' is as a brinjal sprout or tender fruit. 'Acrid' is as the jujube; 'astringent' is as myrobalan, etc. All these tastes involve reference to the substance,² but here it is to be understood that, by the names 'sour,' etc., a sapid object has this or that substance.² 'Nice' is desirable taste; 'nauseous' is undesirable taste. By these two expressions all tastes are exhausted. Nevertheless, those not included in the text, such as those of a stone, a wall, a cloth, etc., are included under the category of the 'or whatever. . . .'

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 629-32.

² Or base (*vatthu*).

And though it is distinguished under these classes, yet the object of taste has not been differentiated as regards salient characteristic, etc. As to that, all tastes have the characteristic of striking the tongue,¹ the property of being the object of gustatory cognition, the manifestation of being the field of the same. The rest should be understood by the method used in the exposition of sight. [321] Here, also, as there the thirteen sections elaborated in fifty-two methods are given.

In the exposition of the feminine controlling faculty,² 'that which' is an expression showing the reason. The meaning here is:—'by whatever cause a woman has feminine features,' etc., where 'feature' is shape. To expand: The shape of a woman's hands, feet, neck, breast, etc., is not like that of a man's. The female lower body is broad, the upper body is less broad. The hands and feet are small, the mouth is small. 'Mark' is recognizable sign. The female breast is prominent. The face is without beard or moustache. The dressing of the hair, the wearing of the clothes are also unlike those of a man. 'Occupation' is action. Thus in youth women play with tiny shallow baskets, pestles and mortars, variegated dolls, and weave string with clay-fibre. 'Deportment' is mode of going or gait, etc. Thus there is a want of assertion in women's walking, standing, lying down, sitting, eating, swallowing. Indeed when a man of that description is seen, folk say, 'He walks, stands, etc., like a woman.' 'Feminine in condition and being'—these two have one meaning: the nature of woman, which is born of kamma and produced at the instant of conception. But feminine features, etc., are not the female controlling faculty; they are produced in course of process because of that faculty. When there is seed the tree grows because of the seed, and is replete with branch and twig and stands filling the sky; so when there is the feminine controlling faculty called femininity, feminine features, etc., come to be. The feminine controlling faculty should be regarded as the seed; as

* ¹ Cf. *Vis. Magga*, pp. 446, 447. There, too, the palate plays no part in the organ of taste.

² *Dhs.* § 633.

the tree stands growing and filling the sky because of the seed, so the feminine features, etc., arise in course of procedure because of that faculty. Herein the controlling faculty is not known by visual cognition but only by mind-cognition. But feminine features, etc., are known by visual as well as by mind-cognition. 'This is that matter which is the feminine controlling faculty' means 'such matter is not as the eye-controlling faculty, etc., are in the male.' By natural law the controlling faculty of a woman is of the woman only.

And the same [322] with the masculine controlling faculty.¹ Masculine features, etc., should be understood as the opposite of the feminine. For the shape of the hands, feet, neck, breast, etc., of a man is unlike the shape of those of a woman. For a man's upper body is broad, the lower body is less broad; his hands and feet are large, the face is large, the breast-flesh is less full; beard and moustaches grow. Hair-dressing and the wearing of clothes are not like those of women. In youth they play with chariots and ploughs, etc., make sandbanks and dig ponds. There is assertion in their walking, etc. When a woman is seen taking long strides, etc., folk say 'she walks like a man.' The rest is the same as was said of the feminine controlling faculty.

Of these two controlling faculties the feminine has the characteristic (of knowing)² the state of a woman, the function of showing 'this is woman,' the manifestation which is the cause of femininity in feature, mark, occupation, deportment. The masculine controlling faculty has the characteristic of (knowing)² the state of man, the function of showing 'this is man,' the manifestation which is the cause of masculinity in feature, etc. Both came into being during the procedure of the first inhabitants of this cycle, subsequently they arise at conception. Matter coming into being at conception fluctuates during procedure and changes its features; and matter coming into being during procedure does likewise; as has been said: 'At that time in a certain bhikkhu the features of a woman were revealed; at that time in a certain female

¹ Dhs. § 634.

² So *Tīkā*.

bhikkhu the features of a man were revealed.¹ Of the two, the masculine sex is superior, the feminine is inferior. Therefore the former disappears through grossly immoral conduct; the latter may be brought about by weak morality. But in disappearing, the latter does so by weak immorality, the former may be brought about by strong morality. Thus both disappear through immorality and may be brought about by morality.

Does a hermaphrodite possess one controlling faculty or two? One, and that is feminine to a female hermaphrodite and masculine to a male hermaphrodite. This being so, there should be no existence of the latter sort of hermaphrodite. For the female controlling faculty is said to be the reason of the characteristic-mark (*vyanjana*).² Then has the male hermaphrodite no controlling faculty? In such the female controlling faculty is not the reason of the characteristic-mark, [323] because of its invariable absence. For when in a female hermaphrodite a lustful thought for a woman arises, then the masculine characteristic-mark is manifested, and the feminine characteristic-mark is hidden and concealed; and *vice versa*. And if in such people the controlling faculty was the cause of the latter characteristic-mark, then always there would be a persistence of both characteristic-marks. But in reality there is no such persistence. Hence it is to be understood that in a hermaphrodite the controlling faculty is not the reason for the characteristic-mark. (What then is the reason?)—Lustful thought, friend of (past) kamma, is the reason. And because there is only the one controlling faculty in a hermaphrodite, therefore the female hermaphrodite herself becomes pregnant and causes another to become pregnant; the male hermaphrodite causes another to become pregnant but himself does not become so.

In the exposition of the controlling faculty of life,³ what should be said has already been said above under the immaterial controlling faculty of life.⁴ There it was simply said 'that

¹ Not traced.

³ *Dhs.* § 635.

² Such as features and marks.—*Tr.*

⁴ See above p. 197. *Dhs.* § 19.

which is of those immaterial states':—here, because of the material nature of the faculty, the only textual difference is 'that which is of those material states.' And its characteristic, etc., should be understood thus: The controlling faculty of life has the characteristic of watching over co-existent material objects, their procedure as function, their persistence as manifestation, the thing which ought to be maintained as proximate cause.

In the exposition of body-intimation,¹ here intimation in the first place is the making known one's own state by [overt] bodily action, both by animals to men and by men to animals, in accordance with a [certain] disposition of the body; thus that state by which such a disposition is made known. Itself intimates in the same way, or again, by such a disposition one's self is made known—this also is intimation. The kind of intimation called body-intimation is the agitating of the body recognized in such sayings as 'self-restraint in action is excellent.' A meaning is made known by bodily gestures, and thus one's self is made known.

In the words 'of a moral thought,' etc., reference is made to the nine kinds of moral consciousness:—eight of the sensuous realm and one concerning super-knowledge; 'or of an immoral thought' by means of the twelve kinds of immoral consciousness; 'or of an unmoral thought' by means of the eleven kinds of inoperative consciousness: eight great inoperative, two limited inoperative, one sensuous inoperative which has attained to super-knowledge. Other kinds of consciousness than these do not produce intimation. [324] But there is intimation by means of not more than these kinds to probationers, adepts, and average persons. Thus by way of these three terms, moral, immoral, unmoral, etc., intimation has been shown as a causal condition.

Now to show such intimation by means of six terms as result the Text goes on:—'of one advancing.' Because advancing and other acts arise by virtue of intimation, they are called results of intimation. Of these, 'of one advancing' is of

¹ *Dhs.* § 636.

one carrying the body forward; 'of one receding' is of one bringing the body backward; 'of one looking ahead' is of one looking straight; 'of one glancing around' is of one looking sideways here and there; 'of one retracting an arm' is of one bending in the joints; 'of one stretching it out' is of one stretching out the joints.

Now to show intimation by means of six terms in its intrinsic nature the Text goes on:—*kāyassa thanbhanā*; wherein *kāyassa* is, 'of the body.' *Thambhanā* is stiffening, making stiff the body. Increasing it by the preposition, *sam*, he said, *santhambhanā*; this may mean a stiffening of greater strength. *Santhambhitatta* is the state of a well-stiffened body. Next, *viññatti* is intimation; *viññāpana* is the act or mode of intimating. The state of being intimated is *viññāpilattan*. Anything here to be added has been said above in the discourse on Doors.¹

Likewise in speech-intimation². But the meaning of the term 'speech-intimation,' and of the terms in the exposition, has not been stated in the discourse on Doors, and should be understood thus:—those who make known their own state by speech—including men with animals and animals with men—this state is made known in accordance with a [certain] disposition of speech. Grasping the significance of words, oneself is intimated—thus it is intimation. The kind of intimation called speech-intimating is an agitating of the voice recognized in such sayings as 'self-restraint in speech is excellent,' etc. It is a way of intimating one's intention by the sound of speech. Again, from intimating oneself in this way intimation is made by means of speech. In 'speech,' 'voice,' etc., the sound which is uttered by a person is 'voice'; 'speech' is that which is uttered, emitted. 'Utterance' is a significant sentence. It is that sentence which is the means of expression of those desirous to know and to make known. That which is uttered is 'enunciation.' 'Noise' is that which is sounded. 'Work or act' is that which is done. 'Noise-work' is making noise. Noise made in various ways [325] is the meaning.

¹ See Part III., p. 109.

² Dhs. § 637.

'Articulate speech' is special forms of speech, which is no mere jangle, but is speech with a specified signification; or vocal utterance so divided as to convey a meaning. The word 'speech' has been shown by means of all these terms.

Now to show that intimation intrinsically, in three modes, by virtue of the terms 'intimation,' etc. (their meaning having been given above), and by joining them with that 'speech,' it is said 'that intimation by that speech,' etc. The meaning is plain from what has been said above.

Now among modes of consciousness producing intimation for the purpose of not causing delusion, thirty-two, twenty-six, nineteen, and sixteen should be understood as particularized. Thirty-two modes of consciousness cause material qualities to arise, and strengthen the postures and give birth to the twofold intimation. Twenty-six modes of consciousness do not give birth to intimation only, but make the other two [processes also]. Nineteen modes of consciousness produce only matter, and do not make the other two. Sixteen modes of consciousness do not make any one of the three. Of all these modes of consciousness, thirty-two are the eight moral types analyzed above and the twelve immoral from the sensuous realm, ten from those that are inoperative, the consciousness of super-knowledge in probationers and average persons, and that of [saints] purged of the intoxicants. The twenty-six are five moral types, and five inoperative from the material realm, four moral and four inoperative from the immaterial realm, the four [stages of] path-consciousness, the four of fruitional consciousness. The nineteen are eleven from the sensuous moral resultants, two from the immoral resultants, inoperative mind-element from inoperative consciousness, five modes of resultant consciousness from the material realm. The sixteen are the ten cognitions, the re-birth-consciousness of all beings, decease-consciousness of [saints] purged of the intoxicants, four immaterial resultants. Thus these sixteen thoughts are not effective in either matter, posture, or intimation. Many other thoughts in the immaterial sphere do not produce matter from having failed to

get an opportunity, but such as do produce body-intimation are speech-intimation.

In the exposition of space-element¹ 'space' is that which is not 'scratched,' not scratched off, which is not possible to scratch, cut, or break. With affix *gata* (gone-to) the meaning is the same, as in *khelagata* (saliva), etc.; or it may be taken as *ā-kāsayata*, an 'unscratched' place. 'Sky' is that which is not struck (*a-gham*); not strikable is the meaning. *Aghagatam* is the same. 'Vacuum' (*vivara*) is in the sense of a hole; also *vivaragatam*. By 'untouched by the four great essentials' the unentangled space-element untouched by these is stated. And starting with its characteristic, space-element has the characteristic of delimitating material objects, the function of showing their boundaries, the manifestation of showing their limits, state of being untouched by the four great essentials and of being their holes and openings as manifestation, the separated objects as proximate cause. It is that of which in the separated groups we say 'this is above, this is below, this is across.'

The following expositions² of 'buoyancy of matter,' etc., should be understood by the method given above on 'buoyancy of thought,' etc.³ But here as to characteristic, etc., buoyancy of matter has non-sluggishness as its characteristic, removing the heaviness of material objects as its function, quickness of change as its manifestation, buoyant matter as its proximate cause. Next 'plasticity of matter' has non-rigidity as characteristic, removing the rigidity of material objects as function, absence of opposition in all acts due to its own plasticity as manifestation, plastic matter as proximate cause. 'Wieldiness of matter' has workableness suitable or favourable to bodily actions as characteristic, removal of non-workableness as function, non-weakness as manifestation, workable matter as proximate cause.

These three do not⁴ abandon each other. Yet though this be so [they are mutually distinguishable]. That change of matter which is buoyancy of matter is buoyancy of material

¹ *Dhs.* § 638.

² *Dhs.* §§ 639-46.

³ See p. 199 *f.*

⁴ Supply *na* in P.T.S. ed., p. 326.

objects, non-sluggishness and the special kind of change which is as the quick movement of one free from ailment, and is produced from the opposite cause to that perturbation of the elements which makes the sluggishness of matter. That change of matter which is plasticity of matter is plasticity of objects like that of well-pounded leather, is distinguished by tractableness, suavity in all special works, and is produced from the opposite cause to that perturbation of the elements which makes the rigidity of matter. That change of matter which is wieldiness of matter is wieldiness of material objects like that of well-polished gold, is distinguished by suitableness for all bodily works, [327] and is produced from the opposite cause to the perturbation of the elements which makes unsuitableness. Thus their difference should be understood. And kamma is not able to make them; only nutriment, [thought, and the caloric order]¹ can do so. Thus ascetics² say, 'To-day we have agreeable food; our body is light, plastic, wieldy'; 'to-day we have suitable weather'; 'to-day our mind is one-pointed, our body is light, plastic, and wieldy.'

In the exposition of integration and continuity,³ 'of organs,' i.e., of ten and a half⁴ sense-organs of matter, 'accumulation' is production or genesis. 'That is the integration of matter' means, 'that accumulation of organs of repeated production.' The meaning is growth. 'That which is integration of matter is the continuity of matter' means, 'the excess of growth during procedure over the growth of material things thus started is continuity of matter. The meaning is procedure. 'Accumulation' should be understood as genesis, as when water issues from a hole dug in the river bank; integration as growth, as when the hole is full of water; continuity as continuous proceeding, as when the water overflows. What does this exposition signify? By sense-organ accumulating is implied,

¹ Text has 'nutriment, etc.' ² *Yogino.* ³ *Dhs.* §§ 642-43.

⁴ I.e., five organs of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and five of visible object, sound, odour, taste, tangible object, and the sixteen subtle material qualities, forming a *portion* (half) of sixty-nine principles which are reckoned as the *dhammāyatana* or organ of the cognizable object. See *Compendium*, p. 184.—Tr.

and by accumulation sense-organ. Both have been stated.¹ And what does the mention of both imply ? The accumulation integration, production, growth of the four continued material things is mentioned. In the real sense both integration and continuity are synonyms of the production of matter. Yet so as to make clear the difference in the mode of production, he makes the teaching in the Outline as [distinguishing between] integration and continuity. Having done so, because there is, in a real sense, no difference in these two words, therefore in the exposition he said, 'That which is accumulation of organs is integration of matter,' 'That which is integration of matter is continuity of matter.' That arising of sense which is said to be accumulation is called integration of matter; further, the subsequent arising of sense is called, in the sense of upper growth, integration of matter, and also continuity of matter.² And because both these, integration and continuity, are synonyms of the production of matter therefore (of them) integration of matter has the characteristic of accumulation, the function of making material things rise at the beginning, leading them, or the fulness of matter as manifestation, integrated matter as proximate cause. Continuity has the characteristic of continuous occurrence, the function of linking or binding without a break, unbroken series as manifestation, matter bound without a break as proximate cause.

In the exposition of decay,³ 'decay' is getting old; [328] this indicates its *intrinsic* nature. The mode of decaying is 'ageing.' The three terms beginning with 'decrepitude' indicate function after the lapse of time. The two last, 'shrinkage in life and maturity of faculties,' indicate the nature of decay. The word itself 'decay' shows what it naturally is; hence the exposition states its nature. By the word 'ageing' mode is shown; hence this exposition indicates the manner of decay. By the word 'decrepitude' is shown

¹ Also accumulation is the characteristic and sense-organ is the possessor of the characteristic. Hence they are relative and mentioned together.—*Tikā*.

² This sentence is not in the P.T.S. ed.—*Tr.*

³ *Dhs.* § 644.

the function which is the reason¹ for the broken state of teeth, nails, etc., in process of time. By 'hoariness' is shown the function which is the reason for the greyness of hair on the head and body. By 'wrinkles' is shown the function which is the reason for the wrinkled state in the skin making the flesh fade. Hence these three terms indicate the function of decay in process of time. By showing these changes decay is manifested. As a path taken by water or by fire is clear from the broken and scattered state, or from the charred state of the grass, the trees, etc., but the path itself is not the water or the fire, so the path of decay is clear by decrepitude, etc., in teeth and so on. It might be taken with open eyes; but decrepitude, etc., are not decay, which, indeed, is not [a thing] cognizable by the eye. And decay has been shown by the resultant nature known as the very evident wasting of life and maturity of the controlling faculties of sight, etc., in process of time by these terms:—'shrinkage in life and maturity of faculties.' Hence these two last expressions indicate the resultant nature of this decay. Because the life of a being who has reached decay shortens, therefore decay is said to be the shrinkage in life by a figure of speech. Moreover, the faculties, such as sight, etc., capable of easily seizing their own object, however subtle, and which are clear in youth, are mature in one who has attained to decay; they are disturbed, not distinct, and not capable of seizing their own object however gross. Hence decay is said to be the maturity of faculties by a figure of speech. And all this decay so indicated is twofold:—evident and hidden. Decay is called evident in material states from the sight of brokenness, etc., in teeth and so on; it is called hidden in immaterial states from our not seeing such change. Again it is twofold as uninterrupted and interrupted. Decay is called uninterrupted from the difficulty of knowing the distinction in colour, etc., from stage to stage, as in the decay of gems, gold, silver, coral, moon, sun, etc., of beings in the decade of infancy, etc., of flowers, fruits, sprouts, etc., [329] of inanimate things; decay without

¹ Reading *"kāraṇa"*.

interruption is the meaning. And decay is called interrupted when it is easy to know the distinction in colour, etc., from stage to stage in the aforesaid things other than gems, gold, silver, etc. As to characteristics, etc., the decay of matter has the characteristic of maturity of matter; leading (to disruption) as function; want of a fresh state, though not devoid of its intrinsic nature, as manifestation, like rotten paddy; the maturing matter as proximate cause.

In the exposition of impermanence,¹ 'destruction' is the becoming destroyed; 'passing away' is the process of so passing; 'break-up' is dissolving. And because after attaining [its own nature], matter undergoes loss, destruction, breaks up, therefore it is with respect to that nature that it undergoes destruction, passing away, dissolution. The term being increased by the preposition *pari-*, 'break-up' is called 'total dissolution' (*paribheda*). In the sense of not existing after having become, it is not permanent, that is, 'impermanent.' The state of such matter being impermanent is 'impermanence.' 'Disappearance,' *i.e.*, matter disappears. When it has reached death, the material qualities disappear and become invisible; not matter only, but all the five aggregates disappear. Hence by the impermanence of every one of the five aggregates, just this is the characteristic. Fully defined, impermanence of matter has the characteristic of complete dissolution, the merging of matter as function, destruction and evanescence as manifestation, matter undergoing dissolution as proximate cause. Above, birth is implicated and decay also; in this place death is implicated. Thus these three states are to beings so constituted like enemies with uplifted swords. For as [any] three foes of a man go about seeking for an opportunity, and one would say, 'Let it be my business to draw him out and bring him to the forest,' the second would say, 'Let it be my business to strike and fell him to the ground, once he is brought to the forest,' the third would say, 'Let it be my business from the time of his falling to the ground till his head is cut off with the sword,' so are these [three stages of life].

¹ *Dhs.* § 845.

For birth is like the enemy who draws him to enter the forest; because he has come to birth in this or that place. Decay is like the enemy who strikes and fells him to earth when he has reached the forest, because the aggregates produced are weak, dependent on others, lying down on a couch. Death is like the enemy who [330] with a sword cuts off the head of him when he is fallen to the ground, because the aggregates, having attained to decay, are come to destruction of life.

In the exposition of solid food,¹ 'solid' means it is made into an eatable morsel. Food (nutriment) means, it is 'taken into.' It is made into a morsel and swallowed down, is the meaning; the fetching-hither (*ā-hāra*) of matter. 'Boiled rice,' etc., is said to bring out the name by the substance, and again, to show its different kinds by the substance. For the nutritive substances implied herein are twelve, beginning with boiled rice and ending with syrup. Roots, etc., not mentioned in the Text are included in the 'or whatever.' Now in order to show these roots, fruits, etc., as things eatable, it has been said: 'in whatever region,' etc. Herein what is to be eaten and enjoyed by the mouth is *mukhāsiya*, what is to be torn by the teeth is *vikhādanāni*, to be swallowed by the throat is *galajjhoharaniyanī*. Now 'stomach-filling' is said to show that substance by virtue of function. For the substance swallowed, such as roots and fruits, etc., as well as boiled rice, sour gruel, etc., fills the stomach. This is the function of the substance.

By all the foregoing terms nutriment is shown together with the substance. Now to show the real nutritive essence extracted from the conceptual, the expression 'by which nutritive essence beings maintain themselves' is said. Of these, which is the function of the substance and which of the nutritive essence? The removal of risk and preservation respectively are their functions. For the substance removes risk and is not able to preserve. The nutritive essence preserves and is not able to remove risk. Being together, the two are able both to preserve and to remove risk. What is this risk? Heat born of kamma. For when there is no substance such as boiled rice in the stomach, that heat arises

¹ *Dhs.*, § 646.

and seizes the stomach-walls and causes the being to cry out thus, 'I am hungry; give me food.' When it has eaten, the heat releases the stomach-walls and seizes the substance. Then the person is quieted in mind. For as a hungry demon seizes him who enters the shade of the tree, binds him with spirit-chains and, rejoicing in his own abode, comes when hungry and bites him on the head, so that the person cries out till those who hear the sound come from various places, saying: 'Here is someone in trouble!' [331] and the demon devouring everyone that comes rejoices in his own abode, so should the application of this simile be understood. For like the hungry demon is the heat born of kamma; like the being kept bound in spirit-chains is the stomach-wall; like the men who keep coming is the substance of boiled rice, etc.; like the descent from the tree and bite on the head is the release of the substance and seizure of the stomach-wall by the heat produced by kamma; like the bitten man's cries is the saying, 'Give me food'; like the rejoicing over the abode after tearing and eating every man that comes at that alarm is the quietude of mind when the stomach-wall is released, and the substance seized by the kamma-born heat.

Herein the nutritive essence in gross substance is weak, in the subtle substance strong. For after eating coarse grain, etc., one becomes hungry again after a brief interval. But to one who has partaken of butter, etc., food is no more welcome for the rest of the day. And here the grossness and subtleness should be understood with varying reference. Thus the nutriment of peafowl is subtle as compared with that of crocodiles. These are said to swallow stones and digest them in their stomach; peafowl eat such creatures as snakes and scorpions. And the nutriment of hyenas is subtle as compared with that of peafowl, for they are said to eat horns and bones discarded for three years, and which become soft as bulbs and roots the moment they are wetted by their saliva. The nutriment of elephants is subtle as compared with that of hyenas, for they eat leaves of various trees, etc. More subtle yet than that is the nutriment of the gayal, the wild ox, deer, etc., which eat the

pithless leaves of various trees, etc. More subtle than that is the nutriment of cattle, which eat grass, wet and dry. More subtle still is the nutriment of hares, more subtle still is that of birds, more still that of frontier people, more still that of village pensioners, more still that of kings and ministers, more still that of universal monarchs, more still that of earth spirits, more still that of the four firmament-guardians, each being more subtle than the last, as far as the Yāma and Paranimittavasavatti spirits, [332] whose nutriment attains perfect subtlety.

As to its characteristic, etc., solid food has the characteristic of nutritive essence, the function of fetching matter [to the eater], of sustaining matter as its manifestation, of substance to be swallowed as proximate cause.

In the exposition of 'not derived'¹ as derived matter clings to, but is not clung to by, another, so this non-derived matter not only clings to, but it also is verily clung to.² 'The tangible' is what may be known when touched. The compound term in the Text is 'that which is tangible' plus 'object of sense.' The compound term 'cohesion-element'² is that which is 'cohesion' and 'element' in the sense of a nature which is not entity, is void [of self].

Now because three kinds of material things may be touched and known, therefore to classify and show them it is said, 'Which is that matter which is tangible object?'³ (1) The element of extension, which has the characteristic of hardness, being the fulerum⁴ [of co-existent states] as function, receiving them as manifestation. (2) The element of heat, which has the characteristic of heat, maturing as function, the gift of softening [co-existent states] as manifestation. (3) The element of mobility, which has the characteristic of strengthening, impelling as function, bringing near and over as manifestation. And the first [named] element, that of cohesion, has trickling as characteristic, breeding [of co-existent states] as function, gathering them together as manifestation. Each of these four has the remaining three as its proximate cause.

¹ Dhs. § 647.

² So *Pyī* reads.

³ Dhs. §§ 648-51.

⁴ Or platform (*patitthānā-*).

'Hard' means rigid, 'soft' means not rigid. 'Smooth' means polished, 'rough' means harsh. 'Pleasurable contact' means desirable touch causing pleasurable feeling; 'painful contact' means undesirable touch causing painful feeling. 'Heavy' means weighty, 'light' means not heavy. And here by means of these terms: 'hard, soft, smooth, rough, heavy, light,' the element 'extension' is analyzed. When this body is accompanied by the life-controlling faculty, by the element of heat, by consciousness, then it becomes lighter, softer, [333] more wieldy. In the Text (Sutta) 'light' and 'soft' concern only the element of extension. But the pair of terms: 'pleasant contact and painful contact,' belongs to the analysis of the three great essentials, viz.: extension, heat, mobility. For whereas the element of extension has a pleasurable touch, as well as a painful touch, so also have the elements of heat and mobility. To them the element of extension with a pleasurable touch, when a lad with soft and tender hands shampoos one's feet, makes this kind of speech, 'Dear, press on, press on, dear!' The element of heat with a pleasurable touch, when in the cold season someone takes a warming-pan and warms one's limbs, makes this kind of speech, 'Dear, foment [them]!' The element of mobility with a pleasurable touch, when in the hot season a dutiful lad fans us with a fan, makes this kind of speech, 'Dear, fan away, fan, dear!' On the other hand, when a lad with hard hands presses one's feet, it is as though the bones would break, and he gets told to go away. If the warming-pan were brought in the hot season, one would be told to take it away. In the cold season if one were fanned by a fan, it would be said, 'Take it away, don't fan!' Thus should the pleasurable and painful touch of these be understood.

Thirteen sections adorned each with four methods as follows:—'such a tangible, invisible and reacting,' etc., are to be understood by the method given in visible object, etc., above. Do these three great essentials reach the avenue of the senses simultaneously or severally? Simultaneously. And do they being thus presented strike the sentient body or not? They do. Making them the object, does bodily

cognition arise at one stroke or not? It does not. For the object becomes such by virtue of deliberate inclination or of intrusion. Of these [alternatives] deliberate inclination should be understood thus:—when the bowl is filled with food and brought, one who takes up a lump and examines whether it is hard or soft, is considering only the element of extension, though there may be heat as well as mobility present. One who investigates by putting the hand in hot water, is considering only the element of heat, though extension and mobility are present. One who lets the wind beat upon the body by opening the window in the hot season, is considering, while the wind beats gently and softly, [334] only the element of mobility, though extension and heat are present. Thus the [mental] object is made by deliberate consideration. But he who slips, or knocks his head against a tree, or in eating bites on a stone takes as his mental object only the element of extension, on account of its intrusiveness, though where he slipped, etc., heat and mobility were present. One treading on fire makes only the element of heat his object, owing to its intrusiveness, although extension and mobility are present therein. When a strong wind blows striking the ear as if to make one deaf, although extension and heat are present therein, the element of mobility alone is made the object owing to its intrusiveness. The tactile cognition of one who [deliberately] makes any element the object of thought does not arise at once. The touch of one pierced by a bundle of pins is stimulated at once. But wherever the sensitive surface is intrusive, there tactile cognition arises, and wherever the impact is strong, there it arises first. On bathing a wound with a fowl's feather, a filament may touch the sensitive surface, but tactile cognition arises only there where the sensitive surface is obtruded. And wherever the impact is strong, one makes the object by intrusion, and by intrusion tactile cognition is said to arise.

But how does the mind shift from an object? In one of two ways:—by one's wish, or by excess of [a new] object. To expand:—one who goes to festivities held in honour of monasteries, etc., with the express wish of paying homage to the

various shrines, to bhikkhus, images, and of seeing the works of carving and painting, and when he has paid his respects and seen one shrine or image, has a desire to pay homage to, and see another, and goes off. This is shifting by one's wish. And one who stands gazing at a great shrine like a silver mountain peak, when subsequently a full orchestra begins to play, releases the visible object and shifts to the audible object; when flowers or scents possessing a delightful odour are brought, he releases the audible object and shifts to the olfactory object. Thus the mind is said to shift owing to excess of [a new] object.

[335] In the exposition of the element of cohesion¹ 'liquid'² is the natural word, whether it be *āpo* or *āpagata*; 'moist' is by way of being fluid, whether it be *sineha* or *sinehagata*. 'Cohesiveness of matter' is the cohering condition of the essential matter, such as the element of extension, etc. For the element of cohesion binds together iron, etc., in masses, makes them rigid. Because they are so bound, they are called rigid. Similarly in the case of stones, mountains, palm-seeds, elephant-tusks, ox-horns, etc. All such things the element of cohesion binds, and makes rigid; they are rigid because of its binding.

Is the element of extension the basis of the remaining elements by being in contact with them, or not? In other words, does the element of cohesion in binding the remaining elements, bind by being in contact, or not? In the first place, the element of extension is the basis of that cohesion without being in contact with it; but is the basis of the elements of heat and mobility by being in contact with them. But the element of cohesion binds the three others without being in contact with them. Otherwise it would be called tangible object. And the same is true of the elements of heat and of mobility in performing their own functions with regard to the remaining two. For the element of heat touches that of

¹ *Dhs.* § 652.

² *Āpo* (water, liquid) has in philosophic terminology assumed the meaning of *bandhanatta*, cohesiveness.—*Id.*

extension and cooks it. Yet the latter does not burn by the intrinsic nature of heat. Did it do so, it would be defined as having the characteristic of being hot. And the element of heat touches that of cohesion and dries it up, yet the latter does not dry up by the intrinsic nature of heat. Did it do so, it would be defined as having the characteristic of being hot. And the element of heat touches that of mobility and heats it, yet the latter does not become heated by the intrinsic nature of heat. Did it do so, it would be defined as having the characteristic of being hot. And the element of mobility touches that of extension and strengthens it, and it does the same to the element of heat; [336] but it strengthens the element of cohesion without being in contact. When a lump of raw sugar is made by cooking sugar-cane juice, is the element of cohesion rigid or not? Not rigid. For it has the characteristic of flowing, it is the element of extension which has that of hardness. And the deficient cohesion becomes an excessive extension. Indeed, it abandons its status of fluidity, but not its characteristic [of flowing]. Though the lump of raw sugar is reduced or pounded, the element of extension is not pounded. Indeed the element has the characteristic of being hard; that of cohesion has the characteristic of flowing. And the deficient extension becomes excessive cohesion. It abandons its status of being in the form of a lump, but not its own characteristic. For there is alteration in state (by way of deficiency and excess) of the four Great Essentials;¹ but there is no such thing as alteration of characteristics. The absence of such alteration of the characteristic is shown in the *Attħā-naparikappa Sutta*: 'Verily, Ānanda, of the elements of extension . . . of cohesion, these four great essentials might alter their characteristic sooner than it were possible for the Ariyan disciple endowed with assured faith in the Buddha to alter.'² For this is the meaning:—Ānanda, the element of extension with the characteristic of being hard might change

¹ Such as the becoming fluid or soft of the hard molasses and the becoming hard of fluids.

² *Anguttara* i. 222.

and be called the element of cohesion with the characteristic of flowing; but there would be no change in the Ariyan disciple. Thus is impossibility of change mentioned in the Sutta.

The meaning of the terms 'grasped-at,'¹ etc., in the following expositions of 'matter which is grasped at,'² should be understood by the method given in the discourse on the Table of Contents.

The organs of sight, etc., have been treated at length above. We shall here speak only of what is distinctive in them. In the exposition of the 'grasped-at,' the sense organs are mentioned solely from this aspect of 'being grasped at.' And because objects of sense are also grasped-at, therefore they, having been shown briefly under 'or whatever,' have again been expanded by the method beginning with 'matter through kamma having been wrought.' In this way the meaning in all the 'or-whatevers' should be understood.

But why, in both expositions, have decay and impermanence not been taken as 'due to kamma having been wrought,' and 'not due to kamma having been wrought'? Why are they taken only in the expositions of the 'not-grasped-at,' etc.?³ [337] In 'not due to kamma having been wrought,' matter sprung from another cause than kamma has been taken. In 'due to kamma having been wrought' only matter sprung from kamma has been taken. And these two, decay and impermanence, do not arise either from kamma,⁴ or from any other matter-producing cause. Therefore they have not been taken. That they do not so arise will be clear later. And by such expressions as 'not-grasped-at,' etc., both the state of springing from kamma, etc., has been rejected, and the state of springing from another cause has not been granted. Hence in that exposition these two have not been taken.

In the exposition of 'sprung from [or originated by] consciousness,'⁵ because the pair of terms, 'body-intimation, speech-intimation,' appears with reference to phenomena solely

¹ *Upādīnna* :—'issue of grasping,' *B.P.E.*, p. 201; 323, n. 1. See *Compendium*, p. 159, n. 6.

² *Dhs.* §§ 653 ff.

⁴ *Points of Controversy*, 207 f.

³ *Dhs.* § 656.

⁵ *Dhs.* § 667.

originated by consciousness, therefore it is mentioned here. In an ultimate sense, however, only the phenomena on which these two intimations depend are originated by consciousness. As it is from depending on such phenomena that decay-and-death of impermanent matter is called impermanence, so does this twofold intimation become known as 'originated by consciousness.'

The same method should be understood in the exposition of the term 'connate with consciousness.'¹ Inasmuch as they appear as consciousness, therefore this pair of questions has been asked. There is, however, not a [genuine] arising connate with consciousness as is the case with the phenomena and also with feeling, etc.

And the same with 'consequent on consciousness.'² Inasmuch as [such matter] appears as consciousness, therefore this pair [of opposites] is so called.

'Gross'³ means thick, that which may be seized by impact of the sensitive surface, because it has become the basis and the object of thought. 'Subtle'⁴ should be understood as the contradictory of what has been said.

'Remote'⁵ :—[an object may be] far even though it stand near. This is when there is a difficulty of cognizing, because it is not to be seized by way of impact. The other term 'near' [may apply to an object] though it stand far. This is when there is ease of cognizing, because it may be seized by way of impact.

The expositions of sight, etc.,⁶ are to be understood at length by the method given above.

[338] So far this is what is distinctive in the twofold summary⁷ of matter.

The threefold summary⁸ is clear in meaning.

At the end of the fourfold summary, owing to the absence of divisions in the last term in 'what is seen,' etc., omitting

¹ *Dhs.* § 669. *B.P.E.* :—'comes into being together with thought.'

² *Dhs.* § 671. *B.P.E.* :—'consecutive to thought.'

³ *Dhs.* § 675.

⁴ *Dhs.* § 676.

⁵ *Dhs.* § 677.

⁶ *Dhs.* §§ 695-741.

⁷ *Dhs.* §§ 653-741.

⁸ *Dhs.* §§ 742-876.

the query from the beginning it is said: 'The visible object is a thing seen, the audible object is a thing heard.'¹ Herein it is possible to see by looking at the visible object with the eye—thus it becomes 'a thing seen.' It is possible to cognize by hearing sound-organ by the ear—thus it becomes 'a thing heard.' The three fields of odour, taste, and touch, when they have been reached by nose, tongue, and body, become 'considered' (*mutam*)² as something to be seized and considered in the sense of being known. It is said to be 'considered' by reason of the arising of knowledge when there has been contact. Thus it is said also in the Commentary. All matter should be known by means of mind-cognition—thus it becomes known as 'cognized by mind.'

In the exposition of the fivefold compendium³ 'hard' is rigid. *Khara* (rough) is also *kharagata*; 'harsh' is the meaning. The other two terms also indicate intrinsic nature. 'Personal' is belonging to self. 'External' is outside. 'Grasped at' is originated by *kamma*. Generally, however, only matter established in the body is implied. Indeed, whether such matter is grasped at, or not, all is known as 'grasped-at' by virtue of being taken, seized, and wrongly handled.

*Tejogata*⁴ is matter with the characteristic of heat (*tejo*) included in (*gata*) all kinds of heat or organic energy. Or, heat has 'gone' to the state of heat—hence *tejogata*. 'Scorching heat' (*usmā*) is a mode of heat. *Usmāgata* is gone to such a state of scorching heat, and is the name for the mode of scorching heat. *Usuma* is strong heat. That which has gone to such a state is *usumagata*. 'Mobility'⁵ is going without stopping. Mobility having *gone* to such a state is *vāyogata*. 'Inflation' is the firm state of matter like that of the lotus stalk, leather-bag, etc., when filled with air.

[339] Owing to the absence of the differentiation of the concluding term of the three compendia beginning with the sixfold, the exposition has been made without putting the query from the outset. Herein 'possible to know by visual

¹ *Dhs.* § 961.

² *Mutam*: 'imagined.' *B.P.E.*, p. 230.

³ *Dhs.* §§ 962-66.

⁴ *Dhs.* § 964.

⁵ *Dhs.* § 965.

cognition' is meant by 'cognizable by eye.'¹ 'Cognizable by mind,' i.e., possible to be known by mind-cognition. It is possible to know specifically by the 'threefold element of mind.'² In 'all matter' this is said because there is no such thing as any kind of matter not cognizable by the element of mind-cognition. Indeed, the Supreme Buddha is never known to have missed the right occasion on which to use method when he came to Abhidhamma. The right occasion to use the method is so-called owing to the absence of any kind of matter unrecognizable by the element of mind-cognition. Hence in using the method he said 'all matter.'

'Pleasurable contact'³ is cause of attainment of pleasurable feeling. 'Painful contact'—cause of attainment of painful feeling. In these two expressions this method has been given because the tangible object is the condition⁴ of pleasure and pain.

And in the ninefold aspect⁵ the method has been given owing to the existence of matter called the controlling faculty. Owing to such matter being with and without reaction, the method has been given under the tenfold aspect.⁶

In the elevenfold aspect⁷ ten and a half organs have been classified. Their sections of expositions should be understood at length by the method given above. The remainder everywhere is clear in meaning.

And in order not to get confused with respect to these material forms, this particularization should be considered:—

Combination, origination, predetermination, conditioning.

Herein combination is the taking all that matter in groups or collectively, amounting to twenty-five; from organ of sight down to material food, tangible objects, element of cohesion. These together with the basic matter make twenty-six. [340] There is no matter other than these forms. But some⁸ say: There is the material quality of torpor. They

¹ Dhs. § 967.

² Dhs. § 969.

³ Dhs. § 970.

⁴ Sabbhavato. (Or, reading sabbhāvato)—owing to the existence or manifestation of pleasure and pain having a tangible object.—Tr.

⁵ Dhs. § 971.

⁶ Dhs. § 974.

⁷ Dhs. § 978.

⁸ The dwellers at Abhayagiri.—Pyi.

should be told after this sort:—‘ Surely you are the Sage, the Buddha Supreme, in whom are no hindrances !’ and checked thus: ‘ There is no such thing.’ Others say that there are twenty-seven kinds of material things with the material quality of power, twenty-eight with that of collocation, twenty-nine with that of birth, or up to thirty with that of disease. These teachers should be refuted by the non-existence of these [added material qualities] being shown in turn. When the element of mobility is taken, the material quality of power is taken also; there is no other. The material quality of collocation is taken with the element of cohesion, that of birth with integration and continuity, that of disease with decay and impermanence; there is no other. Diseases of the ear and so forth are merely an element originated by misfitting causes; no other disease is present. Hence collectively there are only twenty-six material qualities.¹

‘ Origination.’ How many qualities of matter have how many origins ? Ten material qualities have one origin, one has two origins, three have three origins, nine have four, two have none. Of these, eight, viz.: sentient organ of sight down to the life-controlling faculty verily have their origin in kamma. The pair called body-and speech-intimation verily originate from consciousness. Thus ten have a single origin. Sound [object of hearing] originating from the caloric [*i.e.*, physical] order and consciousness is the one which has two origins. Among sounds, unintelligible sounds originate from the caloric order, intelligible sounds originate from consciousness. Three material qualities:—buoyancy, pliancy, wieldiness originate from the caloric order, consciousness and nutriment. Thus three have three origins. The rest of the nine originate both from these three sources and from kamma. Thus nine have four sources. And decay and impermanence do not originate from any one of these four sources, and thus are the two which have no origin. And why ? Because they are not born. Verily they are not born. And why ? Because of the maturity and breaking-up of that matter which has been

¹ Cf. *Compendium*, pt. vi.

produced, for all that is material or immaterial which has arisen breaks up. [341] Verily this is to be accepted. For there is no thing arisen, material or immaterial, which does not undergo loss. But as long as it does not break up, there is a process of maturity; hence the expression, 'because of the ripening and dissolution of that matter which has been produced,' is accomplished. And if these [two material qualities] were produced, they would also mature and break up. Maturity does not mature, breaking-up is not broken up. Hence because of the maturing and breaking up of matter which has been produced, this pair of material qualities has not been produced.

Here this objection might be raised:—As in the expositions beginning with 'from kamma having been wrought,' by the expression, 'integration of matter, continuity of matter,' the expression 'birth is born' has been accepted, so the expression, 'let maturity mature, let breaking-up break up,' ought to have been accepted. (Reply):—In those expositions, 'birth is born,' etc., has not been accepted. However, whatever states come into birth through kamma, etc., because of their having been reborn,¹ the common phrase of birth being the cause of such states has been granted. But in the ultimate sense birth does not come into being. To one who is being born, the mere [fact of] rebirth comes into being.

Here the objection might be raised:—'Just as birth acquires the common usage of being called both the cause of rebirth of these states and rebirth, so maturity and breaking-up also acquire those names by common usage. But then it should also be granted that this pair of material qualities has kamma, etc., for origin.' (Reply) Maturity and breaking-up do not get that common usage. And why? From their absence at the moment when the productive cause is powerful. For there is power to productive causes only at the moment of the production of a state to be produced; none subsequent to that. And birth appearing at the moment of states about to undergo rebirth by means of productive

¹ Abhinibbatti:—B.P.E., p. 271, 're-created.'

causes, acquires by common usage the name both of being their causes and of being rebirth, birth being present at that moment. The other pair (decay and impermanence) being absent at that moment, [such common usage is not acquired], it may not be said that they come into being. Should you imagine that this pair does come into being from the statement, 'Bhikkhus, decay and death are impermanent, conditioned, arisen from a cause,'¹ it is not so. In the Sutta the teaching is explanatory. For in this passage the pair has been said to be dependent in origination by way of explanation, because of the decay and death of states which are of dependent origination. 'If so, the three:—[birth, decay, death]—not coming into being [342] are, like the hare's horn, non-existent. Thus they are permanent like Nibbāna'—is not the case, because they happen bound up with the bases. For when the bases appear—extension and the rest—the trio (birth, etc.) is revealed. Hence it cannot be said that these three are not. They are. They are also revealed in the absence of the bases. Hence they are not permanent. And it was in order to prevent a wrong conviction that this was said: 'Bhikkhus, decay and death are impermanent, conditioned, arisen from a cause.' Thus by such and other methods [we show that] these two qualities of matter have not sprung from any source.

Moreover, the word 'origin' has different implications. In the Table of Contents we have matter (1) born of kamma, (2) caused by kamma, (3) originating in the caloric order caused by kamma, (4) originating in nutriment, (5) caused by nutriment, (6) originating in the caloric order caused by nutriment, (7) originating in the caloric order, (8) caused by the caloric order, (9) originating in the caloric order caused by the caloric order, (10) originating in consciousness, (11) caused by consciousness, (12) originating in the caloric order caused by consciousness. Of these the eightfold matter beginning with the visual organ together with the heart-basis is matter born of kamma (1). Hair, beard, elephant-tusk, horse-tail, yak's tail—such matter is caused by kamma (2). The Wheel-treasure,² the

¹ S. ii., 26.

² Dialogues ii. 202 f.

mansions and gardens of devas, are matter originating in the caloric order and kamma (3). The formula of eight originating from nutriment refers to matter originating in nutriment (4). Material food is the cause of two continuities of matter, of that originated by nutriment and of that which is grasped at. Being the producer of the first, it is a cause; being the guardian of matter born of kamma, it is a cause. This matter born of kamma watched over by nutriment is known as matter caused by nutriment (5). To one who lives on disagreeable food and goes about in the sun arise freckles, moles, leprosy, etc., which originate from the caloric order caused by nutriment (6). The formula of eight originating in the caloric order is called so (7). The caloric order present in this group produces another eightfold group, said to be caused by the caloric order (8). [343] The caloric order present in this other eightfold group produces still another eightfold group, originating in the caloric order which is caused by caloric order (9). Thus the caloric order is able to impinge on three continuities of matter, but not more. It is proper to disclose this meaning also by what is not grasped at. Clouds are said to originate in the caloric order. Torrents of rain are said to be caused by the caloric order. And when rain falls, seeds grow, earth sends out odour, mountains appear blue-green, the ocean increases:—such matter is said to originate in the caloric order caused by the caloric order (9). The formula of the eightfold group originating in consciousness is said to 'originate in consciousness' (10). This material body of pre-existence defined thus, 'posterior mental states and mentals are in the relation of posteriority to this prior body,' is caused by consciousness (11). In the sky, in the firmament, he depicts an elephant, a horse, a chariot, various army forces:—this 'originates in the caloric order caused by consciousness' (12).

'Predetermined.' Fifteen material qualities are called predetermined, ten are unpredetermined.¹ If there were

¹ Parinipphanan ti. This term is stated thus as if it were in the text; but it is not in the P.T.S. ed. The translator, now in England, has not access to the Burm. text. In a dual (positive, negative) list of material attributes in the Visuddhi-Magga, p. 450, Buddhaghosa includes this pair of terms. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, pp. 368, 396.—Ed.

unpredetermined material qualities, they would be called unconditioned. And the bodily change of these determined material qualities is called body-intimation; change in speech is speech-intimation. Space-element is [any] opening or cavity. Buoyancy is lightness; plasticity is softness; wieldiness is workableness; integration is coming into being; continuity is a proceeding; decay is mode of wearing out; impermanence is process of having become [then] not being. Thus all matter is 'predetermined and conditioned.'

End of the elucidation of the chapter on Material Qualities, in the Expositor, the Commentary on the Summary of States.

PART IV—DISCOURSE ON THE CHAPTER OF THE SUMMARY

CHAPTER I THE TRIPLETS

HITHERTO the 'moral triplet' has been expanded by the word-classifying method of all states, moral and so on. And because that method also holds good in the remaining triplets and couplets—for as here, in the moral triplet, it has been noted by the wise, so it is possible for the wise to note it in all the triplets and couplets in serial order thus, 'Which are the states associated with a pleasurable feeling? [344] These are the states associated with a pleasurable feeling'—therefore, the detailed teaching being omitted in order to show the classification of states in all the triplets and couplets by another method neither too concise nor too detailed, the chapter on the Summary beginning with, 'Which are the states that are moral?'¹ has been begun. The chapter on the states of consciousness is a detailed discourse; that on the commentary is a concise discourse. But the chapter on the summary, concise with reference to that of the states of consciousness, is detailed with reference to that of the commentary. Hence it is of the nature of being neither too concise nor too detailed. It should be known as the chapter on the Summary, because it leaves out the detailed discourse, as well as for the reason mentioned above (in the Introductory Discourse).² For it has been said:—

*It summarizes roots and aggregates,
And 'doors,' planes of existence, meaning, text,
Name, sex—and therefore is called Summary.*

This chapter, namely, on the Summary is taught by summarizing (a) roots by the method beginning with 'The three moral

¹ Dhs. § 981.

² P. 9.

roots,¹ (b) aggregates by the method beginning with 'That is the associated aggregate of feeling,' (c) doors by the method beginning with 'Bodily kamma originating from it.' Kamma arisen in the body-door is called body-kamma. It has been shown by summarizing planes of existence by the method beginning with 'in a pleasurable soil [or plane] in the sensuous realm.'² And from being shown here and there by way of meaning, text, name, and sex (or form), it is shown by summarizing meaning, etc. There, in the exposition of moral consciousness,³ in the first place, the word 'three' limits the calculation. States which are moral and roots are moral *roots*, or, they are roots in the sense of rendering service by being the condition, source, production, origin, and birth of moral states; hence 'moral roots.' Thus, having shown them by way of meaning⁴ (or intrinsic nature),⁵ now to show them by way of their [specific] names, he has said, 'non-greed, non-hate, non-delusion.' Because thus far there is nothing moral freed from a root, therefore by bringing all the four-planed moral [consciousness] under the three roots the King of the Law has shown this.

[345] 'That is associated':—that is, associated with non-greed, etc. Here, in the aggregate of the mental co-efficients⁶ associated with non-greed are also counted non-hate and non-delusion. With the remaining two in [similar] association also, the same method should be understood. The King of the Law has shown this by exhausting again the four-planed moral consciousness in association with the associated fourth aggregate.

'That is originated,' i.e., originating in non-greed, etc. In this way also the King of the Law has shown this by exhausting even that four-planed moral consciousness in connection with the three doors of action. Thus far moral consciousness has been shown by being exhausted in three respects.

For immoral consciousness also the same method should be

¹ *Dhs.* § 981.

² *Dhs.* § 984.

³ *Dhs.* § 981.

⁴ *Phalattha*.—*Tikā*.

⁵ *Sabbhāvattha*.—*Anutikā*.

⁶ The fourth, or *sankhārakkhandha*.

understood. Indeed, of the twelve types of immoral consciousness not one is free from a root. The King of the Law has shown this by exhausting it by means of the root.

There is no immorality above that associated fourth aggregate. Hence the King of the Law has shown by exhausting those twelve types of immoral consciousness only by way of the fourth aggregate.

But because the procedure of those classes of immoral consciousness is by way of bodily, vocal, and mental action, therefore the King of the Law has shown them exhaustively by way of those doors of action.

Moreover, here, in the exposition of immoral consciousness,¹ the passage 'corruptions which are united therewith' should be understood thus:—'united' means persisting in one consciousness or person. That which persists in one consciousness is called 'united in co-existence,' that which persists in one person is called 'united in removal.' It persists with greed, etc., hence is called united therewith; or, it is called united because it persists in one consciousness together with another state, such as contact (other than greed, etc.), shown in various passages.

Of these, union in co-existence is implied in the following passages:—'which are the states that are corrupt and corrupting?' in the corrupt and corruptible triplet;² 'which are the states that are base?' in the base or low triplet;³ 'which are the states that are moral?' in this moral triplet; [346] 'which are the states that are corrupt?' etc., in the corruption group;⁴ 'which are the states that are harmful?' in the harmful couplet.⁵

And union in removal comes in the following passages:—'these are the three fetters—corruptions' in the triplet of 'removable-by-insight';⁶ again, 'these three—corruptions' in the triplet of 'having-root-conditions-removable-by-insight';⁷ also 'the three fetters—have root conditions removable by insight' in the same triplet; and 'herein which

¹ *Dhs.* § 932.

² *Dhs.* § 993.

³ *Dhs.* § 1025.

⁴ *Dhs.* § 1243.

⁵ *Dhs.* § 1294.

⁶ *Dhs.* § 1002.

⁷ *Dhs.* § 1010.

are—the corruptions?¹ in the *Vibhanga* chapter on the 'Right Efforts.'²

The exposition of the term 'unmoral'³ is clear in meaning. In this triplet [teachers have] said that three characteristics, three concepts, space obtained by separating the device,³ open space, object of nothingness, attainment of cessation are not obtained.

In the exposition of the triplet of feeling⁴, in 'pleasurable soil,'⁵ pleasurable feeling is called pleasurable soil in the same way as soils are called red or coppery and black. As when we say sugar-soil, rice-soil, we mean the localities where sugar and rice thrive, such consciousness as is an occasion for the arising of pleasure is called 'pleasurable soil.' That sort of consciousness is here implied. And because that feeling arises in the sensuous realm as well as in the other two realms of life, [347] to show its specific kind it is said, 'in the sensuous realm,' etc. 'The pleasurable feeling itself excepted':—i.e., excepting that pleasurable feeling which is in the pleasurable 'soil.' 'Associated therewith,' i.e., associated with that excepted pleasurable feeling. In the remaining pair of terms also the meaning should be understood in the same way.

In this triplet we get neither all three feelings, nor anything material, nor *Nibbāna*. For this triplet is said to be free from these four features which are not got in the moral triplet.

Now in the following triplets and couplets what might have been said by way of text and meaning, all in the order of the terms, has been said in the discourse on the Table of Contents and in the exposition of moral and other consciousness. But wherever there is any specific difference, we shall speak of just that.

In those triplets and couplets, taking first the resultant triplet,⁶ although material [resultant] states as well as immaterial states have their origin in action (*kamma*), yet they, from being without an object, are not like that action. But

¹ *Vibhanga*, p. 209.

² *Dhs.* § 983.

³ *Kasiṇa*. See above, p. 248.

⁴ *Dhs.* §§ 984-86.

⁵ *B.P.E.*, p. 252, n. 1.

⁶ *Dhs.* §§ 987-89.

immaterial [resultant] states which have a mental object, because they resemble the action, have been likened, as results, to fruit which resembles the seed. When rice seed is sown, the shoot, leaves, etc., although coming out are not called *rice fruit*, but when the rice ear is ripe, mature, then the rice which is like the seed is called rice fruit. And the shoot, leaves, etc., are said to be produced from, born of, the seed. Similarly it is fitting to call matter 'kamma'-born or 'grasped-at.'

In the triplet on 'grasped at,'¹ although the body and mind in [the personality of] saints may cause others to grasp at [things desired], as when it is said, 'Our senior uncle, the Elder!' 'Our junior uncle, the Elder!' still a saint has not himself seized, or wrongly handled, or grasped at the Paths, the Fruits or Nibbāna. As a heated iron ball is not the cause of flies sitting thereon, so the plenitude of spiritual heat in Path, Fruit, Nibbāna is not the cause of anyone else seizing through [his own] craving, conceit, or wrong views.

Hence it has been said, 'These are the states which are neither grasped at, nor favourable to grasping.' And the same with those which are neither corrupt nor corruptible.²

Those states, because they do not occur in the moral triplet, together with the sustained application of mind, which is co-existent with the initial application, do not occur in the triplet of initial application of mind.³

[348] In the triplet of the 'rapture-accompanied,'⁴ rapture, pleasure, indifference, giving their nature to the states co-existent with themselves, themselves become regressive.⁵ In this triplet, states of consciousness accompanied by grief, bodily cognition accompanied by pain, indifferent feeling, matter, Nibbāna—nothing of all these is obtained. For this triplet is said to be free from the content not occurring in the moral triplet and these five features.

In the triplet, 'removable-by-insight,'⁶ 'fetters' are bonds; 'theory of individuality' is a view arising with respect to the

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 990-92.

² *Dhs.* § 995.

³ *Dhs.* §§ 996-97.

⁴ *Dhs.* § 999.

⁵ *Pitthivatthakā.*

⁶ *Dhs.* § 1002.

body in the sense of existing, and called the fivefold aggregate, or, itself appearing as the view arising with respect to that body.

That it is possible to purify by (mere) rules, that it is possible to purify by (mere) rites, that it is possible to purify by rule and ritual:—observance thus taken is called ‘wrong observance (or handling) of mere rule and ritual.’ ‘Here’¹ is an indeclinable, signifying place. Sometimes it is said to refer to the world, as when [the Buddha] said, ‘Here in the world the Tathāgata appears.’² Sometimes it is said to refer to the dispensation or religion, as when he said, ‘In just this dispensation the first monk, the second monk. . .’³ Sometimes it is used to refer to a place, as when [the Buddha] said:—

‘*Here as I stood a deva, I obtained
Another life, as thou, good sir, shouldst know.*’⁴

Sometimes it is used merely to fill up a half-line, as when he said, ‘Here as I ate, bhikkhus, I was not prevented.’⁵

Here it is used for the world.

In ‘ignorant average man,’ ‘ignorant’ should be known as ‘owing to the absence of access to the Scriptures, and of the higher attainment of the Path and Fruition.’ For to whomsoever, owing to the absence of learning by heart, catechism thereon and deduction therefrom regarding the aggregates, elements, sense-organs, the causal mode, the application of mindfulness, etc., there is no attainment of that learning which represses opinionativeness, nor any access, owing to the non-attainment of what should be attained by conduct, such a person, from the absence of such access and such attainment, should be known as ‘ignorant’:—

‘*One of the ‘manyfolk’ is he who brings about
A multiplicity of things, ‘mid manyfolk engulfed.*’⁶

[349] For he who is ignorant is called [‘average’ or]

¹ *Dhs.* § 1003.

² *Digha* i. 62, etc.

³ *Anguttara* ii. 238. Cf. *ib.*, n. 1; *Digha* ii. 151; *Points of Controversy*.

⁴ Not traced.

⁵ Not traced. Br. text reads *apavārito*. Tr.

⁶ *Sumangala-Vilāsini* i. 59.

‘common’ for such reasons as the production of corruptions, many and of various sorts, as has been said: ‘He produces many corruptions: they have many views of individuality unremoved; they look to the face of many teachers; they have not got clear of all tendencies; they construct many and various complexities; they are borne along by many and various floods; they are anxious with many and various anxieties; they burn with many and various heart-burnings; with the manifold five desires of sense they are enamoured, swallowed up, cleaving to, attached to, hung up on them, hanging from them, obstructed by them; by the various five hindrances they are enwrapped, muffled up, stifled, closed in, covered up, cramped; or from being engulfed among persons, passing the bounds of calculation, of low practices [or principles] turned away from the Ariyan Law—such are “common.”’ Or counted as ‘separated from,’ ‘unmixed with’ the Ariyan folk possessed of the qualities of virtue, learning, etc.—thus ‘average.’ By these two terms the ‘ignorant average’ man [is denoted]:—

*The Buddha, kinsman of the sun, hath seen,
In common folk two species: one is blind,
The other class is good at heart.¹*

Thus two sorts of average men have been named, of whom the blind average man is here meant:—‘Who perceives not the Ariyans.’ From being far (*āra*) from the corruptions, not urging (*iriya*) the world to behave to unbenevolent purpose, urging beneficial behaviour, worthy of being resorted to by the world of men and devas:—Buddhassi, lent Buddhas, Buddhas’ disciples—are they called ‘Ariyans.’² Or, only the Buddhas herein are Ariyans. As has been said: ‘Bhikkhus, in the world of men and devas the Tathāgata is the Ariyan.’³ ‘Good men’=silent Buddhas, Tathāgatas, disciples. Be-

¹ *Sumangala-Vilāsinī* i. 59.

² The commentarial word-play here is untranslatable. It pieces Ariyā out of *āra*, far, *iriya*, urging, etc. Cf. *Anguttara* iv. 145; *Majjhima* i. 280.

³ Not traced.

cause they from being yoked with transcendental virtues are lovely men, therefore are they 'good men.' [350] Or, all of them are said to be twofold: Ariyans and good men. For Buddhas are both Ariyans and good men; so also silent Buddhas and Buddhas' disciples; as it is said:—

*'He of a grateful heart, of cultured mind,
Firm in devotion, and a virtuous friend,
Who carefully doth tend the many needs
Of them that ail, is called by mortals "good."*

Indeed, by so much of the text: 'Firm in devotion, and a virtuous friend' is the Buddhas' disciple declared; by 'grateful, etc.,' are the silent Buddhas and Buddhas declared. Now that person, who is not used to perceiving these Ariyans, and does not consider it right to do so, should be known as 'one who perceives not the Ariyans.' And there are two kinds: he who does not perceive them by the eye, and he who does not perceive them by insight. Of them the latter is here meant. Ariyans are both seen and not seen when the carnal or the psychic eye merely seizes on outward complexion, and is unable to take Ariyanship as object. Dogs and jackals, etc., see Ariyans by the eye, but are not perceivers of the Ariyans.

Hereon this story:—One who left the world in his old age, who was a supporter of an Elder, purged of the intoxicants, resident at Mount Cittala, while walking about for alms one day with the Elder, carrying the Elder's bowl and robe behind him, asked, 'Sir, what are the Ariyans like?' The Elder said: 'Friend, even though in this religion some old man goes about together with the Ariyans, taking their bowl and robe, and does the greater and lesser duties towards them, he does not know them. Friend, Ariyans are difficult to know.' Though this was said, he did not understand the hint. Therefore seeing is not by the eye but by insight, as he said: 'Vakkali, what good to thee is this [my] visible foul body? Verily, Vakkali, he who sees the Law sees me.'¹

¹ *Samyutta* iii. 120; *Pss. of the Brethren*, p. 198.

Hence not seeing the characteristic signs of impermanence, etc., seen by the Ariyans with insight, not arriving at the Law arrived at by the Ariyans, not seeing Ariyanship or the states which bring about Ariyanship, he, though he sees by the eye, should be known 'to perceive not the Ariyans.'

[351] 'Who comprehends not the Ariyan doctrines':—is unskilled in the Ariyan doctrines such as the different kinds of application of mindfulness, etc.

'Who is not trained according to the Ariyan doctrines.' Discipline here is twofold; each of which is fivefold. Owing to the absence of that discipline this average man is called 'untrained.' For this discipline is twofold, of restraint, namely, and of elimination, each of which is fivefold. Discipline of restraint is fivefold thus:—restraint by virtue, mindfulness, insight, patience, and effort. Discipline of elimination is fivefold thus:—elimination of the factor in question, discarding, extirpating, composure, escape. With these one is filled, replete, endowed with this Pātimokkha restraint—this is restraint by virtue. One guards the eye-controlling-faculty, arrives at restraint in the sight-controlling-faculty—this is restraint by mindfulness.

*The currents flowing in the world, O Ajita,
Said the Exalted One, these may
By mindfulness be checked, this the restraint I teach,
By insight they may be shut in¹—*

this is restraint by insight. Endurance of cold and heat—this is restraint by patience. Not consenting to the uprisen lustful thought—this is restraint by effort. And all this restraint is called restraint and discipline, from the restraining and eliminating of bodily misconduct, etc., which ought to be restrained and eliminated by each for himself. So far should the discipline of restraint be understood to be fivefold.

And owing to opposition among the different kinds of insights and knowledges, such as the distinction of mind from matter, there is elimination of this and that disad-

¹ *Sutta-Nipāta*, ver. 1035.

vantage by means of this and that insight and knowledge like the removal of darkness by lamplight. Elimination, namely, of the theory of individuality by means of determining mind and matter, [352] of the views as to what are not conditions, and what are uneven conditions by means of insight grasping the cause, of the doubtful state by means of insight transcending doubt subsequent to the preceding insight, of such attachment to a view as I, mine, by means of insight contemplating the group of mind and matter, of imagining what is not the path to be the path by means of determining the right path and the wrong path, of the annihilationistic view by means of discernment of genesis, of the eternalistic view by means of discernment of transience, of imagining no danger in danger by means of discernment of peril, of the perception of infatuation by means of the discernment of evil, of the perception of delight by means of insight into disgust, of the desire not to be free by means of knowledge of a desire to be free, of want of indifference by means of knowledge of indifference, of opposition in causal genesis¹ and in Nibbāna by adaptation, of the signs of things-in-the-making by adoption—this is elimination of the factor in question. And that elimination, like smiting away weeds on the water's surface with a pot,² of these and those hindrances, etc., by way of hindering their procedure by means of concentration in the different kinds of access, this is known as elimination by discarding. Elimination by means of the certain non-occurrence of the group of corruptions belonging to the 'uprising' [of Ill]³ and spoken of in this way, 'for the sake of eliminating [wrong] views in one's own life-continuum' on the part of one who is in this or that Path, cultivating the four Ariyan Paths, is called elimination by the removal called extirpation. That tranquillizing the lower nature at the moment of Fruition is called elimination by composure. That Nibbāna which has eliminated all conditioned things owing to detachment from all conditioned things is called elimination by escape.

¹ *Dhammatthiti*. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, p. 386 f.

² Cf. Childers' Dictionary *sub v.* *Vikkhambanam*.—*Ed.*

³ *Samudayapakkhikassa*. Cf. the second Ariyan 'Truth'.—*Ed.*

And because all this is called elimination in the sense of giving-up, and discipline in the sense of suppressing, therefore it is called elimination-discipline. Or, all this is so called from the production of this and that discipline in one who eliminates this and that. Thus it should be understood under five heads. Thus because it, in brief twofold and analysed as tenfold, does not exist in an ignorant average man, because he breaks down restraint and does not eliminate what should be eliminated, therefore from the absence of such discipline such an one is called 'untrained.'

[353] And the same method is to be understood in 'who perceives not good men, who comprehends not, nor is trained according to the doctrine of good men.' For there is no difference in meaning, as it has been said:—' Whatever Ariyans there are, are called good men; whatever good men there are, are called Ariyans. Whatever is the doctrine of Ariyans is the doctrine of good men; whatever is the doctrine of good men is the doctrine of Ariyans. Whatever Ariyan disciplines there are, are the disciplines of good men; whatever disciplines of good men there are, are disciplines of Ariyans. Ariyans and good men, doctrines of Ariyans and doctrines of good men, disciplines of Ariyans and disciplines of good men—they are mutually interchangeable, they are one, of one meaning, identical, partake of an identical nature, correspond in sense, and each is even the other.'¹

Regarding 'He views material qualities as the self'²—here in this world someone looks upon material qualities as the self: 'That which is corporeal is I, I am that matter.' Thus he looks upon matter and self not as two. As he views the flame and the colour as one, 'That which is the flame of a burning oil-lamp is the colour, that which is the colour is the flame,' so here he views matter as the self, owing to wrong views. 'Or the self to be possessed of matter':—taking the immaterial to be the self, he views it as having matter, as a tree has a shadow. 'Or matter in the self':—taking the

¹ Not traced.

² Cf. *B.P.E.*, p. 259, for the different renderings of this and the following phrases in this paragraph.

immaterial to be the self, he views matter as in the self, like scent in a flower. 'Or the self in matter':—taking the immaterial to be the self, he sees the self as in matter, like a gem in a casket. And the same with feeling, etc.¹

Hereby 'he views matter as the self,' bare matter only has been spoken of as the self. In these seven places: viz., 'he views the self as possessed of matter, or matter as in the self, or the self as in matter, feeling, perception, complexes, consciousness as the self,' the immaterial has been spoken of as the self.

[354] In twelve places by way of threes in the four aggregates, viz., 'or the self as having feeling, or feeling as in the self, or the self as in feeling,' mixed matter and non-matter have been spoken of as the self. In five places: 'he views matter as the self, feeling, perception, complexes, consciousness as the self,' the annihilationistic view is stated. Thus here are fifteen views concerning being and five concerning non-being. All of them are to be considered as blocking the way to the Path, as not blocking the way to happy rebirth, and as that which is to be slain by the First Path.

'He doubts the Teacher,'² that is, as regards the Teacher's body, or qualities, or both. In doubting that body he doubts:—'Is there, or is there not a [human] body adorned with the thirty-two excellent characteristic signs?' In doubting those qualities, he doubts:—'Is there, or is there not omniscience capable of knowing the past, present, and future?' In doubting both, he doubts:—'Is there, or is there not a Buddha who is endowed with the colouring of eighty minor signs and a halo of glory, who has penetrated omniscience, is capable of knowing all knowable things, and who is the world-saviour?' Thus, because of his doubting the Buddha's personality and qualities he is said to doubt both. 'Is perplexed':—being unable to decide as to the object of thought, he wearies, he suffers. 'Is not resolved':—he does not get decision as to the object. 'Is not calm':—he is not able to free the mind

¹ I.e., with the other four constituent factors of personality.

² Dhs. § 1004.

from perturbation and calm it, and is not calm regarding qualities.¹

In 'he doubts the doctrine,' etc., he is said to doubt the doctrine thus: 'Are there, or are there not the four Ariyan Paths which eliminate the lower nature, the four Fruitions of the religious life, which tranquillize the lower nature? Is there, or is there not the great deathless Nibbāna, related by way of object to the Paths, and Fruition?' as well as, 'Does the doctrine lead out of the round of births or not?'

[355] He is said to doubt the Order thus: 'Four persons in the Paths, four in the Fruitions—these are that treasure which is the Order; do they exist, or not?' also, 'Is this Order well-behaved or ill-behaved?' also, 'Is there, or is there not any resulting fruit of a gift to the Order?'

He is said to doubt the Training thus: 'Are there the three stages of training, or not?'²

'The past':—past aggregate, element, sense-organ. 'The future' are the corresponding future [states of consciousness]. Of these, regarding past aggregates, etc., he is said to doubt the past thus: 'Have there been, or not these past aggregates?' etc. Regarding those of the future he is said to doubt the future thus: 'Are there any, or are there not any in the future?' In doubting 'both,' he is said to doubt the past and the future.

In doubting thus: 'Is there, or is there not the round of the twelve causes?' he is said to doubt these causally generated states. Herein the word-definition is: 'The causes of these states, decay and death, etc., are specifically assignable causes.' 'Specifically assignable causality' is the state of such assignable causes. The two expressions are identical, and are synonyms here of birth, etc. Birth and the rest of the series are said to be causally generated in the sense 'come to pass because of, in consequence of.' Or, he doubts the specifically assignable causation of states which are causally generated.

'By mere rule of morality':—by ascetic habits called 'bovine,' etc.³ 'By ritual,' i.e., by ascetic conduct called

¹ Cf. P.T.S. ed., p. 354, n. 10.

² *Anguttara* i. 236 f.; Editor's *Buddhism*, 1912, ch. viii.

³ Cf. B.P.E., p. 260, n. 4. *Dialogues* iii. 11 f.

' bovine,' etc. 'By rule and ritual':—by both. 'Purity' is purity from corruption, or Nibbāna as the ultimate purity.

'United therewith,'¹ here chiefly the corruptions as collectively eliminable.² And the Text accepts two:—the corruptions of dogmatism and perplexity. The other eight:—greed, hate, delusion, conceit, sloth, excitement, shamelessness, fearlessness of blame, which are not included should be referred to and explained. For here when dogmatism and perplexity are removed, all the eight beginning with greed, which lead to purgatory and being united in elimination, are eliminated. And union in co-existence should be brought out and explained. [356] Thus, five kinds of consciousness:—four accompanied by dogmatism and one accompanied by perplexity—are removed by the [first, or] stream-winning Path. Of these, when the two kinds of automatic consciousness of dogmatism are eliminated, these corruptions, viz., greed, delusion, excitement, shamelessness, recklessness, which are co-existent therewith are removed by means of such union in co-existence. The remaining corruptions of dogmatism and of perplexity are removed by means of union in elimination. And when the modes of non-automatic consciousness associated with dogmatism are eliminated, these corruptions, viz., greed, delusion, sloth, excitement, shamelessness, recklessness, co-existent therewith, are eliminated by means of union in co-existence. The remaining corruptions of dogmatism and of perplexity are eliminated by means of union in elimination. So union in co-existence is obtained only in union in elimination. This they [the teachers] have brought out and explained.

'Associated therewith':—associated with those eight united corruptions. Or, this should be shown as association with each corruption separately, as with 'that greed,' with 'that hate.' Of them, when greed is taken, this group of corruptions, the aggregate of mental co-efficients, viz.: delusion, conceit, sloth, excitement, shamelessness, recklessness, is called greed.

¹ *Dhs.* § 1006.

² *i.e.*, Corruptions established as removable in a single individual.
—*Tr.*

associated. When hate is taken, this group of corruptions, viz.: delusion, sloth, excitement, shamelessness, recklessness, is called hate-associated. When delusion is taken, this group of corruptions, viz.: greed, hate, conceit, sloth, excitement, shamelessness, recklessness, is called delusion-associated. When conceit is taken, this group of corruptions co-risen therewith, viz., greed, delusion, sloth, excitement, shamelessness, recklessness is called conceit-associated. In this way the state associated with 'that sloth,' 'that excitement,' 'that shamelessness,' 'that recklessness' is said to be associated therewith. Thus should the connection be made.

'Originated thereby' means sprung from, or originated by 'that greed' . . . 'that recklessness.'

In 'these are the states eliminable by insight' the Stream-winning Path is called 'insight,' by which they should be put away—such is the meaning. But why is the Path known as insight? Because in it Nibbāna is first seen. But does not 'Adoption' see it first of all? [357] It does. But having seen it, one does not do what is necessary in the elimination of the Fetters, hence it should not be said that 'it sees.' A man of the provinces, although he may have seen the king at some place, says: 'Neither to-day have I seen the king,' because he has not offered his presents, nor accomplished his business. This is an illustration.

'The remaining greed' is what remains from that which has been put away by insight. And the same with hate and delusion, etc. For it is by insight only that those which lead to purgatory are put away. It is to show about the other [corruptions] that this: 'the remaining greed,' etc., has been said. 'United,' etc., refers to the five¹ corruptions united by association with, as well as by elimination of, those three corruptions adopted in the text.

'Neither by insight nor by culture'² is said with reference to the fact that [certain things] are not to be put away by this or that Path, as are the Fetters, etc. That elimination of

¹ Conceit, sloth, excitement, shamelessness, recklessness.—*Tr.*

² *Dhs.* § 1008.

moral, immoral, and unmoral [kamma] which was admitted [above] in such dicta as 'whatever mind-and-body may have arisen in the ageless round of rebirth, save in the seven [last] lives,¹ here cease to be,'² by the insight of the First Path, by the cessation of that consciousness which prepares [new birth], —that elimination [we repeat] is to be understood as said with respect to this explanation, namely, that because of those Paths not being cultivated, such [personalities] as might arise are eliminated because of the elimination of corruptions having sufficing conditions [in the past eventually bringing about that elimination].

In the triplet of 'having root-conditions removable by insight,'³ having concluded that these are the states which have root-conditions removable by insight, again the expression 'three Fetters,' etc., is said in order to show, after pointing out what is to be eliminated, the conditions and states with conditions by a state of union. Although in the expression 'with conditions removable' these states are comprehended, viz., 'Among these conditions to be removed by insight delusion accompanied by greed is conditional with it; delusion accompanied by hate is conditional with it; and greed, hate are conditional with delusion,' yet delusion accompanied by perplexity, owing to the absence of another associated condition, is called just condition, and it is not accompanied by a condition. It is to show the elimination of this delusion that the above expression has been said.

[358] In the second answer, to show the elimination of delusion accompanied by excitement, 'these are the states having root-conditions to be removed by culture'⁴ has been said. For delusion makes states associated with itself 'coconditional' and becomes regressive.⁵ Owing to the

¹ Cf. *Points of Controversy*, p. 77, n. 3; 268, 271.

² Cf. *Dialogues* i. 283, and cf. above p. 316; also *Visuddhi Magga*, 674 f. On p. 316, for 'the beginning whereof is unknown, prior to seven rebirths,' read as above.—*Ed.*

³ *Dhs.* § 1009.

⁴ *Dhs.* § 1011.

⁵ *Pitthivatthako*. See p. 450.

absence of another associated condition like 'delusion accompanied by perplexity,' delusion is not included in the expression 'condition to be removed.'

In the third answer, 'all other states good,, etc.' the immoral has been included for the purpose of including delusion accompanied by perplexity and distraction, so these delusions, from the absence of the associated condition, are not called 'having root-conditions to be removed.'

In the triplet 'with limited objects'¹:—'with reference to' means having made a mental object. For whether they are themselves limited or sublime, the states arisen, by making limited states the object, are 'with limited objects'; those arisen by taking sublime objects are 'with sublime objects'; those arisen by taking immeasurable objects are 'with immeasurable objects.' But these last are also limited and sublime as well as immeasurable.

In the triplet on wrongfulness, 'immediate'² means giving results without intervening [time]. This is an equivalent term for such acts as matricide, etc. Indeed, when one such act is done, another act is not able, by ejecting it, to find opportunity for its own result. For even the action of one who all his lifetime gives the four requisites to the Order, with the Buddha as the head, lodged to its full capacity in a monastery which he may have caused to be built, with golden shrines of the size of Mount Meru and jewelled walls as ample as a world-system, cannot inhibit the [immediate] result of these acts. 'And that wrong view which is assured': *i.e.*, one or other of the assuredly wrong views of those who do not believe in cause, deny the efficacy of action, are nihilists. The person who has adopted and maintains them even a hundred or a thousand Buddhas are not able to enlighten.

In the triplet of 'with the Path as mental object,'³ 'in connection with the Ariyan Path,' means making the transcendental Path the mental object. And these states with the Path as object may be either limited or sublime.

[359] In the exposition of 'conditioned by the Path,'⁴ by

¹ *Dhs.* § 1022. ² *Dhs.* § 1028. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, pp. 268, 274.

³ *Dhs.* § 1031.

⁴ *Dhs.* § 1032.

the first formula the state of aggregates as accompanied by conditions is shown, the aggregates being associated with the Path by means of condition in the sense of causal relation.¹ By the second formula is shown the state of being accompanied by conditions of the remaining Paths, the condition being called right views and being the Path itself. By the third formula is shown the state of being accompanied by conditions, the state, namely, of right views got by means of conditions arisen in the Path.

‘Making the dominant influence’² means making the object of thought the dominant influence. And verily such states are limited. For the dominant influence of the mental object is obtained at the time when Ariyan disciples attaching importance to their own Path reflect on it. But although the Ariyan disciple reflects on and gives importance to another person’s Path by means of his knowledge of the thoughts of another, he does not attach the same importance to it as to the Path attained by himself. Does he attach importance or not to the Path of the Tathāgata after seeing him do the Twin Miracle ? He does, but not as if it were to his own Path. And the same meaning is to be understood in, ‘The saint attaches importance to no state except the Path, Fruition and Nibbāna.’ ‘With investigation as the dominant influence’³—this is said to show the co-existent influence. For to one who, cultivating the Path, makes conation the chief, conation is called the dominant influence and not the Path. The remaining states also are said to have conation and not the Path as the dominant influence; and the same with sense-consciousness also. But to one who in cultivating the Path makes investigation the chief, investigation as well as the Path is the dominant influence. The remaining states are said to have the Path as the dominant influence. And the same with energy also.

In the exposition of the ‘arisen’ triplet³: ‘are born’ means ‘come to be’ Such terms as ‘become’ are synonyms,

¹ Paccay’atthena hetunā. ‘Condition,’ as always, refers to the six ‘springs of action.’ See next chapter.—*Ed.*

² *Dhs.* § 1034.

³ *Dhs.* § 1035.

all meaning 'having got an intrinsic nature.' For the states which are said to be 'born' are said to 'have become' from attaining an intrinsic nature, 'have been gotten' from union with a cause, 'have attained renewed existence' from having attained to the characteristics of such. Increasing the term by the preposition (*abhi*) they are said to 'have fully attained rebirth.' 'Made manifest' is being made evident. [360] 'Have arisen,' i.e., from the past uprisen. Increasing the term by the preposition *sam*, they are said to be 'ever coming to pass.' 'Have uprisen,' i.e., in the sense of coming to be, they persist 'upward.' 'Have supervened,' i.e., they have happened owing to union with causes. The reason in the repetition of 'have arisen' should be understood by the said method. 'Included among things that have arisen' means counted as a portion of those arisen states. 'Matter, feeling, perception, complexes, consciousness'—this signifies the intrinsic nature of these arisen states. The exposition in the second reply of 'not arisen' should be understood as the negating of the foregoing. The exposition of the third reply is clear in meaning.

And this triplet has been shown to be complete by virtue of the two times (past and future). Indeed the ripening of kamma which has got its opportunity is twofold:—that which has 'reached the moment' and that which has not. The first is said to 'have arisen'; the second may arise immediately after the thought [which is the kamma], or not till the expiration of a hundred thousand ages. But owing to its having an enduring causal relation, it is not non-existent, but has become [a series of] potentially arising states. As he said:—'Granted, Potthapāda, that there is an incorporeal "soul" compact of ideas, even then for this person his arisen ideas are no longer the same when they cease.'¹ Thus here, when

¹ *Dīgha* i. 187; *Dialogues* i. 253. I venture to think the translation has missed the meaning of *aññā . . . aññā* (cf. Latin *alter . . . alter*); also *Samyutta* ii. 20, 95. On 'potentially arising,' cf. 60: 'bound to arise' (*uppādino*). *B.P.E.*, p. 270, n. 4; *Points of Controversy*, p. 242, where the old terminology also seems to need the scientific *mot juste*.—*Ed.*

during life in this sensuous realm consciousness concerning the immaterial plane arises, although the original subconscious continuum ceases, yet, when [in its turn] that [higher] consciousness ceases, the latter will certainly arise. Thus the self, if reckoned as incorporeal, is not counted as non-existent, but is become a potential [series of] states. In this way the results of kamma are twofold.

Now if all moral and immoral kamma which have been put forth were to give a result, there would be no opportunity for any other state. But such kamma is twofold:—its result is either a constant or not. The five kinds of kamma having immediate result,¹ the eight Attainments, the four Ariyan Paths:—such kamma is said to have a constant result. [361] And the result is either instantaneous, or not. In the former case it is said to have 'arisen'; in the latter not arisen. Whether the ripening of that twofold kamma arise immediately after the [kamma-] thought, or at the expiration of a hundred thousand cycles, it is not said to be non-arisen because of the meaning of a constant causal relation; it is known as potentially 'arising states.' The Path of Metteyya, the future Buddha, is said to be non-arisen; its Fruition to be 'potentially arising states.'

In the exposition of the 'past' triplet,² 'past' means having got beyond the three moments.³ 'Ceased,' i.e., has reached cessation. 'Dissolved,' i.e., gone to destruction, departed. 'Changed,' i.e., transformed by abandoning the original nature. 'Terminated' means gone to the term called cessation. The term 'exterminated' has been reinforced by the prefix *abhi*. 'Dissolved after having arisen,' i.e., departed after having come to be. The reason for the repetition of the word 'past' has been given above. In the following terms ['future,' etc.] the same method is to be understood. 'Included among things that are past,' i.e., reckoned to be a portion of the past. Which are these past states? 'Matter,

¹ See p. 462, n. 2.

² *Dhs.* § 1038.

³ Viz., genesis, 'stasis' and passing away. Cf. *Anguttara* i. 152; *Points of Controversy*, p. 374.—*Ed.*

feeling, perception, complexes, consciousness.' And the same with the terms 'future,' etc.

In the exposition of the triplet of 'with the past as object of thought'¹ :—in the passage 'with reference to past states,' only limited and sublime states should be understood. For these arise concerning the past.

In the exposition of the 'personal' triplet² :—by the pair of terms, 'for these or for those [beings],' all beings are comprised. Both 'personal' and 'self-referable' are synonyms of one's own personality. 'One's own,' i.e., become of one's self. 'Individual,' i.e., belonging to each person severally. 'Grasped at,' i.e., established in the bodies of beings. They may, indeed, be born of kamma, or not. But by virtue of grasping, seizure, wrong handling, 'grasped at' is here said. 'For other beings,'³ i.e., for all remaining beings excepting one's self. 'For other persons' is merely its synonym. The rest is even as has been said above. 'Both those,'⁴ i.e., both [personal and external].⁵

In the first term of 'having the personal as object of thought,'⁶ limited and sublime states should be understood. [362] In the second, immeasurable states should also be understood. In the third, only the limited and sublime should be understood. But the immeasurable do not make at one time the external, at another time the personal their object.

The exposition of the triplet of 'visible states' is clear.

CHAPTER II

COUPLETS AND OTHER GROUPS

AMONG the coupled [propositions], in the exposition of 'absence of hate'⁷ :—'having love'⁸ is exercising love, 'loving' is the method of exercising love; 'lovingness' is the state

¹ Dhs. § 1041.

² Dhs. § 1044.

³ Dhs. § 1045.

⁴ Dhs. § 1046.

⁵ Pyi.

⁶ Dhs. § 1047.

⁷ Dhs. § 1056.

⁸ Metti. Cf. B.P.E., p. 275, n. 2.

of heart which is endowed with love, is productive of love.¹ 'Tender care,' *i.e.*, watchful, meaning 'one protects.' Tenderly caring is the method of such care. 'Tender carefulness' is the state of tenderly caring. 'Beneficence' is seeking [to do] good. 'Compassion' is exercising compassion. And by all these terms that love, too, which [in Jhāna] has reached access and ecstasy is included. By the remaining terms absence of hate that is either worldly or transcendental is described.

In the exposition of absence of delusion²:—'insight³ into Ill' means insight into the Fact of Ill. And the same with 'the origin of Ill,' etc. And of these, 'insight into Ill' occurs in hearing, contemplation, intuition, and reflection. Likewise 'origin of Ill.' But 'insight into cessation' occurs only in hearing, intuition, and reflection. Likewise 'insight into the Way.'⁴ 'Former things,' *i.e.*, in the past portion; 'latter things,' *i.e.*, in the future portion; 'former and latter,' *i.e.*, in both. 'The assignable causation of states causally generated' means—this is the cause; that is the effect;⁵ depending on this cause that result has been produced. Thus it is insight into causes and effects.

Next, in the exposition of 'greed,'⁶ the following is the meaning of terms not hitherto mentioned.

'Passion' is the exercise of lusting. 'Infatuation' has the sense of strongly lusting. 'Seduction' is the repeatedly leading beings in the fields of sense. 'Compliance' is to comply with, *i.e.*, following after one's desires. 'Delight' [refers to this, that] by greed beings in any existence feel delight, or greed itself is a delighting in. In 'passionate delight' we get the first term combined with delight. Craving once arisen as to an object is 'delight'; arisen repeatedly, it is 'passionate delight.' 'Infatuation of mind' means that the term described above is not of a permanent being, but only of consciousness. 'Wanting' means that by greed objects

¹ Br. ed. reads mettāya aiyitassa.—*Tr.*

² *Dhs.* § 1057.

³ Nānam. *B.P.E.*—knowledge.

⁴ Paṭipadā. Cf. the Fourth 'Truth.'

⁵ See, in P.T.S. ed. (p. 362), *n.* 13.

⁶ *Dhs.* § 1059.

are wished for. 'Languishing' means that, through the strength of the lower nature, creatures languish with greed. 'Devouring' is to grasp by swallowing and finishing. 'Greediness' means that by greed beings become greedy, practise greed. Or greediness has the sense of 'thickness,' as we speak of a forest being thick (or dense). The next term is [the same] increased by the prefix *pali-*, or it may mean omnivorous¹ greediness. 'Cleaving' means that by greed one clings, or hangs on to. Greed is 'slough' in the sense of submerging, 'longing' in the sense of drawing towards. As it is said 'longing draws this man to and fro for rebirth in this or that plane.' 'Illusion'² means deception. 'Genitrix'—because greed gives birth to beings in the round of life renewed. As it is said:—

Desire begets a man; his mind a-wandering goes.

'Progenitrix,' [the prefix *sañ-* indicating greed's] en chaining [*sañyojamāna*] beings in that round by suffering. 'Seamstress' as sewing, for as a tailor sews cloth to cloth, so greed sews, stitches beings in that round by way of decease and re-conception; hence seamstress is said with the meaning of sewing. 'She who ensnares,' i.e., craving has a net of manifold sense-experience, or a net quivering and far-fixed. 'Flowing stream,' as drawing along by a swift current, or as wetness. For it is said:—

Joys wet and viscid come to sons of men.³

Both [adjectives] are here meant.

'Visattikā'⁴ is spread out, diffused, extensive, compelling, deceptive, misleading, poison-bearing, poison-rooted, poison-

¹ Lit. greediness in every respect.

² *Māyā*. B.P.E.: 'trickery' (because in the Suttas the word occurs usually in connection with the conjurer's craft).—*Ed.*

³ *Dhammapada*, ver. 341.

⁴ This word was apparently a crux to the Commentator. He usually connects it either with *saj*, *satta*, to cling to, clung, or with *visa*, poison. Cf. *Kindred Sayings* i. 2, n. 6. Here he adduces other sources with a brave and generous disregard of sound etymology, his mind intent only on a constraining exegesis.—*Ed.*

fruited, poison-enjoying, permeates; or, that craving is spread out, extended over sights, sounds, odours, tastes, tangibles, ideas, over family, over a multitude. The word 'thread' refers to loss and disaster as if [greed] were a string securing fish-baskets.¹ As it is said:—'The thread, bhikkhus, is an allegory of passionate delight.'² 'Diffused' means spread out over objects of sense. 'She who urges,' i.e., greed makes beings toil to get this and that. 'Consort,' i.e., as a comrade, greed suffers us not to pine; she does not suffer beings to pine on the round of life renewed; wherever they are reborn she, like a dear companion, fills them with pleasure. Wherefore it is said:—

*The man mated with craving wanders long
Through life and death, nor does he get beyond
His travels thus—reborn then otherwise.³*

'Aiming' is setting [the mind] upon. 'Guiding to rebirth,' i.e., the rope to rebirth; for by greed, as cattle bound at the neck by a rope, beings are led whithersoever it desires. 'A forest'—in that greed wins its way to, haunts, remains stuck in, this or that object. Or as begging.⁴ 'Jungle,' which [in Pali] is the same with an extra syllable.⁵ Or whereas a forest is likened to strong craving as being a jungle where obnoxious trees⁶ have grown up, *vanatha* means, as dense undergrowth, a yet stronger craving. As it is said:—

*Cut ye the forest, brethren, not the tree,
Peril and fear are from the forest born.
Cutting away forest and undergrowth,
So shall ye be [free and] dis-forested.⁷*

'Intimacy' is consorting with,⁸ meaning intercourse. [365] Of the two kinds, intimacy of natural desire and of [fraternal]

¹ So *Tīkā*. Cf. our 'lobster pots.'

² Not traced.

³ *Sutta Nipāta*, ver. 740.

⁴ This is so unintelligible, that the *v. l. yāti*, 'going,' is possibly right.—*Ed.*

⁵ *Vana, vanatha*.

⁶ The Burn. MSS. read dukkhānam for rukkhānam.

⁷ *Dhammapada*, ver. 283.

⁸ In Pali one term with different inflections.

love, the former is here meant. 'Fondness' is attachment. 'Longing for' is the exercise of taking up [one's heart's] abode. And this, too, is said:—'Thine, O king, are those four and eighty thousand cities, the chief of which is the royal city of Kusāvatī. For these, O king, let desire awaken! Quicken thy longing after life!'¹ That is, make [them thy heart's] abode. 'Connection,' as of kindred, *i.e.*, greed connects us with individual objects of thought, or is individually akin in the sense of a relative, for in the sense of a constant dependence there is no relative to equal craving. 'Appetite,' *i.e.*, from [greed's] consumption* of the mind's objects, meaning both a spreading itself over them and partaking of them without gaining satisfaction. 'Wanting' signifies the function, 'cupidity' the corresponding state.

Now to show the objective of that craving the following nine terms have been said, wherein taking the meaning of *āsā* to be 'appetite,' we get yearning for visible and other objects. Of these the first five refer to pleasures of sense, the sixth refers to greed for the 'requisites,'² and is said especially for recluses. The three following terms refer to the bases of a layman's insatiability. For to them there is nothing more dear than wealth, sons, life.

'This belongs to me, this is mine,' 'such a man has given me this, this has not been given me'—thus greed makes [people] mutter, hence 'mumbling' (*jappā*), and the following two terms increased by means of the prefixes. Following these, begun so as to classify the next two by a different way, 'mumbling' is again said, followed by the 'act of muttering' and the 'state of muttering.' 'Self-indulgent' means a repeated plundering, hauling along in the fields of sense, followed by [inflections signifying] self-indulgence, self-indulging, state of one who is given to self-indulgence.

'Fluster' is the name of that craving by means of which people go about agitated in places where anything is to be

¹ *Dialogues* i. 223 *f.*

* *Āsā*, āsanato.

² *Parikkhāra*; the recluse's necessities, food, lodging, clothing, medicines.—*Tr.*

gained, like dogs wagging their tails. Greed is keenly desirous of what is agreeable, *i.e.*, of objects, the state of being such is 'keen desire.' [366] Passion for what is improper, such as for a mother, or aunt, etc., is 'incestuous passion.' Greed which is strong, although arisen concerning what is proper, is 'lawless greed.' Or, from such expressions as 'passion,' 'lawless,' whether proper or not, the lustful desire arisen is called 'incestuous passion' in the sense of being unrighteous, and 'lawless greed' in the sense of being irregular. 'Hankering-after,' *i.e.*, desiring objects. Such an act is a 'hungering.' 'Entreating' is a wishing for things. 'Envyng' is the act of envying. Earnest entreating is 'imploring.'

Craving for the pleasures of the five senses is 'sensuous craving.' 'Craving for rebirth' is 'craving for existence, material and immaterial.'¹ 'Craving for non-existence' is desire not to be reborn, called the annihilationistic view. 'Craving for material form' is craving for a purely material existence. 'Craving for the immaterial' is craving for immaterial existence. 'Passion for opinions' is accompanied by the annihilationistic view.² 'Craving for cessation' is craving for the annihilationistic view. Craving for sights is craving for things seen. And so on for sounds, odours, etc.

The meaning of 'flood,' etc., has been discussed.³ As 'obstruction' greed blocks the moral states. As covering [them] it is [called] 'covering.'⁴ As 'bondage,' it binds beings in the round of births. Approaching the mind greed corrupts it, makes it corrupt, and so is 'depravity.' As 'latent bias,' greed lies chronically in us as a strong [tendency]. As 'obsession' greed breaks forth as it arises in the mind.⁵ It seizes on the turn of good [conduct] by not suffering it

¹ 'Rebirth,' 'existence,' is *bhava*, lit. becoming.—*Ed.*

² We should have expected to find here the opposite, namely, eternalistic view.—*Ed.*

³ See above, p. 65.

⁴ The renderings 'counterfeiting' and *B.P.E.*, p. 281, are not tenable. —*Ed.*

⁵ *Pariyutthāna*. Cf. *Points of Controversy*, p. 288. S. Z. Aung's rendering 'obsession' is not a sufficiently aggressive term, but must serve.—*Ed.*

to arise—such is the meaning. In ‘Thieves plundered the wayfarer, drunkards plundered the wayfarer,’ etc., it is implied that they seized the way. So here also ‘obsession’ is to be understood in the sense of taking possession.

[Greed is] like a ‘creeper’ in the sense of enveloping. Where also it comes as,

‘*The creeper rears itself, and stands erect.*¹

this craving is spoken of as a creeper. [Next] as ‘avarice,’ because it wants divers things; as the ‘root of ill,’ that is, of the ills of life renewed in rebirth; ‘source of ill’ refers also to those ills; so does ‘production of ill.’

[Greed is as] a snare, because it binds. ‘Māra-snare’ is the snare [used by] Māra. It is as a fish-hook, because it is hard to disgorge, and it is the fish-hook [used by] Māra. It is ‘Māra’s domain,’ because, overcome by it, beings cannot get past it; Māra assumes authority over them. [367] It is a ‘stream’² in the sense of flowing, a ‘leash,’ because by craving beings are firmly bound and led, as dogs are whether you will; and as hard to fill, craving is even as the ‘ocean.’

In the exposition of hate³:—‘he has done me harm,’ i.e., has worked my disadvantage.⁴ In this way the meaning in all this [group of] terms is to be understood. ‘Or when vexation (springs up) groundlessly’ means anger without reason; for example, someone gets angry saying ‘it rains too much,’ ‘it does not rain,’ ‘the sun shines too much,’ ‘it does not shine’; gets angry when the wind blows, when it does not blow, gets angry at being unable to sweep away the Bodhi leaves, at being unable to put on his robe; he gets angry with the wind, in slipping he gets angry with a tree-stump—in such connection is the expression said. And on nine of the ten occasions mentioned above [in the text], because they concern people, each is divisible into [harm or benefit] of thought, word, and deed. But the unreasonable vexation arising concerning things is

¹ *Dhammapada*, ver. 340.

² The Br. text reads *sandana*.

³ *Dhs.* § 1060.

⁴ *Avad̄d̄him me akāsi*, ‘he has wrought me dis-growth.’—*Ed.*

not so divisible. 'Vexation of spirit' is mental vexation. More strong than that is 'resentment.' 'Repugnance' is the exercise of resistance. 'Hostility,' that of opposing. 'Ill-temper' is getting angry. In 'irritation,' 'indignation,' the terms are intensified by means of the prefixes (*pa, sam*) 'Hate' is offending (or spoiling). In 'antipathy,' 'abhorrence,' the terms are increased by means of the prefixes. 'Mental disorder' means upsetting of mind. 'Detestation' is [hate] corrupting the mind as it arises. 'Anger' is the getting angry. The mode of getting angry is 'fuming.' The state of one angry is 'wrath.' Now to show the aforesaid method 'hate, hating,' etc., were said in the exposition of immoral consciousness.¹ Hence in what is here said of hate, 'all such' states as have been described as 'vexation of mind' down to 'wrath,' whatever state was said above in the former method on 'hate, hating,' etc.—were said to be hate. In this way is the connection here to be made. For by doing so the fault of repetition is avoided.

[368] The exposition of delusion² should be understood in the opposite way to what has been said in that of non-delusion, and in every respect will be made plain in the commentary on the *Vibhanga*.³

'States which by those [six condition-] states have [one or more of] them as concomitants,'⁴ that is, whatever other states, whether they are themselves among the six, or not, these are 'conditioned' (*sahetukā*). So for the contradictory term, 'unconditioned.' Here 'condition' is just condition. Where two or where three conditions arise together, the term 'condition' applies. But where delusion accompanied by perplexity and distraction arises, the condition-state (delusion) is itself unaccompanied by other conditions (*ahetuko*). So also for the exposition of the couplet of states 'associated with a condition'.⁵

¹ See p. 336.

² *Dhs.* § 1061.

³ The *Sammoha-Vinodanī*. A first edition of this work in Roman letter is shortly to be issued by the Pali Text Society.

⁴ *Dhs.* § 1073-74. Cf. above, p. 61 f.

⁵ *Dhs.* § 1095.

In the exposition of the couplet on conditioned [states],¹ the phrase 'that state which is [not causally related], just that state . . .'² and which refers to the 'unconditioned element' mentioned in the previous couplet, is used in the singular number. But in that previous couplet, because the question is set forth in the plural, the answer follows the lead given by the question and is also given in the plural:—'these states are not causally related.'³ This applies also to the following answer:—'these are the states that are visible.'⁴

In the exposition of the couplet of 'cognizable in one way'⁵ . . . 'cognizable by sight' means to be known by the visual sense. And the same also with the rest of the terms. And herein 'cognizable in one way' means to be known either by the visual or by the auditory sense. 'Not cognizable in another way' means not to be known either by visual or auditory sense. This being so, inasmuch as it was said above, in the Table of Contents, that the couplet is formed owing to the difference in the meaning of the two terms, the couplet does not take the form:—'those states that are cognizable by sight are not cognizable by hearing.' But taking the meaning to be that visible objects are cognizable by sight, but sounds are not, this single couplet takes this form:—'Those states that are cognizable by sight are not cognizable by hearing; conversely, states that are cognizable by hearing are not cognizable by sight.' Thus making the couplets four by four with each [of the five] controlling sense-faculties as basis, a set of twenty couplets is to be understood.

[369] What then? is there no such specific cognizing by the *sensus communis (mano)*? Is it on that account that there is not a couplet concerning this? There is such cognizing, but it is left implicit, there being here no complete specification. For there is no complete specification as to what is not cognizable by sight. So in the case of 'mind'-cognition, there is here no couplet because there is no [explicit]

¹ *Dhs.* § 1085.

² *Ib.* § 1086. The translation (B.P.E.) does not quite reproduce the emphasis in this one reply.

³ *Dhs.* § 1084.

⁴ *Ib.* § 1087.

⁵ *Ib.* § 1095.

specification. Nevertheless, it is meant that there are things cognizable in one way, not in another way, by mind-cognition. Hence, though this is not stated, it should be understood according to what is obtained [in consciousness].

So far only states of the sensuous plane are cognizable by some and not by other states of the sensuous plane, as amounting to mind-cognition. States of the plane of attenuated matter and others also are cognizable by some, and not by other states of the sensuous plane. Even states of the sensuous plane are cognizable by some and not by other states of the plane of attenuated matter also; by means of which even states of the plane of attenuated matter and others also are cognizable in some cases and not in others. But states of the sensuous plane, of that of attenuated matter, of the Unincluded are not cognizable by states of the immaterial plane. And states of the immaterial plane are cognizable by some and not by other states of the immaterial plane, of which even some are cognizable and others are not by means of states of the immaterial plane. States of the sensuous plane and others are not cognizable by the Unincluded. Again [states of] the Unincluded, from being not cognizable by Nibbāna, are cognizable by some and not by other states of the Unincluded. And of these, from being not cognizable by Path and Fruition, some are cognizable and others are not cognizable by the Unincluded. Thus it should be known by virtue of what is obtained [in conscious experience].¹

In the exposition of the Intoxicants,² the lust of the five pleasures of sense is called the 'intoxicant of sensuality.' Passionate desire for life in a heaven of attenuated matter, and of immaterial existence, longing for Jhāna, lust co-existent with an eternalistic view are called the 'intoxicant of rebirth,' as being desire applied to rebirth. The sixty-two heresies are known as the 'intoxicant of views.' Lack of knowledge regarding eight points³ is the intoxicant of ignorance.

¹ The P.T.S. ed. does not contain this sentence.

² *Dhs.* § 1096. *Āsavā.* See above, p. 48.

³ Namely, the Four Truths, the past, the future, or both, and causal genesis.

In order to prevent confusion, the Intoxicants, as they occur here and there [in the Canon], should be considered under one or more heads. Thus as to their meaning they are, as one in the sense of 'long fermentation.' In the Vinaya¹ two heads are accepted:—the restraint of intoxicants in the present life, destruction of them in future lives. In the Suttanta, there is first a threefold division:—e.g., in the Salāyatana Sutta²:—'There are these three intoxicants, friend—sensuality, rebirth, ignorance.' Then a fivefold division in the Nibbedhika Sutta³:—'Bhikkhus, there are intoxicants leading to purgatory, [370] to the animal kingdom, to the Peta kingdom, to human life, to celestial life.' In the Āhuneyya Sutta⁴ there are six categories:—'Bhikkhus, there are intoxicants to be eliminated by restraint, by habit, by endurance, by avoidance, by suppression, by culture.' In the Sabbasava Sutta⁵ these six with the addition of 'eliminated by insight' make seven. But here they are presented as four. And the definition of them is as follows:—desires belonging to sense *plus* 'intoxicant' make 'sensuality-intoxicant.'

The intoxicant concerned with Rūpa and Arūpa rebirth, dual as due to [previous] kamma and [subsequent] happening, is rebirth-intoxicant. The opinion-intoxicant is just opinions. The ignorance-intoxicant is just ignorance.

'Concerning desires,'⁶ i.e., the desires of the five senses. 'Sensual desire' is desire so called, not [just] conation, or righteous desire. 'Sensual passion,' i.e., sense-desire as just desiring and lustng after. 'Sensual delight,' i.e., sense-desire as just desiring and delighting in. And understanding sense-desire thus in all the terms, we get, besides, craving, fondness, fever in the sense of burning, languishing, rapacity in the sense of swallowing, consummating. 'This is called,' namely, the sensuality-intoxicant analyzed in eight terms.

'Concerning rebirths':—'desire for rebirth' is desire which

¹ Vinaya iii. 21; v. 143, 223.

² Samyutta iv. 256; cf. Sammāditthi Sutta, M. i. 55; A. i. 167.

³ A. iii. 410, 414.

⁴ Ibid. 387.

⁵ M. i. 7f.

⁶ Dhs. § 1097.

⁷ Dhs. § 1098.

arises by way of aspiring to rebirth in Rūpa and Arūpa forms of life. By this method the other terms should be understood.

That 'the world is eternal' is the view held in ten ways to be the 'Eternalistic view.' Here it is held that the five aggregates are 'the world,' and that this world is eternal, everlasting, is for all times. [371] 'Not eternal' is the view arising as the 'Annihilationistic view' of one who holds that this same world is annihilated, perishes. 'Finite' belongs to the theory that 'the world is finite,' held by one who judges, that the states of consciousness such as he would get on the plane of attenuated matter, or that of immaterial life, and has now got within a limited Jhāna-device¹—one the size of a winnowing basket or shallow cup—are 'the world,' a world finite by the limits of the device. This finite view is both Eternalistic and Annihilationistic. The theory that 'the world is infinite,' is that of one who holds that the states of consciousness such as he would get on the plane of attenuated matter, or that of immaterial life, and has now got through taking a very ample device and attained to the symbol in that device, are 'the world,' a world that is endless according to the limits of the device. This is both Eternalistic and Annihilationistic

That 'the living soul is the same as the body' is the theory held on Annihilationistic lines that since the soul belongs to a merely dissoluble body, it is annihilated when the body is annihilated. In the next clause, since the soul is held to be other than the body, when the body is annihilated, the soul is not annihilated, is a theory on Eternalistic lines.

In the four following views about the Tathāgata, the first, that he as a permanent entity² is [reborn] after death is Eternalistic; the second, that he is not [reborn] is Annihilationistic; the third, of one who holds he both is and is not, is semi-Eternalistic; the fourth, of one who holds he neither is nor is not, is the Eel-wriggling theory.³

These are 'the states that are the intoxicants,' thus making

¹ See above, p. 248 f.

² *Satto*. Cf. *Points of Controversy*.

³ See *Dialogues* i. 40.

that of sensuality and of rebirth one as modes of lusting,¹—the intoxicants are three states in brief and four when expanded.

But—[it may be asked]—is the passionate desire which arises for a mansion, a wish-yielding tree, ornaments, etc., just an intoxicant of sensuality or not? It is not. And why?—because lust of the five senses is put away of the brahma-devas here, *i.e.*, in this plane of desire. Now that passionate desire, when it is ranked in the Condition-group,² is known as ‘the condition that is greed’; when it is ranked in the Knot-group³ it is known as the ‘bodily knot of covetousness’; in the Corruption-group⁴ it is known as ‘the corruption that is greed.’ But is passionate desire when co-existent with dogmatism known as the intoxication of sensuality, or not? It is not. It is called the lust of dogmatism. Thus it is said: ‘Gifts made to a person lusting with the lust of dogmatism are not of much fruit, [372] nor of great advantage.’⁵

Moreover, it is proper to take these drugs or intoxicants in the order of the Corruptions as well as that of the Paths. In the order of the Corruptions, the intoxicant of sensuality is eliminated by the [third] Path of Never-returning, that of rebirth by the Path of Arahantship, that of dogmatism by the Stream-winning Path, that of ignorance by the Path of Arahantship. In the order of the Paths, the intoxicant of dogmatism is put away by the Stream-winning Path, that of sensuality by the Never-returning Path, that of rebirth and of ignorance by the Path of Arahantship.

Among the Fetters in the exposition of ‘conceit’,⁶ ‘conceit at the thought—I am the better man’ is the conceit arising thus: In the scale of perfection I am the better man. ‘Conceit at the thought—I am as good as they’ is the conceit arising thus: In the sense of equality I am as good. ‘Conceit at the thought—I am inferior’ is the conceit arising thus: In the sense of baseness I am inferior. Thus these three kinds of conceit of superiority, equality, inferiority arise in three sorts of men. For in the superior man the three may arise:—

¹ Br. text: of ‘*bhāvanā*’.

² P. 474.

³ P. 64 f.

⁴ P. 55.

⁵ Not traced.

⁶ Dhs. § 1116.

I am superior, equal, inferior. Likewise in the equal and the inferior man. In the superior man the conceit of superiority is alone a real conceit, the others are not real. In the equal man the conceit of equality, in the inferior man the conceit of inferiority is alone real. What does this signify? That in one man the three kinds of conceit may arise. But in the *Khuddakavatthu Vibhanga*, in the classification of the first conceit,¹ it is said that one conceit occurs in three men.

'Conceit,' 'overweening,' and 'conceitedness' signify mode and state. 'Loftiness' is in the sense of rising upwards or of springing over others. 'Haughtiness,' i.e., in whom conceit arises, him it lifts up, keeps upraised. 'Flaunting a flag' is in the sense of swelling above others. 'Assumption' means uplifting; conceit favours the mind all round. Of many flags the flag which rises above others is called a banner. So conceit arising repeatedly in the sense of excelling with reference to subsequent conceits is like a banner. That mind which desires the banner is said to be desirous of the banner (i.e., self-advertisement). Such a state is 'desire for self-advertisement.' And that is of the heart, not of a real self; hence 'desire of the heart for self-advertisement.' Indeed, the heart associated with conceit wants a banner, and its state is reckoned as banner-conceit.

[373] In the exposition of envy,² 'envy at the gains, honour, reverence, affection, salutation, worship accruing to others' is that envy which has the characteristic of not enduring, or of grumbling at, the prosperity of others, saying concerning others' gains, etc., 'What is the use to these people of all this?' etc. Herein 'gains' is attainment of the [recluse's] four requisites, such as robes, etc. Verily the envious person cannot endure that gain should be acquired by others, saying, 'What use to this man is this?' 'Honour' is the getting of these well-made and fine requisites. 'Reverence' is the act of making reverence. 'Regard' is the act of loving by the mind. 'Salutation' is the saluting with the fivefold

¹ *Vibhanga*, p. 353 f. The text does not seem exactly to support Buddhaghosa.

² *Dhs.* § 1121.

contact.¹ 'Worship' is worship with scent, flowers, etc. 'Envy' is the act of envying. The mode of envy is called 'envying.' The state of one envying is 'enviousness.' 'Jealousy,' etc., are synonyms of envy. And the grumbling characteristic of this envy is to be understood of both householders and recluses. For instance, suppose that a certain householder by depending on his own work as this or that means of livelihood, such as ploughing, merchandise, etc., gets a splendid conveyance or vehicle, etc., or a gem. Another man not wishing such gain to him is not pleased. He thinks, 'When will he decline from this prosperity and walk about a pauper?' and if for a certain reason the other does decline from that prosperity he is pleased. A certain recluse also being envious at seeing the acquirement of gain, etc., arising from general knowledge, scriptural scholarship, etc., thinks, 'When will this man decline in these acquirements?' etc., and when he sees him, for some reason, decline, then he is glad. Thus envy should be understood to have the characteristic of grumbling at the prosperity of others.

In the exposition of meanness,² 'five meannesses,' to wit: 'meanness as regards dwelling,' etc., have been said to show meanness as regards a substance. Herein meanness in a monastery is an instance of the first kind. Similarly with the rest of the terms. The whole monastery, a cell, a single room, and night and day chambers are called dwellings. Those living in such live at ease, get the requisites. A certain bhikkhu does not desire the coming there of a certain dutiful and amiable bhikkhu, and thinks, 'Now that he has come [374] may he go away quickly!' This is called 'meanness in a monastery.' But it is not so in one who is adverse to the arrival there of quarrelsome recluses.

'As regards family'—family, i.e., of servitors as well as of relatives. To one not desiring the approach of another to

¹ Touching the ground with knees, hands, forehead.

² Dhs. § 1122. Meanness (*macchariyam*) is translated avarice in *Dialogues of the Buddha* ii. 55. Buddhaghosa's remarks in the corresponding Commentary may be consulted. (Sum. Vil. on *Mahā Nidāna Sta.*)

that family is 'meanness as regards family.' But it is not so if one does not desire the approach of a bad person. For he, the evil recluse, so behaves as to upset the faith of those families. 'Meanness' lies in not desiring the approach there of the bhikkhu capable of guarding their faith.

'Gains' is the getting of the four requisites. There is meanness as regards gains to one who thinks, "May he not get it," even when it is a virtuous person who gets it. But in the case of a [bhikkhu] who is seen to ruin a gift given in faith, to spoil it by not making use of it, or by making a bad use of it, not to give it to another even when it is about to go rotten [by keeping], there is no meanness in [a giver] who thinks, 'If only this [bhikkhu] may not get it, a virtuous [bhikkhu] might get it and enjoy it.'

'Reputation' refers to personal beauty as well as praise of merits. Here the person who is mean as to beauty of body, wishes not to hear it said that another is worthy of faith and beautiful. One who is mean as to praise of merits does not wish to have [another's] praises sung on account of his virtue, ascetic practice, progress, or behaviour.

'As regards doctrine,' i.e., doctrine of learning and of intuition. Of these, Ariyan disciples are not mean as regards doctrine to be intuited; they desire that intuition for the world, including devas, of doctrines they themselves have intuited. Their desire is, 'May others come to know that intuition.' But 'meanness as regards doctrine' occurs only in respect of textual doctrine. A person endowed with it wishes not to let another know what secret text or commen-tarial tradition he may know. But he who does not impart it, out of regard for the doctrine, by taking the person into account, or out of regard for the person by taking the doctrine into account, is not mean as regards the doctrine. In the former case the person so considered is frivolous; sometimes it is a recluse, sometimes a brahmin [375], sometimes a Jain. Indeed, the bhikkhu who thinks, 'This person breaks the traditional text, the abstruse, subtle, special doctrine, and will confuse it,' and imparts it not, acts out of regard for the doctrine by taking the person into account. And he who

thinks, 'This doctrine is abstruse, subtle. If this person were to acquire it he would perish by making a [false] confession of gnosis,¹ and revealing himself,' and imparts it not, acts out of regard for the person by taking the doctrine into account. But he who thinks, 'If this one were to acquire this doctrine, he would be able to destroy our belief,' and imparts it not, is he who is said to be mean as regards the doctrine.

Among these five meannesses, through meanness, in the first place, as regards a monastery, one becomes a demon, or a Peta, and walks about lifting on to his head the rubbish of that very monastery. Next, one who, seeing his own family making gifts, etc., to others, is mean as to family, and thinks, 'Ruined, alas! is this family of mine'—such an one spits blood from the mouth, dysentery sets in, and his intestines broken into bits come out. Through meanness as regards gains belonging to the Order or to a Chapter, and through using it as though it was meant for individuals, one is born as a demon, or a Peta, or a boa-constrictor. Through meanness as regards personal beauty and praise of merits and doctrine of learning, one who extols his own praises and not those of others; who mentions this and that fault of anyone saying, 'What praise does he deserve?' and does not impart any doctrine of learning to him, becomes ugly, or has a mouth dripping with saliva.² Further, owing to the [first, or] monastery-meanness, one is tormented in an iron house. Owing to family-meanness one gets little gain. Owing to meanness over gains one is reborn in the dung-purgatory. Owing to meanness as to reputation one is reborn without beauty or reputation. Owing to meanness as to doctrine one is born in the hot-ash purgatory.

'Stinginess' is the expression of meanness. 'Avariciousness' is the act or mode of being mean. 'Mean spirit' is the state of one endowed with stinginess. 'Let it be for me only and not for another!'—thus wishing not to diffuse all one's own acquisitions one is 'close.'³ The state of such an one is

¹ Aññā, Arahantship.

² Read ejamukho.—*Tr.*

³ Byāpītum aniccho ti viviccho; byāpītum icchati ti viccho; na viccho ti viviccho.—*Tikā.*

'avarice,' a synonym for a soft meanness. [376] An ignoble person is churlish. His state is 'ignobleness,' a name for hard stinginess. Verily, a person endowed with it hinders another from giving to others. And this also has been said,

'Malicious, miserly, ignoble, wrong . . .
Such men hinder the feeding of the poor . . .'¹

A 'niggardly' person seeing mendicants causes his mind to shrink as by sourness. His state is 'niggardliness.' Another way:—'niggardliness' is a 'spoon-feeding.' For when the pot is full to the brim, one takes food from it by a spoon with the edge bent on all sides; it is not possible to get a spoonful; so is the mind of a mean person bent in. When it is bent in, the body also is bent in, recedes, is not diffused—thus stinginess is said to be niggardliness.²

'Lack of generosity of heart' is the state of a mind which is shut and gripped, so that it is not stretched out the mode of making gifts, etc., in doing service to others. But because the mean person wishes not to give to others what belongs to himself, and wishes to take what belongs to others, therefore this meanness should be understood to have the characteristic of hiding or seizing one's own property, occurring thus: 'May it be for me and not for another!' The rest in this group is clear in meaning.

It is proper to take these Fetters in the order of the Corruptions, as well as of the Paths. In the order of the Corruptions the Fetters of sensuality and of aversion are put away by the Never-returners' Path; the Fetter of conceit, by the Path of Arahanthood; dogmatism, perplexity, observance of mere rule and ritual by the Stream-winners' Path; the Fetter of lust for existence by the Path of Arahanthood; envy and meanness by the Stream-winners' Path; ignorance by the Path of Arahanthood. In the order of the Paths, dogmatism, perplexity, observance of mere rule and ritual, envy and meanness are put away by the Stream-winners' Path; [377] sensuality and aversion by the Never-returners' Path; conceit, lust for existence and ignorance by the Path of Arahanthood.

¹ *Kindred Sayings*, i, 120, II. 2, 3, 7.

² Cf. *Vis. Mag.*, p. 656.

In the 'Knot-group'¹ the 'bodily Knot' fastens the mental organism² in the round of births by way of decease and rebirth. The 'disposition to dogmatize' is thus:—rejecting the word of the Omniscient, he disposes his heart in this way:—The world is eternal; this is true, the other is absurd. But because there is a difference between covetousness and sensuality, therefore in the word-classification of the physical Knot of covetousness, instead of saying, 'That sensual desire, that sensual lust concerning the pleasures of sense,'³ 'That lust, that infatuation' was said. By means of this, that which has been said above as 'lust of desire which arises for Brahmā's mansions, etc., is not the drug of sensuality, but under the Knot-group it is the physical Knot of covetousness,'⁴ was rightly said. And the same in the following Corruption-group.

'Excepting the perversion of mere rule and ritual,'⁵ i.e., because one does not dispose the heart in this wise: 'This observance of rule and ritual is true,' but only as 'purity through rules of morality,' therefore rejecting it too as a wrong view, he said, 'excepting,' etc.

In the exposition of sloth and torpor⁶ of the Hindrance-group 'mental indisposition' is sickness of mind. For one who is sick is said to be indisposed. It is also said in the Vinaya, 'I am not indisposed, Sir.'⁷ 'Unwieldiness' is the mode of unwieldiness called sickness of mind. 'Adhering' is the mode of hanging downwards. The consciousness, namely, when unable to strengthen the postures, hangs like a bat from a tree and like a pot of raw sugar hung to a peg. It is with reference to that mode of consciousness that 'adhering' is said. The second term has been increased by the prefix 'saṃ.' 'Clinging,' i.e., constricted by non-expansion. The other two signify mode and state. 'Sloth'⁸ is density with-

¹ Dhs. § 1135.

² Kāyam, the 'group' composing the individual.

³ As in the Intoxicant 'sensuality.' Dhs. § 1097.

⁴ Dhs. § 758.

⁵ Dhs. § 1139.

⁶ Dhs. § 1156.

⁷ Not traced.

⁸ Thīna—B.P.E. 'stolidity.'

out expansion like that of a lump of butter. 'Stiffening' signifies mode. The state of that is 'rigidity,' that is to say, it is rigidity by way of non-expanding.

[378] 'Of mental factors,'¹ i.e., of the three mental aggregates. 'Indisposition, unwieldiness':—this pair has been mentioned just above. 'Shrouding' means it covers up the mental aggregate as the cloud covers up the sky. 'Enveloping' is covering all round. 'Barricading within' is it obstructs within. To explain: As when a town is taken men shut within are unable to go out, so states shut in by torpor are unable to issue forth by way of diffusion; hence the phrase. 'Torpor' means it oppresses, i.e., it injures by means of unwieldiness. 'Sleep' is that whereby we go to sleep. 'Drowsiness' makes blinking of the eyelashes, etc. 'Slumbering, somnolence':—these two terms signify mode and state. And the reason of the repetition of that term 'sleep' preceding them has been explained. 'This is called the Hindrance of sloth and torpor':—uniting 'this is sloth' and 'this is torpor,' the Hindrance of sloth-torpor is given in the sense of obstructing. That Hindrance of sloth-torpor, which generally rises before and after the sleep of probationers and average men, is completely cut off by the Path of Arahanthood. But there is a lapse into the [subconscious] life-continuum (in fatigue) owing to the weakness of the sentient body in Arahanthood.² When this arises unmixed [with thought-process], they sleep. This rest is called their slumber.

Hence it was said by the Blessed One, 'Aggivessana, I recollect spreading the fourfold robe in the last month of the hot season and going off to sleep, mindful and understanding,

¹ In B.P.E. 'of sense.' Dhs. § 1157. The three are 'feeling, perception, and activities' (*sankhārā*).—Ed.

² Karaja = kāyapasādo. It is also explained as the 'constituted body' (*sasambhārakāya*); or 'body born of becoming' (*karo ti satte nibbattetīti karañ; karato jāto karajo. Madhusāratthadīpanī*). The Commentary on *Dīghanikāya II*. takes it to mean the 'body derived from the four great essentials'; while the *Yojanā* gives the last meaning in *Madhusāratthadīpanī*. The rendering by 'frail body' in B.P.E., p. 213, n. 2, is wrong.—Tr.

lying on my right side.'¹ And such weakness of the sentient body is not to be killed by the Paths; it is obtained both when grasped-at and when not grasped-at. In the former case, it is obtained when the saint has gone a long journey, or is fatigued after doing some other work. In the latter case, it is obtained in leaves and flowers. For the leaves of some trees spread by means of the sun's heat and contract at night. Lotus flowers, etc., bloom by the sun's heat and contract again at night. [379] But this torpor does not arise in Arahants on account of any immorality.

Here the objection might be raised:—‘Torpor is not immoral. Why? It is due to matter. For matter is unmoral, and this torpor is a material quality. Therefore herein the word *kāya* should be [mentally] used as “indisposition, unwieldiness of body.”’ If this torpor were matter merely by saying ‘of *kāya*,’ then states also which are repose, etc., of *kāya* would be material.²

[In the passage], ‘he experiences bliss by *kāya*, realizes the ultimate truth by *kāya*,’ experience of bliss and realization of the ultimate truth would also be by means of the material body. Therefore (owing to the phrase ‘of *kāya*’ not determining matter) it should not be said that matter is torpor. Here in ‘indisposition of *kāya*’ *kāya* means the mental *kāya*. If so, then why is ‘sleep, drowsiness’ said?—for the mental *kāya* does not sleep, does not blink the eyelids. This pair of words has been said as being the result or fruit of that torpor, just as the sexes, etc., are the results of the controlling faculties of femininity and masculinity. For as these sexual forms, etc., such as femininity, etc., are given as the result of the feminine controlling faculty, so sleep, drowsiness, are given as results of the torpor, called sickness, of this mental *kāya*. Indeed when there is torpor, there is also sleep and so on; thus by a figure of speech torpor, though immaterial, has been described as ‘sleep, drowsiness, slumbering, somno-

¹ *Majjhima* i. 249.

² The point lies in the twofold meaning of *kāya*: body and the three mental factors. (Cf. preceding page).—*Ed.*

lence'—drowsiness as causing the movement of eyelids, etc. Thus by this word-definition also, this meaning (of torpor being immaterial) has been accomplished. Thus torpor is not a material quality.

The immaterial nature of torpor has also been shown by 'shrouding,' etc. Indeed matter is not the 'shrouding, enveloping, barricading within' of the mental *kāya*. 'But is not torpor material for this very reason? For that which is non-matter cannot be shrouded,' etc. If the shrouding, etc., of matter were accomplished, and not of non-matter, then (especially as the obstruction of matter is seen in binding bridges, etc.), there would be no obstruction of non-matter. Accordingly, just as immaterial states, such as sensual desire, etc., are called Hindrances in the sense of obstructing, so the shrouding, etc., of torpor also should be understood in the sense of shrouding, etc. Again, because of the expression: 'by removing the five Hindrances which cause the weakening of knowledge and corrupt the mind,'¹ torpor is immaterial. [380] For matter is not the corrupter of mind, nor the weakener of intellect. Why is it not so? Has it not been said, 'Bhikkhus, there are some recluses and brahmins who drink liquor, drink spirituous drink, do not refrain from liquor and drink. Bhikkhus, this drinking habit of recluses and brahmins is the first corruption.'² Further it has been said, 'Householder, these are the six dangers from being addicted to wantonness in liquor and strong drink:—present loss of wealth, increase of quarrels, cause of diseases, production of ill-fame, indecent exposure, weakening of wisdom, making the sixth basis.'³ This meaning is self-evident and accomplished manifestly. Because when spirituous drink goes to the stomach the mind is corrupted, wisdom is weakened, therefore like drink torpor also may corrupt the mind and weaken wisdom.

But spirituous drink is not the corruption itself from merely signifying the cause. For were it so then it would be indicated in such expositions of corruption as, 'By removing these five

¹ *Samyutta* v. 160.

² *Anguttara* ii. 53.

³ *Digha* iii. 182.

Hindrances which corrupt the mind'; or 'Bhikkhus, likewise there are these five corrupters of mind by which the corrupted mind is not plastic, not wieldy, not brilliant, not altogether radiant, and not concentrated on the destruction of the Intoxicants. Which are the five? Sensual desire is the corrupter of mind';¹ or, 'Bhikkhus, which is the corruption of mind? Covetousness, lawless greed, is the corruption of mind.'² And because when liquor is drunk, corruptions arise, corrupting mind and weakening wisdom, therefore from being the cause of corruption and signifying such, liquor is said to be so.

But torpor itself is the corrupting of mind and weakening of wisdom. Therefore it is not a material thing. This is endorsed by the mention of association. For it is said: 'The hindrance of sloth-and-torpor is a hindrance associated with the hindrance of ignorance.'³ Hence from the mention of association torpor is not a material thing, for matter is not reckoned as an 'associate' [381]. Taking this as stating what is elicited (by reckoning), we may take this also:—just as it is said that we see shell-fish, gravel, potsherds, a shoal of fish stationary or moving—the gravel and potsherds stationary, the rest doing both—so here torpor is stated as a hindrance only, sloth as both hindrance and associate. And combining the two cases, 'both hindrance and hindrance-cum-associate' is stated according as each obtains reckoning.

But [it may be objected] torpor is stationary, it does not move. And being only a hindrance, not an associate, it is only a material thing.

[If it be so, it is not] because you have established its materiality. That the gravel and potsherds are stationary is a fact not created by the Sutta. Hence in the passage quoted, let the meaning be as you say, nevertheless it does not prove that torpor is a material thing. You cannot establish its materiality by that Sutta. Our conclusion holds good, because you have not established the materiality of torpor by what is therein stated to happen. Nay, more:—take the

¹ *Anguttara* iii. 16; *S. v.* 92.

² Cf. *A. ii.* 67.

³ *Dhs.* § 1170.

passage 'from being abandoned,' etc. in the Vibhanga: it is said:—(he dwells) as one from whom sloth and torpor have departed, that is, inasmuch as they have been abandoned, cast out, there has been a freeing from, elimination of, disengaging, complete extricating from. . . . This consciousness in respect of this sloth and torpor he cleanses, purifies, wholly purifies, releases, delivers, wholly delivers from¹ . . . all this is said because of the casting out. And it is not said with respect to anything material, hence on this account also torpor is not a material quality.

[But, it may be objected], from the passage about the not coming to pass of [the torpor] born of mind—[you have not established your thesis], for torpor is threefold:—mind-born, heat-born, food-born. In the Vibhanga it is stated that, with the different kinds of Jhāna-consciousness, there is a not coming to pass of the torpor that is mind-born. Its immateriality is therefore not established. Torpor is just a material thing.

Nay, it is the materiality that is not established. If it were, we should get it stated [in the Vibhanga] that there is a non-becoming of mind-born torpor. Just this is not established, and torpor is not a material thing. Nay, more:—take the expression 'elimination.' It was said by the Blessed One:—'By eliminating six states, bhikkhus, one is competent [382] to dwell in the attainment of First Jhāna. Which are the six? Sensuous desire, ill-will, sloth and torpor, excitement, worry.² He has well seen by right insight the evil in sense desires. Eliminating these five hindrances he will come to know by strong insight his own good. Although the elimination of torpor is mentioned, material qualities are not [included as] that which is to be eliminated. As he said:—'The material aggregate [of personality] is to be understood, comprehended, not to be eliminated, not to be developed.'³ From these passages on elimination also torpor is immaterial.

[But, it may be objected], texts about elimination refer to both immaterial and material things, for instance, 'Material qualities, bhikkhus, are not yourself. Put them away.'⁴

¹ *Vibh.* p. 254.

² *Anguttara* iii. 450.

³ Cf. *S.* iii. 26, etc.

⁴ *Ib.* 33

Here elimination is mentioned of material things as well, hence the reason alleged is not valid.

Nay, it is not invalid by the context. For in this Sutta, where it is said:—‘The elimination and repression, bhikkhus, of passionate desire for things material’¹—that is the elimination here [meant],—the elimination of passionate desire is spoken of as the elimination of matter. Such is the language used in such phrases as ‘not having eliminated six states’; ‘having eliminated the five Hindrances’²—such is the putting away that is meant. And thus by [this and] other contexts, torpor is not a material thing. Hence the language used in such Suttas as ‘he having eliminated these five Hindrances . . . the things that defile the mind,’ etc.—by these and other Suttas, it is shown that torpor is not a material thing.

Likewise ‘states, bhikkhus, which are obstructions, hindrances, overwhelming the mind, weakening insight are five. Which are the five? Sensual desire . . . sloth and torpor are the obstructions, hindrances, overwhelming the mind, weakening insight’;³ again:—‘Bhikkhus, the hindrance of sloth and torpor brings about darkness, blindness of vision, lack of knowledge, cessation of insight, having its part in adversity,⁴ not leading to Nibbāna’;⁵ again:—‘Brahmin, when he lives with mind possessed by, oppressed by sloth and torpor.⁶ . . .’ Again:—‘Bhikkhus, in one not thinking systematically unrisen sensual desire arises . . . [383] unrisen sloth-and-torpor arises.⁷ . . .’ Again:—‘Bhikkhus, what are the five hindrances but a sheer heap of immorality’⁸—thus such various Suttas have been said exposing the immateriality of torpor.

And because it is immaterial therefore it arises with respect to things immaterial. Thus it is said in the Great Book of the Paṭṭhāna:—‘A state of hindrance arises because of a[nother] state of hindrance not in a causal relation to what has gone before.’ All that is said in the Vibhanga with respect

¹ *S.* iii. 28, etc.

² *Anguttara* iii. 64.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 63; *Saṃyutta* v. 96.

⁴ *Tikā*.

⁴ In the Dukkha of the round of rebirth.—*Tikā*.

⁵ Cf. *Majjhima* i. 115.

⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 433 f.

⁷ *Saṃyutta* v. 93.

⁸ *Anguttara* iii. 65.

to consciousness of things immaterial being hindered should be expanded by that [formula]:—because of the hindrance of sensuous desire come the hindrances of sloth-torpor, distraction, ignorance.¹ Therefore the conclusion here to be arrived at is that torpor is not a material thing.

In the exposition of worry,² ‘Thinking what is lawful concerning something that is unlawful’ is said to explain worry from the root. By thus imagining an improper thing to be proper, when transgression is committed, when offence against something is done, in one who recollecting it regrets, ‘I have done badly,’ worry arises by way of after-regret. Therefore it is to show it from the root that the clause was said. Herein if anyone eats unlawful food imagining it to be lawful, unsuitable flesh imagining it to be suitable, bear’s flesh to be pork, or leopard’s flesh to be venison, eats at a late hour imagining he is in time, eats after the Pavārana, thinking it is not past, eats when dust falls into the bowl imagining that he has got alms, he thus transgresses by imagining what is lawful in something that is unlawful. And he who eats pork thinking it to be bear’s flesh, in time thinking it to be behind time, transgresses ‘imagining what is unlawful in something that is lawful.’ And he who does any faultless thing thinking it to be faulty, and does a fault thinking it to be faultless, and who imagines fault in a faultless thing, and faultlessness in a fault, commits a transgression. And because this worry arises by imagining, when transgression is committed, no fault in faultlessness thus, ‘Alas! I have not done well, I have not worked merit, not made a shelter from fear; I have done evil, a barbarous act, a wicked act,’³ therefore permitting another root or basis of it, [the text] says, ‘all this sort . . .’ [384] wherein the meaning of the term ‘worry’ is given. The mode of worrying is ‘fidgeting.’ The state of one being with worry is ‘over-scrupulousness.’ In the phrase ‘reproach of conscience,’⁴ ‘reproach’ is the approach of the mind towards what is done and undone, faulty

¹ Cf. *Vibh.*, pp. 199, 398.

² *Dhs.* § 1160.

³ Cf. *Anguttara* ii. 174.

⁴ *Cetaso*:=of mind, the original English use of the word.—*Ed.*

and faultless. And because one does not [i.e., cannot] undo evil done, or do the good left undone, therefore the returning approach [of conscience] to such things is ugly and weary, or 're-proach.' It is of the conscience, not of a being—to intimate this, 'reproach of conscience' has been said. This is its intrinsic nature. And reproach in arising scales the mind, as the point of an awl does a metal bowl; hence 'mental scarifying' has been said. This signifies function.

But that worry which comes in scruples of discipline as, 'Then the venerable Sāriputta did not accept it on account of the scruple that the daily food for guests living in a rest-house had been declined by the Buddha'¹ is not a hindrance. True, there is no such burning regret to the saint as 'By me this evil has been done.' But this worry which resembles a hindrance and is called investigation in this wise, 'Is this proper, or not proper?' is known as worry respecting discipline.

In the exposition of the expression, 'Which are states that are hindrances and associated with hindrances'² sloth and torpor do not put away each other. Hence, 'Sloth and torpor are themselves hindrances and associated with the hindrance of ignorance' has been said without making a [special] division. And whereas there may be distraction with worry, this being absent, therefore the two have been spoken of in separate divisions. And any hindrance which does not come into association with any other hindrance is to be understood as not joined.

Now it is proper to take these hindrances in their order as corruptions and also in the order of the Paths. In the former case sensual desire and ill-will are eliminated by the Never-returning Path, sloth and torpor and distraction by the Path of Arahantship, worry and perplexity by the Stream-winning Path, ignorance by the Path of Arahantship. In the latter case, worry and perplexity are eliminated by the Stream-winning Path, sensual desire and ill-will by the Never-returning Path, sloth and torpor, distraction and ignorance by the Path of Arahantship.

¹ *Vin.* iv. 70.

² *Dhs.* § 1170. *Vinaya* iv. 70*

[385] In the Reversion group the plural number in 'excepting those states'¹ has been made to be consistent with the question 'Which are the states?'

In the exposition of Grasping,² 'sensual grasping,' which is both sensuality and grasping, means a clinging to sensuality as a basis. 'Grasping' is a catching hold strongly, the prefix in the word³ having the meaning of 'strong,' as in 'despair,' 'denounced.' The same holds good in the compound 'opinion-grasping,' i.e., clutching hold of an opinion (or 'view'). In such views as 'the self is eternal,' 'the world is eternal,' the later opinion is clutching hold of the former opinion. So also in rule-and-ritual-grasping:—there is a clutching hold of such. Conforming to bovine habits and bovine usages⁴ as means of purification is itself such a mode of grasping. Similarly [in the fourth mode]:—'theory' is a way of declaring; by that there is grasping. What do they declare or grasp? The self (or soul). Thus 'theory-of-self-grasping' is a grasping which is a declaring about self. Or merely a grasping at the word 'self.'⁵

[Reverting to the first of the four modes,⁶] in 'that sensual desire . . . concerning sensual pleasures,' sensual pleasures are taken here as just only desires located in objects of the senses. Hence that the first of the 'Four Grasplings' is sensuous desire concerning objects of sense is something actualized even in the Never-Returner, but in him there is never any sensuous lust based thereon.

In the exposition of 'opinion-grasping,'⁷ the phrase 'there is no such thing as alms' means that, whereas we know one can give anything to anybody, one grasps the idea that there is no fruit, no result from what is given. A similar meaning attaches to the phrases about a great 'sacrifice' and an 'offering.' We know that there may be offerings by invita-

¹ Dhs. § 1176.

² Dhs. §§ 1213-17.

³ *Upa* in *upādāna*; so *upāyāsa*, *upakutīha*.—Tr.

⁴ See above, § 1005.

⁵ Unable to find the meaning of 'self,' they look upon the mere word as the self.—*Tīkā*.

⁶ Dhs. § 1215.

tion, to guests, and in marriage-ceremonies, but the opinion here is that there is no fruit, no result to such. In the phrase 'of good or bad deeds,' the ten courses of moral action and the ten courses of immoral action are respectively meant. [386] One knows that they exist, but takes it that they yield no fruit, no result. 'There is no such thing as this world,' *i.e.*, being mentally established in the next world he takes it that there is no present world. 'There is no such thing as the next world,' *i.e.*, being mentally established in this world he takes it that there is no next world. 'There is no such thing as mother or father,' *i.e.*, he knows the existence of mothers and fathers, and takes it that there is no fruit, no ripening on account of anything done to them. 'There are no such beings as spring into birth without parents,' *i.e.*, he takes it that there are no beings who after decease are reborn. 'Righteous and well-behaved,' ¹ *i.e.*, he takes it that there are in the world no righteous recluses and brahmins who have observed practice suitable [for Nibbāna]. 'Who having understood and realized, by themselves alone, both this world and the next, make known the same,' *i.e.*, he takes it that there is no omniscient Buddha who, knowing this world and the next by his own special insight, is able to make them known.

It is proper to take these Graspings in due order as Corruptions and of the Paths. In the former case sensual grasping is put away by the four Paths, the remaining three by the Stream-winning Path. In the latter case all but the first are put away by the Stream-winning Path, sensual grasping by the Four Paths.

In the exposition of the Corruptions,² these are just bases [seats] of corruption. In other words, persons who have not destroyed the Āsavas, because they are established in greed, hate, and dulness, live in corruption, the corruptions being

¹ *B.P.E.*: 'who have reached the highest point, who have attained the height.'

² *Dhs.* § 1229. On this almost untranslatable word, see *B.P.E.*, p. 327 *n.* The following sentence is a very strained specimen of exegetic etymology, also unreplicable.—*Ed.*

the bases of persons so established. Because here those corruptions also, which arise by means of such causal relations as contiguity, are said to live (or dwell), therefore they are the dwelling-places of [present] corruptions. Of these ten Corruptions the first 'greed' has been set forth in over a hundred terms in the groups entitled Conditions¹ ('What is greed? That which is lust, infatuation, etc.'), Knots, and in this section. In the groups of Intoxicants, Fetters, Floods,² Yokes,² Hindrances, Graspings, it has been shown in sets of eight terms. Shown in such detail it may be taken as completed. [387] Of those groups, in those of Conditions, Knots, Hindrances, Graspings, Corruptions, craving which is to be destroyed by the Four Paths forms one portion. In the groups of Intoxicants, Fetters, Floods, Yokes, craving, although it is to be destroyed by the Four Paths, forms two portions. How? In the Intoxicants are two portions: intoxicant of sensuality, intoxicant of rebirth. In the Fetters are two portions: the Fetter of lustful desire, the Fetter of lust for rebirth. In the Floods are two portions: the Flood of sensuality, the Flood of rebirth. In the Yokes are two similar portions.

It is proper to take these bases of corruption in due order of Corruptions and of Paths. In the former case greed is put away by the Four Paths, hate by the Never-returning Path, delusion and conceit by the Path of Arahanthood, opinion and perplexity by the Stream-winning Path, sloth, etc., by the Path of Arahanthood. In the latter case, opinion and perplexity are put away by the Stream-winning Path, hate by the Never-returning Path, the remaining seven by the Path of Arahanthood.

In the exposition of the sensuous realm,³ 'from beneath' means by the lower portion. 'Waveless deep of woe': i.e., there is here no interval, no break to the fires, to the beings, to painful feeling. And 'deep of woe'⁴ means here there is no happiness called ease. Also in the sense of being void

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 1053 f. esp. 1059; above, 467 f.

² *Dhs.* §§ 1151 f.

³ *Dhs.* § 1280.

⁴ Or 'purgatory' (*nirayo*).

of delight. 'Starting from,' i.e., making this deep of woe called the waveless the limit. 'Above,' i.e., by the upper portion. 'Parinimmitavasavatti devas' are devas usually so designated because of wielding authority in sense-desires created by others. 'Into,' i.e., keeping within. 'Whatever within lies,' i.e., those [states] in this space. 'Has there its range,' i.e., because from having come to be sometime, somewhere, others also traverse within [these limits], therefore not to comprise them, 'has there its range' is said. By this expression those who fare plunged within these limits, who fare, because they have come to be constantly and in all parts of this lower region by proceeding in essentials and derived qualities from the waveless deep of woe upwards, are included. Have their range means that they range about swallowed up in, range about in the lower region. 'Here included':—by this, because there are those who, having here their range, also have their range elsewhere, but are not there included, therefore these also are comprised.

Now to show the nature of the things 'here included' [388] as aggregate, void [of noümenon], and cause, he said the phrase beginning '[whether it be] khandha's,' etc.

In the exposition of the realm of attenuated matter,¹ the Brahma-world means the 'place of Brahma-[devas]' called the plane of First Jhāna. What follows should be understood analogously to the previous paragraph. In the clause 'of one who has attained' and the following, Jhāna of moral, of resultant, and of inoperative thought is to be understood in what is said.

In the exposition of the immaterial realm,² 'entrance among the devas of the sphere of infinite space' means entered into that rebirth so. And the same with the second term. The rest should be understood analogously to the foregoing.

In the exposition of the 'harmful' couplet,³ of the three immoral roots the delusion that [arises] is harmful and associated with greed, and is harmful and associated with

¹ Dhs. § 1283 (c).

² Dhs. § 1285 (e).

³ Dhs. § 1294 f. B.P.E.: 'concomitant with war.' Cf. M. iii. 230 *foli.*

hate. But delusion, when it is associated with perplexity and distraction, is to be understood as harmful, as tainted, because in being eliminated there goes with it the lust and the harm that are associated with false opinions, and are called lust for rebirth in the spheres of attenuated matter and of immateriality.

The Suttanta couplets¹ have been specified and specialized according to their meaning in the discourse on the Table of Contents, and can be well understood by what was there said. Hence the terms will generally be evident in meaning. But there is just a residuum to be explained.

In the first place, taking the couplet on lightning,² suppose a man who can see is travelling along a path on a cloudy night. The path is obscured by the darkness. Lightning flashes and dispels the dark. In the absence of darkness the path becomes clear. This happens on a second journey, and again on a third journey. Here like the man who can see setting out on the path is the effort of insight put forth by the Ariyan disciple for the Stream-winning Path. Like the obliteration of the way in darkness is the darkness covering the Truths. Like the moment when lightning flashes and dispels the darkness is the moment when the light of the Stream-winning Path arises and dispels the darkness covering the Truths. Like the manifestation of the way when darkness clears [389] is the time of the manifestation of the four Truths to the Stream-winning Path; and what is manifest in the Path is even manifest to the person who has got it. Like the second journey is the effort of insight to get the Once-returning Path. Like the obliteration of the way in darkness is the darkness covering the Truths. Like the moment of lightning flashing the second time and dispelling darkness is the moment of the light of the Once-returning Path arising and dispelling the darkness covering the Truths. Like the manifestation of the way when darkness clears is the time of the manifestation of the four Truths to the Once-returning Path. And what is manifest in the Path is manifest to the person who has got

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 1296 f. Above, p. 68.

² *Ib.* § 1298; *A. i.* 123 f.

On the name-giving day of a baby-boy, the relatives stand round and, having done honour to those worthy of gifts, agree to give the name, saying, 'His name is so-and-so':—this is 'name given by acclamation.' A former concept tallies with a later concept, a former current term with a later one, *e.g.*, the moon in a previous cycle is [what we now call] moon; and there were the sun, ocean, earth, mountains in the past:—this is the 'name spontaneously arisen.' This fourfold kind of name is only the one term 'name.' 'Denomination' is name made. 'Name-assigning' is name established. 'Interpretation' is name-making. 'Distinctive mark' is name showing the meaning, said because this name signifies or indicates meaning. 'Signification'¹ is significant of name.

'All states are processes of equivalent nomenclature' means there is no state which is not such a process. One state fits in with all states and all states coincide with one state. How so? The concept as 'name' is that one state which fits in with all states in any of the four planes. There is no being, nor thing that may not be called by a name. The trees also in the forest, the mountains, etc., are the business of the country folk. For they, on being asked, 'What tree is this?' say the name they know, as 'Cutch,' 'Butea.' Even of the tree the name of which they know not, they say, 'It is the nameless tree.' And that also stands as the established name of that tree.² And the same with fishes, tortoises, etc., in the ocean. The other two couplets are of the same meaning as this.

[392] In the couplet of 'name-and-form' (*i.e.*, of mind-matter),³ 'name' (mind) has the sense of name-making, of bending (*namana*), of causing to bend (*nāmāna*). Four of the aggregated are 'name' in the sense of name-making.⁴ For

¹ *Abhilāpo. B.P.E.*: 'discourse.'

² See *B.P.E.*, p. 341, end of *n.* 2.

³ *Dhs. § 1309. Nāma-rūpam.* Cf. *Compendium*, pp. 192 *f.*, 271 *f.*; *Bud. Psychology*, p. 23. Also *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 86; § 83:—'bends down' there is *abhinin-nāmeti*.

⁴ *Rūpa* (lit. shape, form) is so called because it reveals itself. But *nāma* being subtle has to depend on a 'name' to make itself known; hence 'making a name.'—*Tikā*.

whereas, from being named by the people, the name of king Mahāsammata was Mahāsammata, and whereas parents by acclamation make a name for their son, 'Let him be called Tissa, Phussa,' and whereas the name comes in virtue of a quality as Preacher, Vinaya-student, such names as 'feeling' come quite otherwise. Feeling and the other [elements of consciousness], like the great earth and other elements, make their own name as they arise. When they arise their name also arises. For no one, when feeling arises, says: 'Be thou called feeling'; there is no function of name-taking. As when the earth appears there is no function of name-taking:—'Be thou called Earth'; and similarly with the world-systems, with Mt. Meru, the moon, sun, stars,—the name is just as it arises, answering to the spontaneously arising concept. So, when it arises the name 'feeling' just arises, answering to the spontaneously arising concept. The same is true for perceptions and the rest [of mind]. For feeling, whether it be in the past, future, or present, is [after all and always] just feeling. And so is perception, so are mental activities, so is consciousness. But Nibbāna, though it be for all time, is always Nibbāna. Such is 'name' in the sense of name-making. The four aggregates are 'name' in the sense of bending, for they bend toward the object [of thought]. In the sense of causing to bend, all [of the foregoing] are 'name.' For the four aggregates cause one another to bend on to the object; and Nibbāna bends faultless states on to itself by means of the causal relation of the dominant influence of object.

'Ignorance and craving for existence'¹ have been taken to show the growth of the roots of the round of rebirths.

'Both the self and world will be'²—taking the five aggregates as the self and the world, there is the 'Eternalistic view,'³ which is laid to heart in the manner of holding that the self and the world will reappear.⁴ Secondly, the 'Annihilationistic view'⁵ is laid to heart in this way, that the self and the world

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 1311-12.

² *Dhs.* § 1313.

³ *Dhs.* § 1315.

⁴ Lit. 'will become.'

⁵ *Dhs.* § 1316.

will not reappear. [393] 'Referring to the ultimate past,'¹ eighteen such views which come in the *Brahmajāla Suttanta*² with reference to the past are taken. 'Referring to the hereafter':—forty-four such views which come in the same Suttanta with reference to the future are taken.

In the exposition of 'contumacy,'³ the phrase 'when that which is in accordance with the Law has been said' means that that precept which has been ordained by the Blessed One is said to be in accordance with the Law, showing the basis, and placing the offence thus, 'Thou hast committed this offence. Come, show it, rise from it and make amends.' 'The being surly,' etc., refers to the work of an obstinate person, owing to his retaliation in speech, his want of submissiveness when he is urged. 'Fractiousness' is the abstract form. The other term is just an equivalent. 'Contrariness' is taking the opposite side. A 'captious' person is one who finds it pleasant to take the opposite side. It is an equivalent for one who gets pleasure in the thought, 'I have taken in the opposite view and as with a cross-bolt have made him speechless with a single word!' 'Captiousness' is the state of such an one. 'Want of regard' is the state of one who does not accept advice. 'Want of consideration' is an equivalent. 'Truculence' is a mode of this rejection [of advice]. 'Want of reverence' is a state of disrespect arisen in a habitual negation of paying respect where it is owed. 'Want of deference' is a state of habitual negation of showing deference to the seniors with whom one lives. 'This is called,' i.e., such [an attitude] is called 'contumacy'. . . . Actually what is so called is the four aggregates proceeding in this way as the [fifth, the] aggregate of activities.

The answer on 'evil friendship,' etc.,⁴ is to be taken by the same method, for 'contumacy,' 'evil friendship,' and the rest are not separate states. [394] 'Unbelievers' are they that have no faith, i.e., no bases of belief such as the Buddha, etc. 'Immoral'⁵ really means 'without morals,' for morality

¹ Dhs. § 1319.

² Dialogues of the Buddha i. 27 f; 46 f.

³ Dhs. § 1325.

⁴ Dhs. § 1326.

⁵ *Dus-silā*, lit. having bad morality.

cannot be bad. 'Uneducated' means deprived of learning. 'Mean-spirited' refers to those who have the five kinds of selfishness. 'Witless' means without intelligence. 'To resort to' is to follow after. 'To consort with' is to follow vigorously. 'To be taken up with' is to follow in every respect, the term having been intensified by prefixes. The three terms signify just 'following.' 'To be devoted to' is to draw near to, with its variant forms:—'to be engrossed with' (with, in Pali, its intensifying prefix), 'fondness for,' 'enthusiasm for' (also intensified, in Pali, by a prefix). 'To be entangled with' is to be well twisted up with such persons in body and mind. Inclining to them, bent over to them, hanging on them is the meaning.

The exposition of the couplet of gentleness¹ should be understood in a sense opposed to the foregoing.

'The five groups of offences'²:—in the exposition of the Pātimokha Table of Contents these five offences are Pārājika, Saṅghādisesa, Pācittiya, Pātidesaniya, Dukkaṭa. 'The seven groups of offences also,' in the Vinaya-exposition, are Pārājika, Saṅghādisesa, Thullaccaya, Pācittiya, Pātidesaniya, Dukkaṭa, Dubbhāsita. In these five and seven offences, a knowledge of their limits with their bases or causes is called 'skill in offences.' Knowledge of the limits of emerging from offences, together with the ecclesiastical vote, is 'skill in restoration from offences.'³ 'Attainment' is because of fitness to attain. Skill in attainment⁴ is insight into the stages of ecstasy together with the preamble. The existence of insight as to emerging at a fixed time without fail [from Jhāna] thus, 'I will rise when the moon, sun, or a star reaches such a position' is called 'skill in emerging from attainment in Jhāna.'⁵

[395] Discriminating knowledge in acquiring, attending to, hearing, remembering the eighteen elements is 'proficiency in the elements.'⁶ Discriminating knowledge in acquiring, attending to them is 'proficiency in attention.'⁷ Discrimi-

¹ *Dhs.* § 1327.

² *Dhs.* § 1329; *Vin. Texts*, i. 1 f.

³ *Dhs.* § 1330.

⁴ *Dhs.* § 1331.

⁵ *Dhs.* § 1332.

⁶ *Dhs.* § 1333.

⁷ *Dhs.* § 1334.

nating knowledge in acquiring, attending to, hearing, remembering the twelve sense-organs is 'skill in sense-organs.'¹ And in these three proficiencies all is proper:—acquiring, attention, hearing, contemplation, penetration, reflection. The hearing, acquiring, and reflection are worldly; penetration is transcendental; contemplation and attention are mixed.

'From ignorance arises kamma,' etc.,² will be plain in the *Paticcasamuppāda Vibhaṅga*.³ But the knowledge which knows that, on account of this ignorance as cause, there arises this kamma as effect, is 'skill in the Causal Genesis.' In the exposition of 'skill in affirming, in negating causal conjecture,'⁴ condition and cause are synonyms of each other. The sentient eye making visible matter the object is the condition and also the cause of the arising visual cognition. The sentient ear and the rest are likewise the condition and cause of auditory and other cognition, as mango seeds, e.g., are the condition and cause of mango fruit.

In the second method (the negating of causal conjecture) the words 'whatever⁵ states' indicate causal states that do not fit. The words 'of whatever'⁶ indicate resultant states that do not fit. 'Not condition, not cause,' i.e., the sentient eye, when a sound is made the object of thought, is not the condition, is not the cause of the arising auditory cognition. Likewise the sentient ear, etc., are not condition, not cause of the remaining cognitions, just as the mango is not the condition, not the cause of the production of the palmyra.

In the exposition of 'upright,' 'soft,'⁷ only the expression 'lowliness of heart' is distinctive. Its meaning is: by the absence of conceit this person's heart is lowly; the state of such a person is 'lowliness of heart.' The rest has come in the word-classification under 'rectitude of thought'⁸ and of plasticity of thought.⁸

In the exposition of patience,⁹ 'patience' is enduring.

¹ *Dhs.* § 1335.

² *Lit. sankhārā.* *Dhs.* § 1336. Cf. *Compendium*, p. 188, n. 2.

³ *Vibhaṅga*, p. 135 f.

⁴ *Dhs.* §§ 1337-38.

⁵ *B.P.E.*: 'certain.'

⁶ *Dhs.* §§ 1339-40.

⁷ *Dhs.* § 51.

⁸ *Dhs.* § 45.

⁹ *Dhs.* § 1341.

The mode of being patient is 'long-suffering.' By this state they suffer without retaliating. 'Compliance' is to persist without repulsing or opposing. [396] 'Absence of rudeness' is the state of one who is not rude. 'Absence of abruptness,' i.e., from being badly placed or uttered, an ill-spoken word is abrupt. By being opposed to it a good word is not abrupt. Herein the reason has been shown by a figure of speech. 'Complacency of heart,' that is, the mentality itself of the heart as joyous; just the state of one's own mind. The state of not being charged with ill-will is the meaning.¹

In the exposition of temperance,² 'that which is absence of excess in deed' is the threefold bodily good conduct; 'that which is absence of excess in word' is the fourfold good conduct in speech. By the expression, 'in deed and word,' virtue, produced (in these seven ways) at the body-door and the speech-door and, with livelihood as the eighth, is comprised. 'This is called temperance' means that this virtue is called temperance from well avoiding evil. 'Besides, all moral self-restraint' means: because not only in deed and word, but also in thought evil conduct is practised, therefore it is said to show inclusion of virtue in thought.

In the exposition of amity,³ 'insolent' means, as bosses protrude in a decaying or unhealthy tree, so, owing to faultiness, 'knobs' are produced from words of abusing and slandering, etc. 'Scabrous' means putrid, like a putrid tree. As a putrid tree is scabrous and has trickling, powdery tissue, so such speech is scabrous and enters as though piercing the ear. 'Harsh to others' means bitter to the ears of others, not pleasant to their hearts and productive of hate. 'Vituperative to others' means, as a branch with barbed thorns sticks by penetrating into leather, so it sticks to others and clings on, hindering those who want to go. 'Bordering on anger' means near to anger. 'Not conducive to concentra-

¹ Attamanatā. Atta here (cf. Sk. ātta) is not 'self,' 'own,' but 'taken up,' 'uplifted'; hence the word is literally 'exalted-mindedness.' Cf. *Dictionary, Pali Text Soc.*, s.v. Atta, art. 1. But Buddhaghosa's age had lost sight of this first syllable.—*Ed.*

² *Dhs.* § 1342.

³ *Dhs.* § 1343.

tion' means all these terms not conducive to ecstasy or access are synonyms of the words 'with hate.' 'By putting away such speech,'—this has been said to show that when a man persists in not extirpating harsh speech, [397] even his gentle words, albeit they occur at intervals, are reckoned harsh. Next, hate is noxious (*elamp*); amiable speech is innocuous (*nelū*). 'Faultless' is the meaning, as in the passage,

‘Faultless in frame, white-canopied.’¹

‘Pleasant to the ear,’ that is, from sweetness of diction it is pleasant to the ear; it does not produce pain to the ear, like the piercing of a needle. And from the sweetness of sense and meaning not producing ill-temper in the body, it produces affection, and so is called ‘affectionate.’ That speech which appeals to the heart, which enters the mind easily without striking, we say ‘goes to the heart.’ ‘Urbane’ speech is so called because it is full (*purna, porī*) of good qualities, and because it is refined like well-bred persons, and because it is of the town (*pura*, urban). It means talk of citizens. For these use appropriate speech and address fatherly men as fathers, and brotherly men as brothers. ‘Of much-folk-sweetness’ means sweet to many people. ‘Of much-folk-pleasantness’ means pleasant to many people and making for the growth of mind. ‘The speech which there,’ that is, in that person, ‘is gentle,’ i.e., polished, ‘friendly,’ that is, soft, ‘smooth,’ that is, not harsh.

In the exposition of courtesy,² ‘carnal’³ courtesy’ is the closing, covering up, by means of bodily needs, the gap which might exist between oneself and others owing to those needs not getting satisfied. ‘Spiritual courtesy’ is the closing, covering up, by means of the Doctrine, the gap which might exist between oneself and others owing to those needs not getting satisfied. ‘He is courteous,’ that is, he closes these two gaps in the world; shows courtesy by the twofold courtesy. To be courteous is to leave no [such] interval. The following

¹ *Udāna* vii. 5.

² *Dhs.* § 1344.

³ Āmisena. Cf. the Christian: ‘minister to them in carnal things.’ (*Rom.* xv. 27).

discourse explains from the beginning:—‘A courteous bhikkhu, on seeing a guest arrive, should meet him [398] and take his bowl and robe, offer him a seat, fan him with palmyra leaf, wash his feet, rub him with oil; if there be butter and syrup he should give him medicine, offer him water, scour the monastery—thus in one part is carnal courtesy shown. Moreover, at eventide—if there be no junior come to pay his respects—the bhikkhu should go to the presence of his guest, sit there and, without asking him irrelevant things, question him on relevant things. He should not ask ‘What texts do you recite?’ but should ask ‘What scriptural text do your teacher and spiritual adviser use?’ and should question him on points within his capacities. Should the guest be able to answer, well and good; if not, he himself should give the reply. Thus in one part is spiritual courtesy shown. If the guest stays with him, he should always take him when going his rounds for alms; should he desire to depart, the next day the bhikkhu should take him to a spot which is a favourable point of departure, and having gone about in one village for alms should send him off. But if on the other hand the bhikkhus have been invited, he should go taking the guest, if willing, with him. If he desires not to go, saying such a place is not suitable for him, the bhikkhu should send the rest of the bhikkhus, and with him go for alms; and should give him the carnal things he himself has obtained:—thus is carnal courtesy shown. To whom should the bhikkhu courteous in carnal needs give what he has gained for himself? So far, to the guest. If there be one sick, or one who has not observed Lent, to him also he should give; and also to his teachers and spiritual advisers, also to one who holds his belongings, such as the robe. And the bhikkhu who is fulfilling the precepts should give, beginning from the Elder’s seat, his carnal gains every time they are brought, even for a hundred or thousand times. But the courteous bhikkhu should give to him, who has not obtained¹ his carnal needs.

¹ Reading aladdham. With the foregoing cf. *Vin. Texts* iii. 272 f., esp. p. 281 f.

On going outside a village and seeing an old or helpless bhikkhu or bhikkhuni he should also give to such an one.

Hereon there is this story: It is said that, just when the village of Guttasāla had been destroyed by bandits, a woman Arahant, emerging from trance and, making a young bhikkhuni carry her baggage, was going along the road together with the people. When at noon they reached the village-gate of Nakulanagara [399] she sat down at the foot of a tree. Just then the Elder, Mahānāga, of Kālavallimandapa, after going about Nakulanagara village for alms, as he was coming out, saw the sister and offered her a meal. She answered, 'I have no bowl.' He said, 'Use this,' and gave the food with his bowl. She having partaken of the meal, washed the bowl and gave it to the Elder, saying, 'To-day, dear Sir, you will be tired with begging for alms. But from to-day there will be no fatigue to you on account of alms-begging.' And thence-forward never was there to the Elder an alms worth less than a kahapanā. This is carnal courtesy. Showing this courtesy, the bhikkhu, with a view to giving help, should speak on the stations of religious exercise to that bhikkhu, cause the text to be recited, dispel worry, perform his present duties, give the *abbhāna*, *vutthāna*, *mānatta*, *parivāsā*,¹ ordain him who is worthy of ordination, give the full ordination to a worthy one. And it is fit to get a resolution of the Order² to a sister also, should she desire ordination of him. This is spiritual courtesy. The bhikkhu courteous in these two ways gains that which he had not, establishes that which has arisen, and guards his own life on any perilous occasion, like the Elder who, taking the bowl which he got from king Coranāga³ by the rim, scattered the food by [shaking] the bowl. But in gaining that which he had not, the story of king Mahānāga⁴ should be told. He, travelling from Ceylon to the Indian shore, obtaining favour from the presence of one Elder and coming back, was estab-

¹ For these different kinds of probation and penance, see *Vinaya Texts* ii. 397 ff.—*Ed.*

² *Kammavācā*

³ *Mahāvanssa* xxxiv. 11.

⁴ *Ib.* xxxiii. 45. But neither story is given. In the former presumably there was poison in the bowl.—*Ed.*

lished in the kingdom and made a great gift of medicine in Setambangana as long as he lived. In the matter of establishing what has arisen, the story of thieves who did not plunder the sacred property in Mount Cetiya because of the courtesy they were shown at the hands of Dighabhaṇaka Abhaya the Elder should be told.

In the exposition of 'having the doors of the controlling faculties unguarded,'¹ the phrase 'sees an object with the eye' means, he sees visible matter by visual cognition which has got the name of eye by way of the cause and is able to see matter. [400] But the Ancients say:—Eye does not see matter. And why? Because it is not consciousness. Consciousness cannot see matter, and why? Because it is not eye. But by the impact of object with door, one sees by consciousness with the sentient organism as the physical basis. And such discourse is said to be supported by its components, as in the phrase 'he pierces by a bow,' etc. Hence 'seeing matter by visual cognition' is the meaning.

'Grasps the general appearance,' i.e., grasps by way of lustful desire a sign such as is of the male, or female, pleasant, etc., and which is the basis of corruption. The stand is taken not merely on what is seen.

'Grasps the details,' i.e., takes the various modes of hands and feet, of smiling, laughing, speaking, looking straight ahead, looking askance, which have earned the name of 'details' from the manifesting, the revealing of the lower nature.

In 'that which might give occasion,' for whatever reason, from whatever conditions of not restraining the controlling faculty of sight, it being not shut by the door-leaf of mindfulness, 'those states,' such as covetousness, always 'follow,' i.e., chase, overwhelm the person 'who lives' with the 'controlling faculty of sight unguarded.'

'He does not set himself to restrain that,' i.e., does not practise in order to shut the controlling faculty of sight with the door-leaf of mindfulness. And such a person is said 'not to keep watch over his controlling-faculty of sight.'

¹ Dhs. § 1345.

Now in the controlling faculty itself, there is neither restraint nor non-restraint, for neither mindfulness nor lapse of it depends on the sentient eye. Moreover, when the visible object reaches the avenue of sight, then, after two pulsations of the subconscious continuum, consciousness adverting to the five doors functions and ceases, after which visual cognition functions and ceases. After this receptive consciousness arises effecting the function of receiving and ceases. [401] After this examining consciousness arises accomplishing the function of examination and ceases. After this mind-door-adverting consciousness arises accomplishing the function of determination and ceases. Immediately after this apperception takes place. Herein during subconscious life-continuum there is neither restraint nor non-restraint. At one time or another of the advertings there is neither restraint nor non-restraint. But at the moment of apperception there arises either wickedness, forgetfulness, lack of knowledge, of patience or idleness, and there is non-restraint. Nevertheless such non-restraint is called that of the controlling faculty of sight. And why? Because at that apperceptual moment in the existence of non-restraint, the door also is unguarded, the subconscious continuum also is unguarded, and so also are the thought-processes, such as advertинг. As, when the four gates of a city are not closed, though the doors of houses, arches, chambers within are well closed, all treasure in the interior of the city is unprotected, unguarded—for thieves entering by the city-gate may do as they please—so when wickedness and so on arise at apperception when there is non-restraint, the door at the apperceptual moment is unguarded, so also is the subconscious continuum, and so are the thought-processes such as advertинг.

And the same is true with 'he hears a sound with the ear,' etc.

'That which is of these,' i.e., that non-guarding, non-protecting, non-watching, non-restraint, non-shutting, non-closing of these six controlling faculties of one not having restraint, is the meaning.

In the exposition of immoderation in diet,¹ 'someone

¹ *Dhs.* § 1340.

here' means someone in this world of beings; 'through carelessness,' i.e., not knowing, not considering by means of reflecting knowledge; 'unwisely,' i.e., without reason; 'food,' i.e., a thing to be swallowed, such as eatables, etc. 'Takes,' i.e., eats, swallows. 'For sport,' etc.:—this has been said to show the absence of method, for he who eats without method takes food for sport, intoxication, personal decoration, beautification. For the sake of escape from the round of births by food he does not eat.

'That which is his insatiableness,' etc., i.e., the discontent, the dissatisfaction there is in this unwise eating of food. [402] 'Immoderation' is a state of being immoderate, not knowing the limit called measure. 'This is called,' i.e., the practice which arises by way of eating without consideration is called 'immoderation in food.'

In the exposition of 'having the doors of the controlling faculties guarded'¹ 'with the eye' is to be understood by the above-said method. 'Does not grasp the general appearance,' i.e., does not seize by way of lustful desire the sign as described above. So also should the remaining terms be understood by opposition to the said method. And as has been said above—'but at the moment of apperception there arises either wickedness . . . so are the thought-processes such as adverting,'² so here also it is said (*substituting virtue, etc., for wickedness, etc., and the positive for the negative*).

And the same in 'he hears a sound with the ear,' etc.

In the exposition of moderation in diet,³ 'takes food with reflection and judgment' means eats food with consideration, knowingly, by means of reflecting knowledge.

Now to show that consideration or reason, 'not for sport,' etc., has been said. Herein 'not for sport' means that he eats not for sport. Of such people, actors, acrobats, etc., are said to eat for sport. Indeed they search for and eat unrighteously and unjustly whatever food is favourable to such sport as dancing, singing, composing songs, eulogizing. But the bhikkhu does not eat so. [403] 'Not for intoxication'

¹ Dhs. § 1347.

² See p. 510.

³ Dhs. § 1348.

means that he eats not to swell his pride and manhood. Of such people, kings and kings' ministers are known to eat for intoxication. Indeed these eat lumps of tasty food or excellent food to swell their pride and manhood. But the bhikkhu does not eat so. 'Not for personal charm' means he eats not for bodily decoration. Of such people, women such as are courtesans, who live by physical beauty, and court ladies drink ghee and molasses and eat smooth, soft, sweet food:—'thus our finger-joints will be well shaped and our bodily complexion clear,'—so they eat. But not so the bhikkhu. 'Not for beautifying' means that he eats not for growth of flesh in the body. Of such people, wrestlers and boxers, etc., make the body stout by exceedingly smooth fish, meat, etc.:—'thus our flesh will be filled out, adequate to bear blows,'—so they eat. But not so the bhikkhu.

'So as to suffice' signifies the limit of the result of taking food. 'For the sustenance of this body' means he eats to keep this sentient body¹ going, dependent as it is on the four great essentials. This is the motive of the bhikkhu in eating food, is the meaning. 'For the preservation of' means he eats for the preservation of the life-controlling faculty. In 'for allaying the pangs of hunger,' from not having eaten, the hunger which arises is called 'pang.' He eats for the allaying, the calming of that. In 'for aiding the practice of the higher life,' 'the higher life' comprises the three precepts and all instructions.² He eats for the purpose of the glorifying or upholding of that. 'Thus' signifies or indicates the reason. 'For this reason' is the meaning.

In 'I shall subdue the old feeling,' the arisen feeling due to not eating is called the 'old feeling.' He eats so that he will expel such feeling. In 'I shall cause no new feeling to arise,' the feeling arising from over-eating is called 'the new feeling.' He eats so that he will not produce it. Or, the feeling arising from having eaten is called the new feeling. [404] He eats so that he will not produce it.

¹ Karajakāya. See p. 485, n. 1.

² I.e., learning, attainment, penetration.

'And maintenance shall be mine,' i.e., there will be preservation. In 'faultlessness also and comfort,' there is faulty eating and there is faultless eating; wherein all that is unrighteous seeking, unrighteous accepting, unrighteous enjoying is known as faulty; but seeking righteously, accepting righteously, eating with reflections:—all this is known as faultless. Someone makes himself faulty in the partaking of a faultless thing, saying; 'I have obtained it,' he eats to excess, and being unable to digest it suffers from vomiting and purging, so that the bhikkhus in the whole monastery fall to exerting themselves in succouring his body and in seeking medicine. When asked, 'What is the matter?' they reply, 'It is the swollen stomach of so-and-so,' etc., and they blame and censure him:—'This bhikkhu is of this nature at all times; he knows not the capacity of his stomach; he commits a fault where there should be no fault.' Without doing such things, [the good man] eats so that there will be no fault.

As to the term 'comfort,' there is comfort and there is discomfort. The eating of these five brahmins produces discomfort, namely, of the 'lifted-by-hand-er,' the 'enough-for-the-loincloth-er,' the 'there-gyrator,' the 'crow-pecked one,' the 'meal-vomiter.' Of these, the first eating much cannot rise by himself, and says, 'Take my hand'; the second has his stomach so swollen that even standing he cannot wrap his loincloth; the third rolls about where he ate unable to rise; the fourth stuffs his mouth so full that crows can peck at it; the fifth can no more fill his mouth, but vomits then and there. When all this is not done [the good man] takes food so that there will be comfort. Comfort is to have a relaxed stomach after four or five mouthfuls. For when so much only is eaten and water drunk, the four postures may go on with ease. Hence the Generalissimo of the Dhamma said:—

[405] *Hath he but eaten mouthfuls four or five,
Let him drink water—here is sure enough
Refreshment for a bhikkhu filled with zeal.*¹

¹ *Psalms of the Brethren*, ver. 983.

Now in this place the items should be collected, for each of these is one:—‘not for sport,’ ‘not for intoxication,’ ‘not for personal charm,’ ‘not for beautifying,’ ‘so as to suffice for the sustenance and preservation of this body,’ ‘for the allaying of the pangs of hunger and aiding the practice of the holy life,’ ‘I shall subdue the old feeling and cause no new feeling to arise,’ ‘and maintenance shall be mine.’ ‘Faultlessness also and comfort’—herein is the advantage of taking food. But Mahāsīva the Elder says: ‘The first four items are called Rejection, and next them the other eight items should be grouped.’ Here each of these is one:—‘so as to suffice for the sustenance of this body,’ ‘for its preservation,’ ‘for the allaying of the pangs of hunger,’ ‘for aiding the practice of the holy life,’ ‘I shall subdue the old feeling,’ ‘I shall cause no new feeling to arise,’ ‘and maintenance shall be mine,’ ‘faultlessness also.’ And ‘comfortable living’ is the advantage given by taking food. Thus he whose eating is characterized by the eight items is called knower of measure in food. ‘This is called,’ i.e., the partaking of food with reflection arising as the knowing what is fit, and measure in search, acceptance, and enjoyment is called ‘moderation in diet.’

In the exposition of forgetfulness,¹ ‘unmindfulness’ is the four [mental] aggregates as devoid of mindfulness. ‘Lapse of memory, non-recollection’:—these have been enhanced by means of the prefixes.² ‘Non-remembrance’ is the [mental] mode of not remembering; ‘not bearing in mind’ is inability to bear in mind; for the person endowed therewith has not arrived at noting well, is not fit to commit to memory. ‘Superficiality’ means floating in the object like gourd-skins in water. ‘Oblivion’ is ruined, muddled memory. Indeed, the person endowed therewith is like a crow [gazing with eyes fixed] on food, a jackal intent on flesh.

In the exposition of ‘culture-strength,’³ ‘of moral states’ [406] refers to the (thirty-seven) factors of wisdom. ‘Pursuing’ means initial pursuit. ‘Cultivating’ means growth or development. ‘Multiplying’ means repeated action.

¹ *Dhs.* § 1349. Cf. above, p. 150 f.

² *Anu-ssati, paṭi-ssati.*

³ *Dhs.* § 1354.

The exposition of moral failure¹ should be understood as opposed to that of temperance. The exposition of theoretic fallacy² should be understood as opposed to that of progress in theories³ (opinions or views), and this should be understood as opposed to that of grasping after theories.⁴

Though the exposition of purity in morals⁵ is the same as that of progress in morals, yet in the latter the morality of Pātimokha restraint leading to purity has been mentioned. Here, in the former, morality or virtue arrived at purity has been mentioned. And by these six couplets of mindfulness and comprehension, the strengths of reflection and of culture, calm and insight, mark of calm and of support, support and non-distraction, moral progress and progress in theory,⁶ worldly and transcendental states of the four planes have been mentioned.

In the exposition of purity in theory⁷ 'knowledge of the specific nature of kamma' means the knowledge that *this* moral kamma is one's own, *that* immoral kamma is not one's own. Of these, all immoral kamma, whether done by oneself or another, is not one's own; and why? Because of its destroying good and producing disadvantage. But moral kamma, because it destroys disadvantage and produces advantage, is called one's own. Herein, just as a man of means and money, when on a long journey festivals are proclaimed in village or township, does not think: 'I am a visitor, by whose help can I enjoy the festival?' but enjoys himself just as he pleases, and comes through any difficulty with ease, so these beings, relying on the knowledge as to their own kamma, put forth much action conducive to rebirth, enjoy happiness through happiness,⁸ and attain Arahantship in countless numbers.

[407] 'Knowledge in due order of the Truths'⁹ is the knowl-

¹ *Dhs.* § 1361. ² *Dhs.* § 1362. ³ *Dhs.* § 1364. ⁴ *Dhs.* § 1215.

⁵ *Dhs.* § 1365. ⁶ *Dhs.* §§ 1351-60, 1363-64. ⁷ *Dhs.* § 1366.

⁸ Sukhena sukham. Cf. *Pss. of the Brethren*, ver. 220: *This happiness by happy ways is won*, as different from the ascetic theory, ver. 63; Majjhima i. 93 f.:—'happiness is got through suffering.'—*Ed.*

⁹ *Dhs.* § 1366.

ledge of insight into that order. 'Knowledge of him who holds the Path' is insight into the Path and Fruition.

In the exposition of the expression 'now purity in theory' by the terms 'that science,' etc., the four insights above, such as knowledge that kamma is one's own, have been classified. In the exposition of the expression 'and as the effort of him who holds certain views,' the energy signified by the expression 'that inception of mental energy,' etc., is similar in course to understanding. And understanding should be understood as worldly on worldly occasions and as transcendental on transcendental occasions.

In the exposition of the couplet of agitation, 'dread of birth' is the knowledge established by seeing birth as perilous. And the same in 'dread of old age and death,' etc. Seeing birth, decay, sickness, and death as perilous by means of the phrase, 'of bad (states) not yet arisen,' describes the reasonable effort of one desirous of escaping from birth, etc. And the meaning of the word-analysis will be plain in the Commentary on the *Vibhaṅga*.¹

In the exposition of 'And discontent in moral states,'² 'further longing' is longing for special excellence. Someone in this world gives first a meal for a party, a meal by tickets,*requisites for the Sabbath and for select individuals. Not satisfied with this, he again gives the 'principal meal,'³ a meal by tickets, a meal for the clergy, robes for Lent, builds a monastery, offers the four requisites. Not satisfied therewith, he takes the refuges, observes the five precepts, etc. Dissatisfied therewith, he becomes a monk and acquires one Nikāya, two Nikāyas, the three Piṭakas, the Buddha's Word,⁴ develops the eight attainments, increases insight, acquires Arahantship. When Arahantship is won then comes the Great Content. Thus 'further longing' is longing for special excellence up to Arahantship.

¹ *Sammoha-Vinodanī*. The Pali Text Society is about to publish the text.—*Ed.*

² *Dhs.* § 1367

³ Meal taken at a particular house by special invitation.—*Tr.*

⁴ Cf. above, p. 32, where 'words' is lit.: 'word.'—*Ed.*

In the exposition of the expression, the phrase 'And the not shrinking back in the effort' means that one who is slack in cultivating the higher moral states in wayside monasteries is said to shrink, recede, step back from such effort; [408] therefore to show that method, 'that which is of moral states,' etc., has been said. Herein 'thorough performance' is thorough work in doing moral deeds; 'persevering performance' is incessant work; 'unresting' is work without break and without stopping; 'absence of stagnation' is absence of stagnated life or occurrence; 'unfaltering conation' is not laying down the will for good; 'unflinching endurance' is not laying down the burden in the work for good.

In 'reminiscent knowledge of one's former living,' 'former lives' are aggregates which have happened, and things [such as garments, village, carriage, etc.] belonging to the aggregates. 'Reminiscent of one's former lives' is that which keeps remembering such former lives. The knowledge associated with such is 'reminiscent knowledge of one's former lives.' The knowledge which pierces the darkness covering the aggregates of past existences is *vijjā*¹ (wisdom). Piercing that darkness it makes the past aggregates plain, manifest—hence *vijjā* is used in the sense of making plain.

'Knowledge of decease-rebirth' is knowledge both of decease and of rebirth. This also pierces the darkness covering the decease and reconception of beings and is *vijjā*. Piercing that darkness it makes plain the decease and reconception of beings—hence *vijjā* here also is used in the sense of making plain.

'Knowledge in the loss of the Intoxicants (or Drugs)' is knowledge at the Ariyan Path-moment of the loss of all corruptions. This also pierces the darkness covering the Four Truths and is *vijjā*. Piercing that darkness it makes plain the Four Truths—hence *vijjā* here also is used in the sense of making plain.

[409] In 'freedom of thought and Nibbāna':—in the sense of being set free on to the object, and of being well freed from

¹ A word-play on *vidy-* (to know) and *vijjhati*, to pierce.—*Ed.*

opposed states, the eight attainments are known as ' freedom of thought.' Or Nibbāna [is so-called] because it is gone away (*ni[r]-ggatam*) from that jungle (*vānay*) called craving. In the eight attainments and Nibbāna, the former are called ' freedom ' because they are free from the self-discarded lower nature; the latter is freedom because of the final release from the lower nature.

' Knowledge of him who holds the path ' is the Fourfold Path-knowledge. ' Knowledge of him who holds the Fruition ' is the fourfold fruitional knowledge. Of them, the First Path-knowledge when it arises causes the loss, cessation, suppression, and tranquillization of the five corruptions; hence it is known as ' knowledge as to loss.' The Second when it arises causes the loss, etc., of the four corruptions; hence it is known as ' knowledge as to loss.' And the Third likewise. The Fourth when it arises causes the loss, etc., of the eight corruptions; hence it is ' knowledge as to loss.' And the fruitional knowledge of the various paths, arising at the end of the loss, cessation, suppression, tranquillization, non-production, and non-arising of the various corruptions, is known as ' knowledge of non-reproduction.'

End of the explanation of the Chapter of the Summary in the Expositor, the Commentary on the Compendium of States.

BOOK IV

DISCOURSE ON THE COMMENTARIAL CHAPTER

Now has arrived the turn of explaining the Commentarial Chapter placed immediately after the chapter of the Summary. But why has this chapter come to be called Commentarial ? Because it is established by elucidating the meaning of the three Piṭakas, the Buddha's Word. For the special doctrine which does not come in the three Piṭakas, being defined and determined by the Commentarial Chapter, becomes well determined. It behoves the Abhidhamma student who cannot note the method of procedure in the entire Abhidhamma Piṭaka, the framing of queries, and the numerical series in the Great Book¹ to compare or bring them together from the Commentarial Chapter only.

[410] Whence is its origin ? In Sāriputta the Elder. For Sāriputta spoke it and gave it to a pupil of his, who was unable to remember the elucidation in the chapter of the Summary. However, this account has been rejected in the Great Commentary, and the following account has been given:—What is known as Abhidhamma is not the province nor the sphere of a disciple; it is the province, the sphere of the Buddhas. And the Generalissimo of the Dhamma, being questioned by a fellow-student, took him to the Teacher's presence and told him. The Buddha uttered the Commentarial Chapter and gave it to that bhikkhu. How ? The Blessed One asked him, 'What states are moral ?' That is to say which do you mark as moral states ? Then the student remaining silent, he said, 'Have not I, in the method, "Which states are moral ? When a moral thought of the sensuous realm arises . . . ,"² shown moral consciousness as divided

¹ *Patthāna*.

² *Dhs. § 1.*

into planes ?¹ All that moral consciousness in the four planes he arranged point by point, group by group, cluster by cluster by that method: these are the moral states, etc., and gave it to him showing moral states, etc., by way of elucidation.

Herein 'in the four planes' means in the sensuous, material, immaterial realms and the unincluded. 'Moral':—i.e., such as the various kinds of contact, etc.—'these are the moral states,' all these states, such as contact, etc., named in these planes are moral.

But owing to the absence of division *qua* plane of immorality, the Blessed One said, 'twelve states of immoral consciousness'² wherein 'states' means risings. And this word 'consciousness' is the chief in the discourse. For, as when it is said, the king is come, the coming also of ministers, etc., is implied, so when 'state of consciousness' is said, states associated therewith also are implied. Hence it should be understood that in all places, consciousness together with the associated states has been taken by the expression 'state of consciousness.'

The meaning of all the following triplet and couplet classifiable terms such as 'results in the four planes,'³ and the non-definition of pleasure, etc., in the feeling triplet, etc., should be tested by the meaning of the Text by the said method and understood. [411] But we shall speak only of what is distinctive.

Among the triplets,⁴ first in that of the 'limited object,'⁵ there are these twenty-five states of consciousness which have limited objects:—

(1-10) The phrase 'all is result of the sensuous realm' refers to the twice-five cognitions which arise in dependence on the five organs of [special] sense concerning the five varieties of sense-objects. They proceed only by natural law⁶ and are divisible into the desired and the undesired.

(11, 12) Two mind-elements, the results of good and of bad

¹ Dhs. § 1368.

² Dhs. § 1369.

³ Dhs. § 1370.

⁴ Dhs. §§ 1368-1423.

⁵ Dhs. § 1406.

⁶ Niyamena, niyamato.

conduct severally, arise in dependence on the heart-basis, concerning the five varieties of sense-objects. They proceed by natural law immediately after visual and other sense cognition.

(13) The element of mind-cognition, having no root-conditions, being a result of good conduct and accompanied by joy, proceeds by way of examination in the five doors, and by way of registration in the six doors. It arises by natural law concerning the six varieties of limited objects, namely, sights, sounds, etc.

(14, 15) The two elements of mind-cognition having no root-conditions, being the results of good and bad conduct severally, and accompanied by neutral feeling, arise by way of examination in the five doors and by way of registration in the six doors. They arise by natural law concerning the six varieties of limited objects of sense. Proceeding by way of rebirth they have as mental object limited kamma, kamma-symbol, or tendency-symbol;¹ during life they proceed by way of the subconscious continuum, and at its end by way of decease they have just this as mental object.

(16-23) Eight risings of consciousness, results and with root-conditions, arise by the aforesaid method concerning limited things only, by way of registration and by way of rebirth, subconscious continuum, and decease.

(24) Inoperative² mind-element arises in the five doors concerning the five varieties of sense-objects.

(25) Inoperative element of mind-cognition, accompanied by joy, and without root-conditions arises in the six doors concerning such limited objects of sense as are present, and also in the mind-door concerning such as are past and future, making a mode of happiness for Arahants. Such are the twenty-five.

The states of the spheres of infinite consciousness and of neither perception nor non-perception, because they arise by making as object an attainment higher than themselves,

¹ Cf. *Compendium*, p. 149 f. (a, b, c).

² See p. 385.

take 'sublime objects.'¹ [412] Path states and Fruition states, from having Nibbāna as object, take an 'immeasurable object.'² Eight states of consciousness dissociated from knowledge, four being moral, four inoperative, occurring to probationers, average persons, and Arahants, concerning such matters of sense-experience as careless³ giving, reflection, hearing of the Dhamma, take at the time of occurrence limited objects; at the time of considering the first Jhāna, etc., when they are exceedingly fit for practice, they take sublime objects; at the time of considering the concepts such as the device-symbol, etc., they take an undefinable object. Four states of consciousness associated with views as immoral take limited objects at the time when perverting [the truth] there is a being pleased with and delighted at the fifty-five states of sense-experience as implying a 'being' [or fixed entity]. In this way are they sublime in object at the time of occurrence by making the twenty-seven sublime objects the object. And some time they may have undefinable objects as at the time of occurrence with conceptual states as objects. The state of being limited, sublime, undefinable in object should be known as of states which, when they occur, are dissociated from views by virtue of one's being merely pleased with and delighted at those said states, [limited, sublime, and conceptual] as object; of states associated with aversion by virtue of grief; of states associated with doubt by virtue of not arriving at decision; of states accompanied by distraction by virtue of want of balance and calm. And of those [twenty kinds of consciousness] no state is able to arise making transcendental states the object; hence they do not have immeasurable objects.

Eight states of consciousness associated with knowledge, four being moral, four inoperative, have at the time of occurrence limited, sublime, and undefinable objects, by making as their object those aforesaid matters of sense-experience—a careless gift, reflection, hearing of the Dhamma on the part

¹ *Dhs.* § 1407.

² *Dhs.* § 1408.

³ Asakkacca, since saints have calmed all anxiety, all care.—*Tīkā*.

of probationers, average persons, and Arahants. But the state of having an immeasurable object of those eight kinds of consciousness associated with knowledge should be understood at the stage of adoption [in Jhāna], and when considering the transcendental state.

But that Fourth Jhāna of Rūpa-consciousness, as moral and inoperative, is of twelve modes, as follows:—(1) everywhere a vantage-point; (2) space-device; (3) light device; (4) divine states; (5) respiration; [413] (6) varieties of potency; (7) supernormal hearing; (8) thought-reading; (9) knowledge of destiny according to kamma; (10) supernormal sight; (11) reminiscence of former lives; (12) knowledge of the future. Of these (1) is Fourth Jhāna in the eight 'devices.' For inasmuch as Fourth Jhāna is the vantage-point for insight, superknowledge, cessation, the round of rebirth, it is called everywhere a vantage-point. (2) and (3) are vantage-points for insight, superknowledge, and round of rebirth, not for cessation. (4) and (5) are vantage-points for insight and the round of rebirths, but not for superknowledge or cessation.

In this connection the following are said to have an undefinable state as object:—tenfold device-Jhāna because it arises with the device-concept as its object; the divine states of Fourth Jhāna because they arise with the conception of a person as object; and breathing-exercise in Fourth Jhāna because it arises with a symbol as object.

The modes of potency of the Fourth Jhāna have limited and sublime states as objects. How? When one makes the body dependent on the mind, being desirous of going by means of an invisible body, the potency bends the body by the power of mind, inserts, places it in the sublime consciousness; then there is an object of mind obtained by exercise—thus there is a limited object, because the material body is the object. When one makes mind dependent on the body, being desirous of going by means of a visible body, the potency bends mind by the power of body, inserts, places the basic jhāna-consciousness in the material body; then the object of mind is obtained by exercise—thus from being the object of the sublime consciousness it has a sublime object.

Supernormal hearing of the Fourth Jhāna is certainly limited in object because it arises with sound as object.

Knowledge of others' thoughts has the limited, sublime, immeasurable for object. How? [414] It has a limited object at the time of one's knowing the sense-realm thoughts of others, a sublime object at the time of knowing thoughts of the Rūpa and Arūpa realms, and an immeasurable object at the time of knowing the Path and Fruition. And here among average persons, etc., the average man does not know the Stream-winner's thoughts, the Stream-winner does not know the Once-returner's thoughts—and so on up to the Arahant, who knows the thoughts of all beings. The person knows the thoughts of a lower person. Thus should this distinction be understood.

Knowledge of the destiny of one's actions has a limited object at the time of knowing action of the sensuous realm, and a sublime object at the time of knowing action of the Rūpa and Arūpa realms.

Supernormal vision verily has a limited object from having a material object.

Reminiscent knowledge of one's former lives has limited, sublime, immeasurable, undefinable objects. How? It has a limited object at the time of recollecting the aggregates of the sensuous realm, a sublime object at the time of recollecting aggregates of the Rūpa and Arūpa realms, an immeasurable object at the time of recollecting the Path cultivated and the Fruition realized by self or others in the past. 'The Buddhas in the past cultivated the Path, realized the Fruition, and entered Parinibbāna by the element of Nibbāna'—here also is an immeasurable object from reflecting on the Path, Fruition, and Nibbāna of the Buddhas who have cut off the round of rebirths. It has an undefinable object when one is recollecting such things as name, family, earth, sign, etc., in this way:—'In the past there was the Buddha Vipassī; [415] he had the city Bandhumatī. His father was king Bandhumā, his mother was Bandhumatī,' and so on.¹

¹ Cf. *Dialogues of the Buddha* ii. 13 f. (*Dīgha* ii. 6 f.).

And the same with knowledge of the future. It has a limited object at the time of knowing, *e.g.*, 'in future this man will be born in the sensuous realm,' and a sublime object at the time of knowing 'he will be born in the Rūpa or Arūpa realm,' and an immeasurable object at the time of knowing 'he will cultivate the Path, realize the Fruition, enter Parinibbāna by the element of Nibbāna,' and an undefinable object at the time of knowing name and family in this way:—in future there will be the Buddha Metteyya, his father will be the Brahmin Subrahmā, and his mother will be the Brahmani Brahnavatī.¹

The Arūpa realm and loss of the Intoxicants in Fourth Jhāna are to be discussed as they come in the Text.

Mind-door-adverting accompanied by indifference is the precursor of all these classes of moral, immoral, and inoperative consciousness; its variety of objects should be understood by the method given in such consciousness. But it certainly has a limited object at occurrence by virtue of determination being in the five doors. 'Three- and four-fold Jhāna of the Rūpa realm,'² etc., have undefinable objects owing to their occurring with the undefinable as limited, etc., for their object. For here Rūpa realms arise in connection with the earth-device, etc.; the sphere of infinite space arises in connection with space separated from any one of the nine devices, and the sphere of nothingness arises in connection with the separation of Arūpa consciousness.

In the triplet of Path-object³ the eight risings of consciousness associated with knowledge described at the beginning [of this work] have the Path for object when probationers and adepts are themselves reflecting on the Path penetrated. But owing to not being co-existent with the Path they are not conditioned by it; they are dominantly influenced by the Path by virtue of object-dominance when they are reflecting while paying regard to the Path as penetrated by themselves. They should not be said to have the Path for object and for

¹ Cf. *Anāgatavamsa*, ver. 96. *JPTS*, 1886, 50.

² *Dhs.* § 1408.

³ *Dhs.* § 1415. To be divided under three heads (in P.T.S. edition).

dominant influence when making any other states than the Path the object of their thought. 'The Four Ariyan Paths' are certainly 'conditioned by the Path' owing to the existence of condition associated with the Path and called the Path. They are 'dominantly influenced by the Path' sometimes by means of the dominant influence of co-existence at the time of cultivating the Path, energy [416] or investigation being made the chief; but they should not be said to be sometime dominantly influenced by the Path at the time of making any other unspecified state in conational consciousness the chief. The nine Jhānas, beginning with that which is everywhere a vantage-point in the twelve kinds of the Fourth Jhāna of the Rūpa realm, have not the Path for object, neither for condition nor for dominant influence. Knowledge of the thoughts of others, of one's former lives, of the future in the Fourth Jhāna has the Path for object at the time of knowing the Path-consciousness of the Ariyans; but from not being co-existent with the Path it is not conditioned by it, and from not arising out of regard for the Path, it is not dominantly influenced by it. And why? Does such knowledge have no regard for the Path? Nay, it is because of their being sublime. For all the world have regard for the king; but his parents do not have regard. For they do not rise from their seat on seeing him, do not raise their hands in homage; they call him just as when he was young. So these three kinds of knowledge, because they themselves are sublime, have no regard for the Path. The mind-door-adverting consciousness has the Path for object from being the precursor of reflection at the time of reflecting on the Path of Ariyans; but from being not co-existent with it, it is not conditioned by the Path, and from not arising out of regard for it, it is not dominantly influenced by the Path. Why does it not have regard? Because it has itself no condition, being base and foolish. Thus the whole world has regard for the king, yet retainers, such as his hunchbacks, dwarfs, and servants, from their own want of knowledge do not have regard like clever men. So this consciousness, because itself has no condition, and is base and foolish, has no regard for the Path. Moral thoughts, etc., dissociated

from knowledge, being void of knowledge, and having the transcendental state for object, do not get to the state of having the Path for object, etc.; they have only the undefinable for object.

[417] In the triplet of the past object¹ the states of the sphere of infinite consciousness and that of neither perception nor non-perception, because they arise with the past attainment above for object certainly have the past only for object. 'There are no future objects without connection' means that assuredly an individual or separate consciousness is never known to have a future object. But surely, it may be said, does not knowledge for the future have a future object, and does not knowledge of others' thoughts arise with a future object? They certainly do. But this knowledge of the future and of others' thoughts is never known as one separate consciousness; but, being taken with the Fourth Jhāna of the Rūpa realm, is mixed with other sublime thoughts. Hence it has been said, 'there are no future objects without connection.' Ten cognitions, three mind-elements, from arising about present sense-objects, etc., are known 'to have present objects.'²

In the term 'ten states of consciousness,' in the first place, eight have past objects when they occur with reference to kamma or a kamma-symbol at the time of taking conception among devas or men. And the same is true for the time of subconscious continuum and of decease also. But they take present objects at the time of taking conception with reference to the tendency-symbol, and subsequently at the time of subconscious continuum. Likewise when they occur by way of registration at the five doors. But they take past, future, or present objects when arising with reference to the object of apperceptions, which in the mind-door are past, future, or present objects. And the same with the element of mind-cognition which is a moral resultant, without root-conditions, and is accompanied by indifference. This is the case in the conception of such as are born-blind among men;

¹ *Dhs.* §§ 1417-19.

² *Dhs.* § 1418.

it has a present object by way of examining at the five doors also. This is the specific distinction here.

But examining accompanied by joy has a present object by way of examining and registration at the five doors, and like the conditioned resultant has past, future, and present objects by virtue of registration at the mind-door. But examining with an immoral resultant, and accompanied by indifference, is similar in course to examining which is a moral resultant, and is accompanied by indifference. [418] For the former only arises to denizens of purgatory by way of rebirth, subconscious continuum, decease. This is the specific distinction here. The mind-door advertiring, accompanied by joy, has a present object making laughter at the five sense-doors of Arahants, and has past, future, and present objects when occurring by virtue of causing laughter with reference to states differentiated as past, etc.

In the phrase 'sensuous moral consciousness,' etc., so far four states of consciousness associated with knowledge¹ have, as moral, past, future, and present objects for probationers and average persons when these are contemplating the different kinds of past things such as aggregates, elements, sense-organs, and have undefinable objects at the moment when concepts and Nibbāna are contemplated. And the same is true with states dissociated from knowledge. For there is no consideration of the Path, Fruition, and Nibbāna by them. This is the specific distinction.

In the phrase 'four risings of consciousness associated with opinions,'² such states, as immoral, have past, present, future objects when taking pleasure and delight in, and perversely grasping such things, past, present, future, as aggregates, elements, sense-organs. They have undefinable objects when one takes pleasure and delight in, and perversely grasps the term-and-concept of 'person.' This is true also of risings dissociated with opinions; for it is not merely they which perversely seize.

The 'two risings of consciousness associated with aversion'³

¹ Dhs. § 1415.

² Dhs. § 1412.

³ Ib.

have past, present, future objects in the case of persons grieved about things in time, and undefinable objects in the case of persons who are grieved about term-and-concept of such objects-in-time.

The phrases, 'associated with doubt,' and 'with distraction,'¹ have past, future, present objects at occurrence owing to their not having reached decision in those states, and owing to excitement. The eight risings of consciousness with root-conditions, as inoperative, are similar in course to moral states of consciousness. Mind-door-adverting accompanied by indifference has a present object at occurrence by way of determining, [419] and past, future, present, undefinable objects at the time of being the precursor to apperceptions having past, future, present objects; it has term-and-concept and Nibbāna as object in the mind-door.

These five, viz., that which is the basis of all, space-device, light-device, divine states, respiration-exercise, in the Jhāna of the Rūpa realm, different kinds of which have been mentioned, have an undefinable object. Variety of potency of the Fourth Jhāna has a past object because of its arising with reference to the past basic Jhāna-consciousness for one who bends his mind by means of the body.

There is a future object to those who are resolving on a future thing, as in the case of such elders as Mahākassapa on disposing of the Buddha's relics. For Mahākassapa the Elder in depositing the Buddha's relics made a resolve, 'For two hundred and eighteen years to come may these perfumes not dry up, these flowers not fade, these lamps not go out';² and all happened accordingly. Assagutta the Elder,³ seeing the clergy at the Vattaniya monastery eating dry food without curry, resolved: 'Daily may the pond before meals be tasty as milk curds'; and it became as the taste of curds before meals and natural after meals. And there is a present object which arises with reference to the body, at the time of going by an invisible body making it dependent on the mind, [or of showing any other miracle].⁴

¹ *Dhs.* § 1414.

² Cf. *Dialogues* ii. 185.

³ Cf. *Milinda* i. 11.

⁴ P.T.S. ed. omits.

Supernormal hearing of the Fourth Jhāna has a present object when it arises with reference to an actual sound. Knowledge of others' thoughts of the Fourth Jhāna has past and future objects for one who knows the thoughts of others within seven days in the past, within seven days in the future, but is unable to know them when seven days expire, because such knowledge of others' thoughts after seven days is the province of knowledge of the past and of the future. And it has a present object at the time of knowing the present.

[420] This present is threefold: momentary, continuous, durational. Of these, that kind of state which has reached genesis, development, and disruption is the momentary present. That which is included in one or two continuous intervals is the continuous present. This is when an object does not at first become evident to one who goes to the light after having sat in darkness. The [material or immaterial¹] continuity which occurs until it becomes manifest should be understood as one, or two continuous intervals. Matter also is not manifest at once to one who enters a room after having walked in the light. The [material or immaterial¹] continuity which occurs until that is manifest should be known as one or two continuous intervals. And to one who stands afar, and who nevertheless sees the change in the hands of dyers, and in the reverberation of bells, drums, etc., the [material or immaterial¹] continuity which occurs until the sound is heard should be known as one or two continuous intervals. So say the reciters of the Majjhima-Nikāya.

But the reciters of the Samyutta-Nikāya, saying that there are two distinct continuities:—(1) the material continuity is when the ripples of the water stepped into by one crossing to the bank have not settled down, or when, after a journey the heat of the body has not subsided, or when to one coming out of the glare into a room, the gloom is not yet dispelled, or when after being occupied with religious exercise in a room, one looks out of the window during the day and the quivering of the eyes has not subsided, but (2) the two or three appercep-

¹ P.T.S. ed. omits.

tive intervals are immaterial continuity—maintain that both are a continuous present.

And the kind of state limited by one existence is called the durational present, concerning which it was said [by the Blessed One] in the Bhaddekaratta Sutta:—‘Friend, the mind and associated ideas that there are, are both called present; in just that “present,” consciousness is bound with passionate desire. Because of consciousness being so bound, mind takes delight in the present. So delighting it is drawn into present things.’¹ [421] The continuous present is accepted in the Commentaries; the durational present, in the Suttas. Of the three presents some say that the momentary present is the object of knowledge of others’ thoughts. Why? Because in a person with potency and another person a thought will arise simultaneously.

And this is the simile:—just as a handful of flowers is thrown into the air, one flower-cluster is sure to pierce another, stalk by stalk, so I know another’s mind. Thus when people’s minds are considered as a group, mind of one is sure to be pierced by another mind at the moment of genesis, development, or disruption. But this has been rejected in the Commentaries as improper, owing to the absence of coincidence in both minds by which one reflects and knows when reflecting even for a hundred and a thousand years, and owing to faultiness in reaching the state of a variety of objects.

And the continuous and the durational present should be known as the object of knowledge of others’ thoughts. Of these two, all that consciousness which is another person’s at the time of having the measure of two or three apperceptional processes by virtue of the past and future from the existing apperceptional process is called the continuous present.

The saying in the Commentary, that present time should be shown by means of an apperceptional interval has been well said. Wherein this is the explanation: a person of potency desirous of knowing another’s mind reflects. The mind-door-adverting consciousness, making the momentary

¹ *Majjhima* iii. 197.

present its object together with the other's mind, ceases. Subsequently there takes place four or five apperceptions, the last of which is the potency-consciousness.¹ The remaining [third and fourth apperceptions] are of sensuous-realm consciousness. Of all these that which has ceased is the object, but the others have not different objects; and why? Because they have a present object by virtue of present time. When there is oneness of object, of all apperceptions the potency-consciousness knows the mind of another, but the others do not. As in the eye-door visual cognition only sees the visible object and other cognition, such as adverting does not see it, so this knowledge of others' thoughts has a present thought by virtue of continuous present and present time. [422] Or, because the continuous present also falls into present time only, therefore by virtue of present time only this knowledge of others' thoughts should be known as having a present object.

Knowledge of one's former lives of the Fourth Jhāna has an undefinable object in the recollection of name and family, and in the consideration of Nibbāna and symbol; it has a past object in the remaining time. Knowledge of the destiny of one's actions of the Fourth Jhāna has a past object. Therein although knowledge of former lives and of others' thoughts also have past objects, yet of them the past aggregates of the former lives and name and family which are bound with the aggregates are not known as object. Indeed, this knowledge of former lives in these past aggregates and states bound therewith is similar in course to omniscience. And of the other knowledge the thought past the limit of seven days is the object. For it does not know another aggregate or what is bound with aggregate. But it is said to have the Path for object by way of explanation from having as object the mind associated with the Path. And only the past volition of knowledge of the destiny of one's actions is the object. This should be known as the specific distinction. This herein is the method of the Commentary. Yet because it

¹ I.e., Rūpa-consciousness.—Ed.

is said in the *Pathāna*: 'The moral aggregates are the cause by way of object; causal relation of the knowledge of the varieties of potency, of others' thoughts, of former lives, of the destiny of actions, of the future,' therefore the four aggregates are the object of knowledge of others' thoughts and of the destiny of actions. There also of this last knowledge moralities and immoralities are the object.

Supernormal vision of the Fourth Jhāna has a present object from having for object an actual form or colour.

Knowledge of the future of the Fourth Jhāna has a future object, and indeed in the future aggregate and aggregate-bound is similar in course to omniscient-like knowledge of former lives. Of them although knowledge of others' thoughts has a future object, it makes only the thought arising within seven days the object. [423] This knowledge of the future takes for object the arising thought, aggregates, states bound with aggregates, for one hundred thousand cosmic periods in the future.

The 'threefold and fourfold Jhāna of the Rūpa realm,'¹ because they do not arise with reference to even a single thing in the past, future, or present, have verily an undefinable object.

In the 'personal' triplet,² as that state which is bound to the controlling faculty is subjective-personal, even though, in another person's continuity it would be called external, so the [given] state is not in any way personal when not bound to the controlling faculty and external to matter and to Nibbāna. Hence it is said to be external because there is no way of explaining it as subjective-personal, and not because the subjective-personal just does not come to pass. And in this triplet of the 'personal object,'³ it is with reference to just this not coming to pass of the subjective-personal that the state of having an external object is mentioned. The phrase 'the sphere of nothingness has an undefinable and also a personal object'⁴ is said without acquiescence in the personal,

¹ *Dhs.* § 1418.

² Or 'subjective,' etc., triplet. *Dhs.* § 1419.

³ *Ib.*

⁴ *Dhs.* § 1420.

external, or personal-external state of the object of the sphere of nothingness merely because the personal state has ceased. Therein not only the Jhāna of the sphere of nothingness has an undefinable object, but also its advertинг, its access-thoughts, its object-reconsidering thoughts, its immoral thoughts, proceeding by way of enjoying its object, have undefinable objects. But all these are named along with it, hence they have not been taken separately. How, then, are they taken? This sphere of nothingness, and that consciousness which, as its precursor, arises and proceeds by way of advertинг, access, etc., should have one object together with it. All that consciousness is said to have an undefinable object, because [firstly] the undefinable state of the object is *granted* by such a method as this: 'Sometimes these risings of consciousness said, in the triplet of the "past object," to be the moral consciousness in the realm of sense, the immoral consciousness, the nine states of consciousness as inoperative, the fourth Jhāna of the Rūpa realm may not be said to have even a past object,' and [secondly] because it is *explicitly* stated thus: 'Of the sphere of nothingness the sphere itself, the four unincluded Paths and the four Fruitions—these states have an undefinable past object.'

[424] Now because the undefinableness of the object of the moral consciousness in the realm of sense, etc., has been mentioned above in the triplet of the 'past object'¹ with reference to their having one object together with the sphere of nothingness, therefore this last Jhāna, though spoken of in the triplet of the personal object as single, shows, here also, the undefinableness of the object of the moral consciousness in the realm of sense, etc.² For, is there any obstacle to these states of consciousness, which have one object, together with that Jhāna, in having an undefinable object? It is in this way, when this Jhāna is mentioned, that the advertинг and other states are implied.

The rest herein is plain in meaning from the Pali. But in the classification according to object, these [two] Jhāna-

¹ Dhs. § 1417.

² Dhs. § 1419.

spheres: infinite consciousness and neither perception nor non-perception, should be considered as having a personal object because they proceed as moral, resultant, inoperative, with reference to the [next] lower attainment of the six geneses of consciousness, bound up with their own continuity.

Among them the inoperative sphere of infinite space is the object only of the inoperative sphere of infinite consciousness and not of the other [moral, resultant sphere of infinite consciousness]. Why? Because of the absence of a moral resultant sphere of infinite consciousness to one endowed with the inoperative sphere of infinite space. But the moral sphere of infinite space is the object of the threefold sphere of infinite consciousness, moral, resultant, and inoperative. And why? Because of the arising and becoming of the threefold sphere of infinite consciousness above that of the infinite space of one who has produced it. And the resultant sphere of infinite space is not the object of any thought of the sphere of infinite consciousness; and why? Because of the thought not being brought forward after rising from the resultant. And the same with making the sphere of nothingness, moral and inoperative the object of that of neither perception nor non-perception.

All the threefold and fourfold Jhānas of the Rūpa realm, etc., should be considered as having an external object, because they proceed with reference to external earth and other 'devices' (*kasina*) external to the subjective-personal. In connection with the passage 'all sensuous, moral, immoral, unmoral states, the Fourth Jhāna of the Rūpa-realm'¹ . . . four states of consciousness associated with knowledge as moral, have personal objects for one who is reflecting on his own body and mind,² external objects for one who is reflecting on another's body and mind, or is reflecting on concepts and Nibbāna, and subjective-external objects for one who is reflecting on both. The same method should be understood in the case of states of consciousness dissociated with knowledge. In none of these is there reflection on Nibbāna [425].

¹ Dhs. § 1420.

² Khandhādīni, lit. aggregates, etc.

Four risings of consciousness associated with dogmatism as immoral have personal objects when [the conscious subject] is enjoying, taking delight in, and wrongly handling [the idea of] his own body and mind, external objects when [the idea of] body and mind of another are so enjoyed, etc.; or matter, 'device,' etc., not bound up with the controlling faculty; and subjective-external objects when enjoying, etc., both. And the same method should be understood when the states of consciousness are dissociated with dogmatism. For here there is no wrong handling.

'Two states associated with aversion'¹ have personal objects when the subject is depressed about his own body and mind, external objects when depressed about another's body and mind, or matter, concepts, etc., not bound up with controlling faculty, and subjective-external objects when depressed about both.

'States associated with perplexity and excitement'² should be considered as having a personal object; proceeding by way of doubting and wavering among those different kinds already mentioned.

Thirteen risings of consciousness, to wit, twice five [sense-] cognitions and three mental elements, have a personal object when proceeding with reference to their own material qualities, etc., and an external object when the qualities of another are concerned, and a subjective-external object when concerned with both. The element of mind-cognition without root-conditions and accompanied by joy has a personal object when proceeding with reference to its own five material states, etc., by examining, registration at the five doors and to other personal sensuous states by way of registration at the mind-door; it has an external object when proceeding with reference to the states of another person, and a subjective-personal object when referring to both. The same is valid for the twofold element of mind-cognition without root-conditions, a resultant and accompanied by indifference. It is only these [two classes of consciousness] which proceed in happy destiny

¹ *Dhs.* § 1421.

² *Dhs.* § 1426.

and evil destiny by way of reconception, subconscious continuum, and decease in actions classed as personal, etc. The eight main classes of resultant consciousness are similar in course to these two, but do not proceed solely as examining; they proceed in a happy rebirth by reconception, subconscious continuum, and decease.

Inoperative-consciousness without root-conditions accompanied by joy has a personal object when so proceeding as to cause mirth in connection with the subject's own material qualities, etc., at the five sense-doors, [420] an external object when proceeding similarly in connection with those of another; further, it has a personal object when proceeding so as to cause mirth in the Tathāgata in connection with his own kamma, such as his actions when he was the youth Jotipāla, the king Makhādeva, the ascetic Kanha,¹ an external object when proceeding in connection with such actions as those of the queen Mallikā,² the minister Santati,³ the flower-seller Sumana,⁴ and a subjective-external object when proceeding in both such connections.

The element of mind-cognition without root-conditions, inoperative and accompanied by indifference, has a personal object when proceeding as determining at the five doors, and as adverting at the mind-door. The eight main classes of inoperative consciousness are similar in the above-named respect to the moral consciousness. But only these eight arise in Arahants; the moral eight arise in probationers and average persons. To this extent is there any difference.

The five Jhānas, having in the way above-stated a vantage-point everywhere in Fourth Jhāna, come also into this triplet, for in device, concept, symbol they have external objects.

The variety of potency of the Fourth Jhāna has a personal object because it makes one's own body and mind the object at the time of bending the mind by body, or body by mind, and at the time of itself creating forms such as a child's; has an external object at the time of manifesting externally

¹ See on all three above, p. 387.

² Jātaka, No. 415.

³ Dhammapada Commentary, iii. 78 f.

⁴ Ib. ii. 40 f.

elephants and horses and the like; and has a subjective-external object at procedure, sometimes personal, sometimes external. Supernormal hearing of the Fourth Jhāna has a personal object at the time of hearing its own internal sound and an external object at the time of hearing the sound of others, and a subjective-external object by way of (combining) both. Knowledge of others' thoughts of the Fourth Jhāna has an external object because it has others' thoughts for object; but there is no need for it to know its own thought. Knowledge of one's former lives of the Fourth Jhāna has a personal object when there is a recollecting of one's own individuality,¹ an external object when another's individuality is remembered, or matter not bound up with controlling faculty or the three concepts, and a subjective-external object when remembering in both ways.

[427] Supernormal sight in Fourth Jhāna has a personal object when anything is seen inwardly, an external object when seeing in the ordinary way, and a subjective-external object when seeing in both ways.

Awareness of the future in Fourth Jhāna has a personal object when there is a recollecting of one's own future individuality, an external object when another's future individuality is recollected, or matter not bound up with controlling faculty, and a subjective-external object when recollecting in both ways.

The reason why the sphere of nothingness has an undefinable object has been dealt with above.

In the exposition of the root-condition group,² the root-conditions are first shown: 'There are three moral conditions'; then their genesis is shown: 'They arise in the four moral planes.' In this way the explaining of the other groups should be understood.

In 'where two or three Intoxicants arise together'³ the co-origin of the Intoxicants in three ways should be understood. Therein, the Intoxicant of sensuality arises in one state of

¹ Khandhā

² Dhs. § 1424.

² Dhs. § 1448.

consciousness in two ways: by virtue of ignorance in the four dissociated from views, and, together with the Intoxicants of views and of ignorance, in those associated with views. The Intoxicant of existence arises in one state of consciousness in one way: together with the Intoxicant of ignorance in the four dissociated from views. And as in this expression the co-origin of Intoxicants is understood, so in 'where two or three Fetters arise together' the co-origin of Fetters may be tenfold.

Herein, 'sensual lust'¹ arises in one state of consciousness in four ways; 'aversion' in three ways; 'conceit' in one way; 'doubt, and lust for existence' arise in one state of consciousness likewise in one way. How? Sensual lust arises in one state of consciousness in four ways—with the Fetters of conceit and of ignorance, of views and of ignorance, of observance of rule and ritual and of ignorance, and of ignorance alone. Aversion arises in one state of consciousness in three ways,—with the Fetters of envy and of ignorance, of meanness and of ignorance, of ignorance alone. Conceit arises in one state of consciousness in one way with the Fetters of lust for existence and of ignorance. [428] And doubt also; for it arises with the Fetter of ignorance. And the same with lust for existence. Thus here two or three fetters arise together in one state of consciousness.

And in the Hindrance-group² also in that expression which has been said thus, 'where two or three Hindrances arise together' the co-origin of Hindrances in eight ways should be understood. For among them 'sensual desire' arises in one state of consciousness in two ways, 'ill-will' in four ways, 'excitement' in one way, 'doubt' also in one way. How? Sensual desire arises in one state of consciousness in two ways, with the Hindrances of excitement and of ignorance in classes of automatic consciousness and with the Hindrances of sloth-torpor, of excitement, and of ignorance in voluntary consciousness.

Why was 'two or three' said by way of the above classifica-

¹ Dhs. § 1460.

Dhs. § 1486.

tion? Because it is possible for even four Hindrances to arise together in one state of consciousness. 'Ill-will' arises in one state of consciousness in four ways,—with the Hindrances of excitement and of ignorance in automatic consciousness; of sloth-torpor, of excitement and of ignorance in non-automatic consciousness; of excitement, of worry, and of ignorance in automatic; and of sloth-torpor, of excitement, of worry, and of ignorance in non-automatic consciousness. And 'excitement' arises in one way with merely the Hindrance of ignorance. 'Doubt' arises together with the Hindrances of excitement and of ignorance.

In the Corruption-group,¹ in the expression 'where two or three Corruptions arise together,' in various places two or three Corruptions arise together with other Corruptions. Why? Because of the non-production of just two or three Corruptions in a single state of consciousness. Herein the co-origin of the Corruptions is in ten ways. For among them 'greed' arises in one state of consciousness in six ways, 'aversion' in two ways, 'delusion' also in two ways. How? Greed arises in one state of consciousness in six ways,—with delusion, excitement, shamelessness, recklessness of blame in automatic consciousness and in that dissociated from views; with delusion, sloth, excitement, shamelessness, fearlessness of blame in the non-automatic; with delusion, conceit, excitement, shamelessness, fearlessness of blame in the automatic; with delusion, conceit, sloth, excitement, shamelessness, fearlessness of blame in the non-automatic; with delusion, excitement, dogmatism, shamelessness, recklessness of blame in the consciousness associated with dogmatism and automatic; and with delusion, dogmatism, sloth, excitement, shamelessness, recklessness of blame in the non-automatic. And 'aversion' arises in two ways with delusion, excitement, shamelessness, recklessness of blame in the automatic; and with delusion, sloth, excitement, shamelessness, recklessness of blame in the non-automatic. And 'delusion' arises in two ways with doubt, excitement, shamelessness, recklessness

¹ *Dhs. § 1548.*

ness of blame in the doubt-associated; and with excitement, shamelessness, recklessness of blame in the excitement-associated. The rest everywhere is evident in meaning.

End of the explanation of the Commentarial Chapter of the Expositor, the Commentary on the Compendium of States.

Hither the Master of the world attained
 Expounding the fair Dhammasaṅgāni,
 Dividing it according to the names:—
 Mind, Matter, Exposition, Summary.
 But the interpreting thereof, which I
 Began by comprehension of the Truths
 Of Abhidhamma, is completed now
 And is by name called ATTHASĀLINĪ,
 Revealing truths not incompatible.
 Through the same merit which I have attained,
 Who fashioned it in nine and thirty texts
 Of recitations, that the holy Law
 May long abide, let all men understand
 The Law that bringeth blessing by the grace
 Of the Law's King, and let them thus attain
 Thro' pure and happy life Nibbāna's bliss
 Ineffable, from tears and sorrow free.
 Forever may the Law abide, by all
 Revered ! May rain in its due season fall !
 As good kings guarded all mankind of old,
 May the king guard mankind as his own son !

This Commentary, called the EXPOSITOR on the COMPENDIUM OF STATES, was made by the Elder, in whom are grouped together the immaculate and gentle virtues of precept and conduct, adorned by pure and exalted faith, understanding and energy, who is capable of diving into the depths of his own and other doctrines, endowed with keen intellect, replete with the ability of unhindered knowledge in the Teacher's religion,—the which is divided into three Piṭakas, together with the commentaries,—

a great grammarian, gifted with sweetness of speech, full of the virtues of sweetness, nobleness, issuing from the bliss born of the perfection of his acts, an unerring speaker like Sakka's thunderbolt not missing its mark, most excellent of speakers, a great poet, who is the ornament of the lineage of Elders resident at the Great Minster who are lamps in the lineage of the Elders, of well-established intelligence in the Law surpassing human law, and who is attended by analytical knowledge and adorned with such virtues as the sixfold super-knowledge, whose wisdom is very extensive and pure, who bears the name BUDDHAGHOSA given him by the Elders.

*While Buddha, the great name of the great Sage,
Pure-minded world-chief, in the world abides,
So long may this book live and show the way
Of wisdom's purity to noble sons
Who seek for liberation from the world.*

*By grace of this, the book I wrote,
Into Metteyya's presence am I come.
Within the Refuges established
Upon the Sāsana I take my stand.
May mother, father, teachers, they who wish me well
And they who do not, give me happy thanks
And long safeguard the merit I have won !¹*

*May there be success !
May there be welfare !*

¹ These last seven lines are not in the Burmese texts, but are in the P.T.S. edition, presumably transcribed from the three Sinhalese MSS. used by the editor. The allusion to Metteyya, as associated by a prophetic utterance with Buddhaghosa in the future (see Buddhaghosuppatti, p. 66) is of interest, and may be compared with the similar envoi at the end of the Visuddhi Magga. It is quite possible that we have here the author's coda to his book, so I have translated and inserted the lines. (The last two sentences are probably additions by a scribe.)—Ed.

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 saddo gatyattho.—*Madhusāra*.
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CORRIGENDA, ETC.

(Add to Corrigenda, Vol. I.: Page 32, line 4 from bottom *read fifteen for fourteen.*)

Page 299, note 1 *delete (a).*

Page 371, line 1 *delete non-.*

Page 395, line 15 *delete full stop.*

 " line 18 *insert full stop for comma.*

Page 452, line 5 *from below read Buddhas, silent for Buddhassi, lent.*

Page 470, *delete asterisk to Åsa.*

CATALOGUED.